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After discussing the Foundation's goals for the Tropical Disease Program (TDR)
assessment with the President and Director of Assessment, the project team reviewed
Foundation:
• Records, including Board of Trustees and Advisory Committee meeting minutes;
• Program plans and updates;
• TDR Program and aggregate Foundation program evaluations;
• Descriptions of major grants;
• Key memos; and
• A sample of site visit reports.
The team compiled aggregate Foundation grant funding information, and
reviewed written materials from the World Health Organization and pertinent tropical
medicine literature.  Members of the team attended a Foundation-supported TDR grantee
workshop on onchocerciasis held at Woods Hole, and a meeting on Public/Private
Partnerships held at Harvard University, featuring a case study of the International
Trachoma Initiative partnership.  Face to face and telephone interviews were held with 37
key informants, representing a broad cross-section of TDR stakeholders.  These included
several current and prior Board members and Presidents involved with the TDR Program,
TDR Program directors and staff, key grantees, numerous scientists and other highly
respected key informants from the tropical medicine and international health fields, and
representatives of public and private funding organizations and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) involved in tropical disease treatment and control efforts.
  A three-member advisory committee, with expertise in the three TDR disease
categories, international health, and philanthropy, advised on plans for the draft report
through a conference call with the assessment team and the Foundation's Director of
Assessment.  This group then reviewed the draft report and provided insight and
suggestions during a meeting held at the Foundation.  Feedback from this meeting, and




For a quarter century, from 1973 through 1998, the Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation devoted more than $90 million to the control of debilitating tropical diseases
that afflict millions of people worldwide.  The Foundation stayed the course with the
Tropical Disease Research (TDR) Program for 25 years, a remarkably rare event in
philanthropy.  Assessing what has been accomplished by the Program, relative to what
the Foundation set out to do, provides an opportunity to gauge the results of that
investment and to reflect on lessons learned along the way.  Although these lessons
derive from the Foundation's extensive international experience, they may help to inform
the Foundation's new domestic plans to strengthen the nation's capacity to assist young
people in impoverished communities to attain their full potential.  They also may prove
useful to any foundation involved in or considering support of health programs in
developing countries.
This assessment endeavors to place the decisions and approaches taken by the
TDR Program within the context of the emerging science and international health
controversies of the time.  These included polarized views about whether to focus on the
development and application of control measures versus investment in basic research and
vaccine development, on a single disease versus broad primary care integration, and on
strengthening in-country research capacity versus relying on developed countries'
perceived scientific dominance.
Overall, the assessment reveals that the Foundation created a major philanthropic
presence that fostered significant research progress in each of the three tropical diseases it
focused on, schistosomiasis (“schisto”), onchocerciasis (“oncho”) and trachoma. Among
the cadre of individuals and institutions comprising the TDR field, the Clark Foundation
was able to catalyze interest and momentum not only for these three areas but also for
tropical disease research as a whole.
xThrough the three disease-specific programs, as well as through the broader
Health of School Age Children (HSAC) Program undertaken late in the TDR experience,
Foundation investments yielded important gains in basic immunology research and
attracted a cohort of gifted new scientists and international health professionals into
tropical disease research.  Despite these impressive gains, the goal of developing an
effective vaccine for each of the three diseases proved elusive.  The Foundation and its
partner Pfizer, however, now face the real possibility of achieving significant control of
blinding trachoma by treatment with Pfizer's Zithromax®, surgery, behavioral, and
environmental measures.  This concerted approach is being undertaken through the
International Trachoma Initiative (ITI), an intermediary organization established through
a joint partnership between the Foundation and Pfizer.  This first intermediary
organization established by the Foundation is a promising model for Clark's newly
evolving strategy to strengthen institutions that are key to accelerating progress within
specific fields.
As a catalyst, the Foundation is also recognized as the major organizing force
behind the creation of the Essential National Health Research (ENHR) effort, undertaken
by multiple funders to lay out a blueprint for systematically addressing international
health research needs.  As a grantmaking innovator, the Foundation also can be credited
with pursuing a fundamentally entrepreneurial approach to grantmaking that is now
becoming widely emulated within the philanthropic field.  In all of its TDR programs, the
Foundation used this entrepreneurial orientation to identify and solve problems in highly
creative ways.
Development of an Initial Program Focus: Schistosomiasis
In selecting a focus for the Developing World Program (later renamed the TDR),
the Foundation defined its niche by way of a precise standard: Given the myriad problems
and enormous population at risk, which problem presented the best opportunity to make
a meaningful, rather than marginal, impact?  As one of the TDR Program directors
recently commented in regard to encouraging foundations to consider entering
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international health, "There are enormous opportunities in international health.  Rather
than shy away because you think the problems are just too numerous, you can select
anything that presents a reasonable opportunity for making an impact, and develop a
strong rationale for whatever you select.  The challenge is one of determining how to
intervene effectively, once you make that choice."
Thirteen potential program areas were identified and explored during 1973 and
1974; the Foundation selected tropical disease research as the opportunity most consistent
with its early interests, and eventually with its “mission” which evolved over time "to
improve conditions and opportunities for people who live in poor and disadvantaged
communities.”  Among the opportunities within the field of TDR, the Foundation
selected schistosomiasis, based in part on advice from scientific advisors.  Schisto, a
chronic, parasitic disease that affects the urinary and intestinal systems, causes serious
kidney and liver damage and can be fatal.  Scientific advisors to the TDR Program
recommended this focus because the disease was widespread, affecting approximately
200 million people worldwide, had garnered few resources from the research and funding
communities, and yet had some promising research already underway that could be built
upon.  The Foundation's $2 million in funding for a field that had an annual budget of $3
million afforded the Foundation an impressive debut into a significant role.
Committing $32.4 million over the next 20 years, the Foundation's goal was to
achieve effective control of schisto and its elimination as an important disease.  The
objectives were to determine whether immunity exists or can be induced in humans and,
if so, to develop a vaccine, develop safe and effective drugs, improve measures to
interrupt or reduce disease transmission, and assess the disease's economic and public
health significance to generate political will to control it.  The strategy involved
undertaking a broad-based, multidisciplinary attack, bringing leading scientists into the
planning as well as research activities, informing the field, and providing research grants
and other services to stimulate and facilitate research progress.
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The TDR Program's first director, Dr. Donald Hoffman, used his basic science
and management consulting expertise to implement a highly strategic planning approach
that established benchmarks and timeframes for achieving them.  Staff assessed the “state
of the science” of schistosomiasis, and then invested in the “components” deemed
essential to its growth, sustainability and eventual success.  These components included a
systematic plan to overcome technological and scientific barriers as they were
encountered.  Unusual in basic research funding and viewed with apprehension and
skepticism by some scientists, this approach was later credited with contributing to the
strategic planning efforts of WHO’s Special Programme for Research and Training in
Tropical Diseases (WHO/TDR) as well.
This entrepreneurial spirit also characterized the Program’s interactions with the
private sector.  The Clark TDR Program was unique in its efforts to spur drug
development for schisto through contracts with Parke-Davis, and to pursue patent
protection for grantee products, preempting even the National Institutes of Health's (NIH)
mandate for grantees to patent their work.  Patents are necessary to prevent cheaper
copies from being developed and sold, and this protection was vital to having industry
agree to take scientific innovations discovered by others and produce and market them.
First under Dr. Hoffman, then briefly under Dr. J. Stafford Lehman, and then
under Dr. Joseph Cook, the Foundation provided 691 grants to developed country
researchers between 1974 and 1994 for schisto immunology, vaccine and drug
development, and epidemiology and control.  The TDR Program also held workshops for
researchers and published the Schisto Update to keep the field informed. Additionally,
the TDR Program created a significant leadership role as a convening authority for other
foundations and international health organizations, as well as for the community of
tropical disease researchers.
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Factors Affecting the Program's Approach and Achievements
Describing the Schisto Program's achievements, and putting them into
perspective, requires viewing them within the scientific, regulatory and business factors
of the time, all of which affected the Program's trajectory.  During the 1970s, when the
Program was developed, the scientific and public health communities had been through
several cycles of elation and dashed hopes from various efforts to eradicate disease; the
cycle was then in its optimistic phase. The cycle first began early in the twentieth century
when the Rockefeller Foundation established commissions to eradicate hookworm world-
wide (1907) and yellow fever in the U.S. (1915); both failed and diminished the
popularity of eradication efforts for the next three decades. But, following the successful
elimination of malaria from specific regions and development of a stable vaccine for
smallpox, the notion that disease eradication was possible regained favor with public
health practitioners.  When, in the mid- to late-1950s, the WHO adopted the goals of
global malaria and smallpox eradication, optimism for eradication efforts was high (CDC
1993).
While the vaccine-based smallpox eradication campaign concluded successfully
in 1977, WHO’s malaria eradication effort failed due to a host of factors, including
mosquito and drug resistance and rising costs.  WHO’s failure with malaria—at a cost to
its funders and constituents of  $1.4 billion over ten years—renewed the climate of
skepticism for eradication campaigns.
It was not surprising, therefore, that in the early-mid 1970s the view of most
schisto experts was that multi-faceted interventions were needed to control schisto and its
transmission:  The reigning approaches included drug treatment, snail control and other
interventions to decrease water contact and to diminish contamination of potentially
infective waterways.  Recognizing the immense resources required to control schisto
through these approaches, however, some international program architects of the time
favored a “silver-bullet” approach.  Highly focused on a “single solution,” such
approaches were intended to balance the competing needs of effective health care
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provision and resource constraints1.
The field of molecular biology was just emerging in the 1970s and being applied
to immunology.  The scientific potential afforded by these techniques (hybridoma,
monoclonal antibody and recombinant DNA) created a climate of “immunologic
exuberance”; although the field was just getting underway, optimism was high that these
advances would help lead to vaccine development over time. The optimism for a schisto
vaccine, at the earliest stage of the TDR Program, arose within this climate as well as
from previous, more-or-less empiric successes in developing effective vaccines for
bacterial and viral diseases, such as DPT, polio, and others.
Ultimately, however, vaccine technology became viewed as the “silver-bullet” to
control schistosomiasis.  The necessary factors seemed within reach, given the known
characteristics of the disease, and a reasonable “scientific likelihood” conferred by the
new technologies.  A vaccine was viewed as preferable, given the complex nature of
alternative approaches to control (such as eliminating the intermediate snail hosts for the
parasite before it infects humans).
In spite of these scientific possibilities, the pharmaceutical industry's enthusiasm
for vaccine development--particularly those intended for the developing world—was on
the decline.  Several market and regulatory factors that precluded a sufficient return on
investment had dulled industry interest in tropical disease product development.
Together, these conditions created an opportunity—and some perceived an obligation--
for the private non-profit sector, including philanthropy, to step in.  While the 1970s had
witnessed few collaborations between the public and private sectors, two successful
models did exist.  One was the investment by the National Foundation for Infantile
Paralysis in the Salk polio vaccine, and the other was Planned Parenthood's early support
for birth control pill research.  The vacuum created by private industry withdrawal from
                                                          
1 Although the terminology differs slightly today, the debate between the relative merits of “horizontal”
(comprehensive, integrated services) and “vertical” (focused, single-disease) approaches continues.  Some critics
perceive that vertical programs have a “black hole” effect, drawing scarce resources away from comprehensive
services.  Both the vertical and horizontal approaches to human health and disease management have their respective
trade-offs however.
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much of vaccine development for the developing world provided an important niche for
Foundation efforts focused on schisto control.
Program Accomplishments
Program products were numerous and varied.  Although the Schisto Program did
not achieve its ultimate goal—to create a vaccine or drug to control schisto—strategic
investments advanced research that figures prominently in the current state of the field.
A 1984 assessment study found that Clark-funded researchers, while representing only
3% of all schisto authors cited by MEDLINE, had published 32% of the schisto
immunology articles published between 1970 and 1984; current tallies put the total
number of TDR articles by schisto grantees at about 270.  The Program cultivated other
communications strategies, such as the Schisto Update and workshops, which succeeded
in uniting field, clinical and bench researchers by keeping them informed of the latest
advances.
Two diagnostic techniques were developed as a result of TDR investments.  The
first, a radioimmunoassay, was never actually applied in the field owing to technical
limitations.  Epidemiology and control efforts were furthered through the development
and application of ultrasound as a valuable field tool for measuring disease with a non-
invasive technique.   Nonetheless, some experts  have questioned whether, in retrospect,
the Foundation had missed an opportunity by failing to develop a low-cost field
diagnostic tool to improve surveillance for both targeting treatment and assessing
outcomes.  Over the life of the Program, the focus of epidemiology and control efforts
narrowed to testing specific strategies, particularly targeting school age children.  This
later led to investments in integrated parasitic disease control efforts through the Health
of School Age Children Program, established in 1993.
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The Program's Exit from the Field
During the Schisto Program's life, two commercially developed drugs,
praziquantel and oxamniquine, became available to treat schisto.  Their availability,
combined with disappointing results in identifying promising vaccine candidates, lead to
the Board's decision in 1981 to phase out of drug development activities.  The Foundation
gradually phased-out between 1981 and 1994, creating a Schisto Vaccine Task Force as a
mechanism to continue to coordinate vaccine research into the future.
The Foundation’s carefully staged withdrawal from schisto was predicated on
several assumptions: (1) that development of the two drugs met the need for a simple and
effective chemotherapeutic means of control; (2) that further investment by the
Foundation in chemotherapy was no longer warranted except for treating resistant strains
of schisto; and (3) that the schisto vaccine research agenda would continue to move
forward under WHO's guidance.  Response from the field was as diverse as the field
itself; some researchers accepted the Foundation’s rationale for moving out of schisto and
into other areas while others indicated that the loss of such a major player created a
vacuum of resources, and most importantly, leadership in the field.
Development of the Onchocerciasis and Trachoma Programs
In seeking to maintain a “niche” position for itself among the modest fellowship
of U.S.-based international health funders, the Board requested in 1981 that staff explore
new opportunities for the TDR Program using funds reallocated from schisto drug
development grantmaking.  After examining several disease possibilities, TDR Program




Oncho is a blinding parasitic disease transmitted by black flies that breed in
flowing water; it is usually referred to as River Blindness.  If afflicts about 18 million
people, most of them in Africa.  The Onchocerciasis Program, running from 1985
through 1998, was solely focused on immunology and vaccine development.  Utilizing
what staff coined a “rifle-shot approach” the Oncho Program built upon the lessons
learned from its predecessor, the Schisto Program.  Expending $21.5 million over 13
years, the Oncho Program utilized many of the processes initially developed for the
Schisto Program, including workshops and a Task Force. A major new innovation,
though, was the development of research resource "banks" for grantees that supplied
needed biological materials and reagents, and DNA "libraries", essential to basic research
and vaccine development.
Oncho Program Outcomes
Development of an oncho vaccine was particularly vexing because researchers
had to separate antigens that might confer protection from those that might actually
precipitate the disease.  Oncho researchers collaborated extensively within and across
four interrelated research areas, coordinated through the Oncho Vaccine Task Force.  In
contrast to the schisto vaccine research effort where the Task Force became part of the
exit strategy, however, the Oncho Task Force orchestrated a highly interactive
collaboration throughout the life of the Program.  As in schisto, no vaccine was
developed.  But, the strategy yielded other products that helped to advance future
research, particularly related to developing a greater understanding of host immune
response.  As with schisto, Clark’s investments successfully raised the profile of oncho
research by attracting and maintaining a cadre of top-notch researchers to the field.
According to the one formal evaluation undertaken for the TDR Program in 1994, the
Oncho Program can be credited with stimulating a five-fold increase in the number of
labs conducting oncho research.  The Program produced 50 antigens for vaccine testing,
constructed four DNA libraries to support further genomic research, and established a
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large communications network that encompasses new worldwide-web based and
traditional media (Hoffman 1994).
Throughout the 13-year Program, staff identified the risks associated with such a
tightly honed strategy, in the form of opportunity costs. The first option foregone was an
investment in a biochemical approach to disease control through the development of a
drug to kill adult worms (a macrofilaricide).  This was a research opportunity that the
WHO had chosen to pursue.  The second option foregone related to involvement with the
Mectizan Donation Program, established by Merck Pharmaceuticals in 1987.  Merck
committed to donate Mectizan for the treatment of onchocerciasis through this program.
This unprecedented commitment by Merck focused attention on the rationale for the
Oncho Program's continued pursuit of a vaccine.  Of chief concern to the Advisors, staff
and Board, was whether the availability of Mectizan as an effective and low cost means
of control “made the rationale for the vaccine program less compelling.”   TDR staff and
Advisory Committee members concluded that “a vaccine to prevent infection still
presents the best long-term solution and that the prospects for a vaccine justify our
continued investment.”
Exiting Oncho
By 1994, even though some promising vaccine candidates had been identified,
development was viewed as not imminently attainable despite its progress.  Nonetheless,
the 1994 Oncho Program evaluation had found that the TDR Program's efforts had
moved the field sufficiently forward in terms of basic science and competitive edge that
continued productivity and sustainability for oncho vaccine research was likely.  The
Board approved a recommendation by staff to close out the Oncho Program, and the
Program’s final awards were granted in 1998.
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Trachoma Program Development
The Trachoma Program was developed simultaneously with the Onchocerciasis
Program.  Trachoma is the world's leading cause of preventable blindness. With some
600 million people at risk worldwide, about 150 million have the infection, perhaps six
million of whom have become blind.  A chronic progressive disease in children, it is
acquired from infection by the chlamydia bacteria that is prevalent in areas characterized
by poverty, inadequate sanitation, and poor hygiene. Later in life, it causes eye
inflammation that can lead to scarring of the eye directly and through in-turned
eyelashes; this scarring may eventually cause blindness.
While the Trachoma Program strategy followed naturally from the Foundation’s
experience with the Schisto and Oncho Programs, it differed from these by encompassing
a broader scientific agenda; it included a significant focus on the behavioral and
environmental aspects of disease transmission and control.  Between 1983 and 1999, the
Foundation invested $28.1 million on trachoma immunology and vaccine development,
and epidemiology and disease control research.
Over time, as occurred in the other two disease programs, vaccine and drug
development efforts proved disappointing.  In contrast, the epidemiology and control
investments were more promising, yielding several important findings, including the
effectiveness of face washing as a preventive measure.  This prompted staff to
recommend a change in strategy to the Board: phase out of vaccine and drug efforts, and
concentrate on furthering progress through epidemiology and control.
Trachoma Program Achievements
Research efforts yielded a grading system that could be used to assess severity of
the disease under field conditions, verified the efficacy of using tarsal rotation surgery to
avert blindness due to in-turned eyelashes, and identified behavioral risk factors and
effective preventive measures for transmission.   Each accomplishment was significant
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alone, but even more so when later incorporated into a four-part strategy to prevent
blindness from trachoma. Coined “SAFE” (an acronym for Surgery, Antibiotics, Face
Washing, and Environment), the strategy was endorsed by the WHO in its efforts to
eliminate trachoma globally by the year 2020 (the “GET2020” Initiative).
Carrying Forward: The International Trachoma Initiative
A major breakthrough occurred in improving the effectiveness of this strategy
with the successful results achieved in clinical trials with Pfizer's antimicrobial drug,
Zithromax®.   The Foundation had been the catalyst in creating the clinical trials,
supported by Pfizer and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID).  Compelled by the success of the drug in treating blinding trachoma with a
single oral dose, Pfizer decided to establish a drug donation program in partnership with
the Foundation, through joint creation of an intermediary organization, the International
Trachoma Initiative.  The ITI, directed by former TDR director Dr. Cook, is dedicated to
eliminating blindness from trachoma using Zithromax® as part of the SAFE strategy.  It is
initiating this effort in highly focused interventions in five countries.
This not-for-profit/for-profit partnership's “intermediary” organization is designed
to carry forward the Foundation's commitment to tropical disease control by becoming a
self-sustaining organization through the appeal and compelling power of its purpose and
potential, raising funds from other public and private sources to implement the SAFE
strategy in developing nations.  As the first intermediary organization established by the
Foundation, ITI is a potential model for the Foundation’s hallmark future strategy of
creating and using intermediaries to help create the elements necessary to advance a field
and to strengthen the capacity of key organizations within fields.
Two Additional TDR Efforts
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the TDR Program expanded its focus beyond
schisto, oncho and trachoma into complementary international health efforts.  The first
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was an attempt to provide a broader, more integrated context for international health
research initiatives, a need Dr. Cook strongly promoted.  Through a $200,000 grant to the
International Development Research Council in Canada, the Independent Commission for
Health Research and Development was established.  The Commission’s mission was to
examine formally the opportunities and barriers for research in the developing world to
determine priorities and promote action among the key institutional and national players
in international health.
The Commission presented its report Health Research:  Essential Link to Equity
in Development, in 1990.  It contained four key recommendations relating to the core
issue of sustainable development, essential national health research.  The
recommendations helped to orient the Foundation’s subsequent efforts toward the
development of in-country health research resources (including technology and
workforce).  Well beyond its effect on the TDR Program, however, the Commission’s
work effectively created momentum within the field of international health toward
implementing the plans and approaches advanced in the report.
A subsequent Foundation grant of $200,000 supported further work on ENHR
opportunities in Africa through the Task Force for Health Research for Development,
which had been established to promote ENHR.  The Foundation's $400,000 investment,
combined with those from 11 other funders, created a long legacy.  Today, the
Commission’s work is carried out by the Council on Health Research for Development
(COHRED), based at the United Nations Development Programme office in Geneva
(COHRED 2000).
The second effort related to the three disease-specific programs was the Health of
School Age Children Program (HSAC).  Created in 1993 to focus on capacity-building
and operational research relevant to the health of school age children, it was guided by
several lessons learned in the three disease-specific programs.  First, there was an explicit
recognition of the need for integrated health services and the limitation of resources in
developing countries to provide them.  Second, experience demonstrated that informed
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decision-making and policy formulation required reliable and timely data.  Experience
with schisto and trachoma also supported the belief that programs designed and
implemented by host-country nationals were typically more successful and sustainable.
A final lesson drew upon the ENHR message gleaned from the Commission’s report that
developing countries must advance their capacity to conduct essential health research to
meet their own health care needs.
Between 1993 and 1998, the HSAC Program unfolded in Ghana and Tanzania,
expending $4.3 million.  The projects were not a success, and emphasized some of the
difficulties in undertaking in-country implementation efforts.  Nonetheless, the HSAC
Program is credited with putting “worm control” on the agenda of many funders.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the Program provided a critical learning opportunity
for the Foundation concerning in-country implementation and also drug pricing, both of
which would later prove useful in the Foundation's evolving partnership with Pfizer and
the ITI's five-country trachoma control initiative.
Lessons Learned
Several useful lessons have emerged from the TDR Program's 25 years of
experience.  Presentation and discussion of these lessons is undertaken with a healthy
respect for the maxim that “hindsight is always 20/20.”  As Mr. Emery cautioned, "trying
retrospectively to recreate the path from TDR to ITI as a map for the future would be like
cold fusion.  Serendipity played a role."
Although these lessons have arisen from an international program focus, and from
the relatively technical field of tropical disease research, they address some fundamental
aspects of grantmaking that may provide helpful insight for the Foundation's new
approach to helping to strengthen the field of youth development.  For the most part, they
can be distilled into six key elements.  A few examples are used within each to illustrate
the points.
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1. Strategic planning provided an essential framework.  It worked best,
however, when assumptions were made explicit, and when the planning
process was flexible enough to take advantage of opportunities and to adjust
to a constantly changing environment.
The strategic plans for each of the TDR programs served several essential
purposes.  They provided a focus and direction that oriented the Board, staff, and
grantees to the goals, objectives and means for each of the programs.  They also provided
a mechanism for scientific leaders to contribute to the planning process, and to share
"ownership" of the approach. Nonetheless, assumptions--both scientific and operational--
were not always made explicit.  This made it more difficult to challenge the
"conventional wisdom" and the assumptions underlying it, and to adjust the planning
accordingly.
• Scientists assumed that resistance to the drug praziquantel would occur over time
[diminishing the role of drug therapy in schisto control efforts].  This provided a
rationale for pursuing a schisto vaccine as essential to long-term disease control.
Resistance has not yet occurred to a significant degree, however.  It is unclear
whether this assumption was reexamined during the extended 13 year
commitment to vaccine development through 1994.
• While plans relied on the likelihood that industry would undertake further
development and production of vaccines once promising candidate antigens were
identified, this crucial assumption did not seem to have been investigated
explicitly.  NIAID is currently encountering difficulties in stimulating industry
interest in developing experimental vaccines to test the several antigens identified
to date, most of which were initially explored by Clark Foundation grantees.
• The projected timeline for vaccine development was estimated early in the
evolution of molecular biological and immunological tools.  It is not clear
whether a critical assessment of these tools' applicability to vaccine development
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was reevaluated over time as the complexity of the underlying basic science
became better understood.  Experience, such as that revealed by NASA's strategy
to land a man on the moon, suggests that a strategically directed research agenda
may work best when the essential scientific components are known and mainly
need to be coordinated. The TDR Program's directed approach was a much higher
risk since it appears to been ahead of the "readiness" of the science.
• Nonetheless, calculated risk-taking can pay a crucial role in philanthropy, which
has the "luxury" of resources regardless of program outcomes.  For instance, risk-
taking in the School Age Children's Program did not result in anticipated program
outcomes, but it did produce some unanticipated benefits when staff explored
prospects for a two-tier pricing system for SmithKline’s albendazole, the
recommended drug treatment.  The knowledge and experience gained through this
negotiation process was of tremendous advantage when the opportunity to
collaborate with Pfizer arose.  A foundation colleague summed it up aptly:  “In
the grantmaking business, if all your programs succeed, then you're not taking
enough risks.”
• Assumptions were made explicit in the “rifle shot” approach of the oncho vaccine
program.  Staff and the Board made the explicit decisions to pursue a narrowly
focused effort, which was a high risk/high yield approach.  Narrow approaches
run the risk of becoming a funding “sink-hole,” particularly for niche players, yet
unanticipated successes or even incremental products can justify the investment in
the end.
• Additionally, the Oncho Program's initial plan--which assumed that essential
research resources were available--was challenged by workshop participants.
This resulted in development of a highly coordinated research resource capacity
that has been credited with greatly accelerating progress on differentiating
protective from deleterious antigens.
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• The strategic updates late in the Trachoma Program reflected a plan to phase out
of the sole remaining area of epidemiology and control because research had
established the potential utility of the SAFE program, which was being
incorporated into the WHO's GET2020 Initiative.  Yet, TDR Program staff
recognized the exciting potential of Pfizer's Zithromax® to improve the antibiotic
component of the program, and rapidly and effectively catalyzed clinical trials
that demonstrated its superiority over existing products.  This ability to recognize
and foster opportunity, and the flexibility to adjust plans accordingly to coordinate
the trials and to establish a partnership with Pfizer, has been a striking advance for
the field.
• The Health of School Age Children Program was an attempt to merge the notion
of geographic focus, a domestic program theme, with the notion of helping to
build in-country capacity.  The Foundation assumed a shared theme among
domestic and international programs would work, however, this approach forced
artificial similarities that were not practical or in the best interests of the
participating countries.  Problems in developing necessary in-country
relationships and the support of major stakeholders emphasized the mismatch
between the Foundation's objectives and the countries' internal priorities.
2. Assessing, or "field testing" innovations to determine if they work in practice
provided vital feedback for refinements.
Undertaking development of disease control tools, such as drugs and diagnostic
agents, was most successful when it was followed by operations research to determine
optimal means for implementation.  This has critical implications for sustaining field-
building efforts.
• The rationale for developing a diagnostic tool for schisto was to improve
surveillance outcomes and targeting of treatment with praziquantel. But, the test
developed was underutilized, largely because the cost of praziquantel failed to
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decline to affordable levels, rendering the test irrelevant.  This and other
information on praziquantel did, however, lead the TDR Program to support
efforts to make a cheaper version of the drug.
• Operations research was used to assess the efficacy of surgery undertaken by
nurses in correcting trichiasis (inward-turning eyelashes) in trachoma, followed
by nurses training.  Subsequent studies have established the effectiveness of this
surgical intervention in preventing blindness from trachoma.
3. Formal, external evaluation was rarely used, and the TDR Program missed
an opportunity for information that might have helped guide or alter its
course.
The TDR Program did not involve evaluators prospectively, during program
design and implementation, and it appears that staff did not develop an explicit
understanding of whether, and if so how, desired outcomes were to be measured.  By
failing to define operational definitions of expected Program outcomes, it is likely that
grantees did not understand fully the criteria that would be used to determine if they
should continue to be funded.  Instead, the TDR Program used progress toward scientific
benchmarks.  While this provided critical information on tactics, it did not assess overall
direction and relevance within a changing environment.
• When scientific objectives were not met, there may have been a tendency to focus
on redefining means rather than on reassessing objectives.  In the one formal
evaluation undertaken, of the Oncho Program, outside evaluators' assessment
produced a shift in the Program's direction to concentrate on key areas of
opportunity that would advance the field and position it to garner competitive
funding from other sources as an exit strategy.
• The absence of formal evaluations places even greater reliance on post hoc
analyses of quantitative data reflecting the status of specific aims.  The process of
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an evaluation, however, can be valuable in revealing qualitative aspects that may
be otherwise overlooked.  Even simple outcomes analyses can provide useful
ongoing status updates, such as the schisto immunology literature review
conducted in 1986.  Although this report provided strong evidence of the
contribution of Foundation-funded grantees to the field's scientific literature, such
studies were rare.  Additionally, there was no explicit tracking and no attempt
made to count the number of new scientists attracted into tropical disease
research, even though this was an explicit objective of the TDR Program.
• Independent verification, through outside evaluations, can be an important adjunct
to information available to the Board to carry out its stewardship role, particularly
in highly technical fields.  Board members have relied upon the excellence of and
trust in the TDR Program directors, and on input from program advisors who are
recognized to have to balance their self-interest against "objectivity."  This
process is generally acknowledged to be imperfect but largely effective.  Program
evaluations will not perfect the situation, but would be additive.
• Planning and evaluation of the ITI’s activities is based, in part, upon
epidemiological data provided by each of the pilot sites.  Strategic plans should
include quality control measures to assure the availability and reliability of
necessary data.  Because the ITI is in an early stage of development, serious
consideration should be given to developing and undertaking a prospective
evaluation.
4.  With experience, the exit strategies became progressively better developed
and implemented.
Staff recognized over time that exit strategies were needed to help strengthen the
capacity of researchers to build upon Foundation-funded gains and to progress in the
absence of continued funding.  The ITI may represent the first exit strategy to identify
fully the factors that are both necessary and sufficient for continuing to progress toward
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the goal(s), and by determining feasible means to assist these efforts to become self-
sufficient.  As such, the ITI may provide an important model for the Foundation's newly
evolving institution-and-field building approach.
• While schisto researchers were grateful for the gradual withdrawal from the field,
the only mechanism developed to facilitate continued progress on a schisto
vaccine was establishment of the Schisto Vaccine Task Force and short-term
support to WHO to sponsor it.  This was insufficient to promote continued
progress.  NIAID and the European Union have continued to support schisto
vaccine research, but have not been successful in finding industry sponsors to
undertake development of promising antigens.  Thus, neither the public nor
private sectors has created conditions necessary to sustain the work.
• Lessons learned from the Schisto Program informed development of a strong exit
strategy for the Oncho Vaccine Development Program.  That Program's exit was
facilitated by its grounding in a progressively more tightly focused strategic plan,
and the early creation of mechanisms to produce and provide research resources
and to foster collaboration.  Nonetheless, the Foundation recognized that even
while these advantages would put the researchers in a stronger position to
compete for NIH funding, continued progress on an oncho vaccine was not
assured.  While in the short-term funding for oncho vaccine development will
decline, the potential for sustained progress is greater than it was for schisto.
Evidence of this includes newly created funding sources and organizational
linkages, current NIAID funding of key investigators, recent scientific
“breakthroughs,” and the exchange facilitated by the OnchoNet website.  It is
clear, however, that the ultimate goal of a safe and effective vaccine for human
use lies far in the future, and will be difficult to achieve (as with schisto), without
active participation of industry.
• Initially, the exit strategy for trachoma was similar.  For the vaccine work, the
strategy was to leave future research efforts to the NIAID where they might be
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incorporated into ongoing chlamydia research on genital tract and lung infections.
But with the promising early studies of Zithromax in treating trachoma, the exit
strategy took a major turn and focused on helping to establish the drug's efficacy
as part of the SAFE strategy.  It then progressed to development of a partnership
with Pfizer to design and implement a drug donation program as part of this
strategy.  This institution and field-building effort will become dependent on other
funding partners, on effectively managing complex relationships with a host of
international and in-country agencies and NGOs, and on continued commitment
of Pfizer to donate the drug for the long-term.  An assessment of these and other
factors necessary for sustaining progress toward trachoma control would be a
valuable contribution to the field of field building.
• For instance, the ITI has, in essence, “captured the field” by virtue of its exclusive
arrangement with Pfizer to utilize Zithromax  in the elimination of blinding
trachoma.  However, Pfizer will lose its worldwide patent for Zithromax in 2001
and its U.S. patent in 2005.  What are the long-term implications of these
eventualities for Pfizer's continued donation and for funding from other sources?
If necessary, will ITI have the funding to responsibly exit the field?
5.  Strong, clearly-defined working relationships were an essential hallmark of
successful TDR Program activities.
The TDR Program demonstrated that successful collaboration required knowing
the strengths, limitations, public perception, and culture of collaborating organizations,
and designing collaborations accordingly.  This has critical implications for institution-
and field-building strategies.  Providing pilot or small-scale grants to potential
collaborators was an often used and effective means for assessing their strengths and
limitations.
• Strategic alliances with the WHO were based on first-hand experience with
WHO’s Tropical Disease Research and Blindness Prevention Programmes, the
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context within which they operated, and on an understanding of which goals the
two organizations shared, or conversely, what unshared goals might be
complementary.  For instance, knowing the financial and political factors that
limited WHO/TDR’s long-term commitment to oncho vaccine development
created an opportunity for the Foundation that its colleagues at WHO welcomed.
• Pilot grants provided to collaborating organizations helped identify strengths that
were later called upon in larger scale efforts.  This included the NGO Helen
Keller International's expertise, flexibility, and strong networking in the field that
were revealed by earlier grants and later called upon to provide the initial home of
the ITI.  When establishing multi-party alliances, the TDR Program evidenced
knowledge of the partners' strengths, organizational capacity, and mission and
balanced these against weaknesses and potential conflicts.
• Important to the successful partnership with Pfizer in creating the ITI partnership
was a well-honed understanding of the shared goals of the two organizations, and
of an appreciation of one another's objectives and the rationale for these,
according to the recent Harvard Business School case study (Barrett, Austin,
McCarthy 2000).  As one Board member indicated, this partnership is predicated
on the common goal of preventing blindness from trachoma, and the economic
issues that usually contribute to the breakup of joint ventures is not likely to be
present.
• In contrast, in the Health of School Age Children's Program, the Foundation's lack
of understanding of the partners' capabilities, objectives and means of operations
hindered collaboration and limited the Program’s success.
6. The TDR Program's entrepreneurial approach to grantmaking sought to
create sustainable conditions, in the absence of a viable private sector
market, and this may stimulate ideas for working with industry to help build
capacity in other fields.
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• In one approach, the Foundation sought to "take matters into its own hands" by
supporting research on the development of a cheaper alternative to praziquantel
for treatment of schistosomiasis.
• In another approach, the Foundation developed its own industrial process, by
providing support to industry (Parke-Davis) to work on drug development
directed by the Foundation, and grants to academic institutions to carry out
carcinogenicity and animal testing functions that are an essential part of drug
development.
• The Foundation took out patents on grantee product therapeutic and diagnostic
innovations, to help facilitate industry willingness to further develop, produce and
market products by barring competition from cheaper copies.
• In the case of ITI, the Foundation first catalyzed the studies necessary to
demonstrate efficacy, and then developed a working partnership with Pfizer to
develop, coordinate and assess drug donation incorporated into the SAFE
strategy.  This latter approach may prove to be a hallmark in private sector for-
profit, not-for-profit ventures.
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Figure 1:  Tropical Disease Research Program Expenditures 1974-1999,
                 by Program Area
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I.  Introduction
It was during a return flight from earthquake-damaged Managua, Nicaragua in
1973 that the idea of a potential Foundation role in tropical disease research first took
root.  The notion arose as Donald Hoffman, Ph.D., the Foundation's new recruit in charge
of exploring international, and science and technology options, discussed possibilities
with Foundation President James (“Jim”) Henry.
The Foundation's interest was broad, "for the benefit of mankind,” which over
time became defined more specifically to improve conditions and opportunities for
people who live in poor and disadvantaged communities.  "We had decided to view the
option of the whole world,”  Dr. Hoffman (now a practicing MD pulmonary/critical care
specialist) recalled recently.  With a doctorate in biophysics, a minor in history, and
experience working in Tanzania for McKinsey Consulting on the government manu-
facturing sector's import/export issues, Dr. Hoffman had spent his first year at the
Foundation gathering data on potential international and science and technology
opportunities.
According to Dr. Hoffman, Mr. Henry's notion of how the Foundation should
function was key in orienting the exploration.  "Jim thought the Foundation should
leverage other resources, be a venture capitalist of ideas, hire broad generalist
consultant types, and use planning and audit to initiate and refine efforts over time.  John
Emery helped to define the guiding principles…Just as the Gates Foundation is now
using venture capital and setting out expected results in its international vaccine efforts,
Jim Henry operated under that philosophy thirty years ago."
"Originally, the Foundation did not seem interested in international grants--it
was too big.  But Avon was an international sales company…We had three outside
experts to critique and help us select among choices.  George Harar was one of the
advisors; he was an architect of the institutional structure that led to the Rockefeller
Foundation's Green Revolution.  Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank at the
2time, was another of the advisors, and wanted a role for the Foundation in world
population, but we couldn't find a leverage point…I presented several areas to them,
including an international disaster relief system, and an effort to improve the
effectiveness of management training in lesser developed countries, essentially to create
middle management…On the flight from Managua, Jim [Henry] and I decided
international health was too big an area.  But, tropical disease might not be.”
It was the early 1970s, and the prevalence of major tropical diseases had reached
more than one billion in the developing world.  In several instances, increases in
prevalence were an unintended consequence of development, for example large-scale
rural development projects having water resource components.  These new sources of
water for irrigation and hydroelectric power served also to enhance the transmission of
diseases such as schistosomiasis (“schisto”) and malaria.
While the Foundation also considered the other areas Dr. Hoffman had suggested,
including developing an emergency relief system, management training capacity in lesser
developed countries, and crafts as an economic growth vehicle for developing nations,
tropical disease research quickly emerged as the recommended direction.  According to
John Emery, a Trustee since the Foundation’s founding, "Since we had made the decision
to be involved in the international area, had a relatively small amount of funding to
devote to it, and had Dr. Hoffman on staff, health was a natural area that had potentially
high leverage possibilities.  The need was horrendous.  And the possibility of helping a
lot of people who were suffering from diseases, by investing a relatively small amount of
funding, was very attractive.”  Although some National Institutes of Health (NIH)
scientists discouraged Dr. Hoffman from pursuing a role in tropical disease research, he
saw potential.  “Leverage point analysis revealed that tropical disease was way under-
funded per capita.  Of the U.S. groups, only the military was providing sizeable funds for
pursuit of prevention and treatment product research, and developing countries did not
have an inside track to address issues of concern to them.  So, we came up with names of
people to advise us on tropical disease and on using a workshop mechanism, including
Ken Warren (Case Western Reserve), Tom Weller (Harvard School of Public Health and
a Nobel Laureate), Gordon Smith and George Nelson (London School of Tropical
3Medicine) and Herbert Giles (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine)… I developed a
strategic plan to present to scientists in the field, and got many of them out of joint by
it…My plan was to co-opt scientists into buying into planning, and to get their input so
they would help shape and have ownership in a specific plan.”
Dr. Hoffman convened a workshop in St. Lucia in 1974, and charged the
participants with determining which tropical disease to target, and subsequently with
helping to develop and maintain the strategic plan and research process, and with
providing oversight and technical guidance along the way.  The Department of Defense
was already spending $4 million annually on malaria.  “So, we chose schistosomiasis for
several reasons.  It was not so distant a goal as to be hopeless.  Research was already
underway (supported predominately by the Wellcome Trust and Medical Research
Council of Great Britain, and to a lesser extent the NIH) so there was already a good
cadre of researchers who were the nucleus.  Participants advocated emphasizing
epidemiology and parasitology.  I wanted to add molecular biology and immunology,
sciences of the future.”
With contributions from a range of scientists, the initial plan was expanded during
and following the St. Lucia meeting.  Some contributors, such as Dan Colley, Ph.D., a
promising immunologist at Vanderbilt University, urged that the plan be sufficiently
broad to enable Foundation staff and advisors flexibility in selecting areas to emphasize
over time.  He and others believed that care should be taken not to exclude promising
scientists and disciplines.
" I set out to apply modern business techniques to optimize our limited resources
to achieve the highest leveraging possible,” Dr. Hoffman recently commented, "and
initiated this with a strategic plan.  This was a departure from the funding mode of the
time used for supporting research, particularly for basic research.”  As the TDR
Program emerged and evolved over the subsequent 25 years, the Foundation contributed
nearly $90 million.  The Program was led first by Dr. Hoffman, then briefly under Dr. J.
Stauffer Lehman of Harvard, and for 20 years under Dr. Joseph (“Joe”) Cook.  Initially,
4and for the next seven years, it focused solely on schistosomiasis.  The TDR Program
was entrepreneurial in nature, seeking ways to stimulate investment by others, taking a
venture capital approach, and establishing a timetable for achieving specific scientific
benchmarks in the development of a vaccine to protect against schistosomiasis, drugs to
treat the disease, and epidemiological knowledge to provide a basis for the development
of rational control measures.
Program operations would fill the deficits in fundamental knowledge, appropriate
control tools, and planning efforts to solve the problem.  The TDR Program's roles were
to guide results-oriented research, attract “new research talent,” and to catalyze planning
and funding of schistosomiasis control by governments and international agencies.
In industry-like fashion, work was focused on specific scientific targets.  As
issues arose, entrepreneurial paths guided removal or circumvention of barriers.  For
instance, when research led to potential development of products, the Foundation took
out patents in collaboration with grantee universities.  Patents provided a 17-year period
of protection (extended recently to 20), blocking the marketing of any identical products
that could be sold more cheaply.  Seeking patents for products and/or their processes and
uses was highly unusual at the time for non-profit organizations, and preceded the NIH’s
policies in the early 1980s of encouraging researchers to patent their grant-supported
intellectual property.
Equally unusual was the Foundation’s support to industry, another entrepreneurial
tactic.  Parke-Davis received funds to undertake chemical synthesis of potential anti-
schistosomal agents. University researchers received funds to test the chemically
synthesized agents in mice, and to evaluate simple biologic systems for detecting
potential carcinogenic effects of antischistosomal agents.  Essentially, this established the
same type of development and testing process used by industrial firms.  Additionally, the
Foundation supported a survey of U.S. pharmaceutical companies engaged in tropical
disease research to determine the origin, regulatory histories and fates of all new drug
candidates tested in humans for tropical diseases.  This would help identify potential
5barriers that the Foundation would need to address in its efforts.  Another entrepreneurial
avenue was taken when an effective drug for treating schistosomiasis became available
but was too expensive for developing nations to purchase. The Foundation funded efforts
to develop a cheaper alternative.
Despite this highly entrepreneurial approach, the ultimate goal of developing a
schistosomiasis vaccine remained elusive and eventually the Foundation chose to exit the
field.  While Foundation-supported researchers contributed significantly to the field, a
cadre of new scientists were attracted into schistosomiasis research, and some important
products and processes were developed, the Foundation staff was concerned that they had
not created a mechanism for continuing progress in the absence of grant funds.
Entrepreneurialism also guided the Program's subsequent development of
initiatives in the mid-1980s to improve control of trachoma and onchocerciasis
(“oncho”), two leading causes of preventable blindness in the developing world.  During
efforts to develop a vaccine for oncho and a vaccine, drugs and epidemiological control
for trachoma, the TDR Program added another unusual practice, developing “resource
banks” for investigators.  For instance, as DNA technology progressed, the Foundation
developed a genetic tissue “library” for researchers to use in laboratory studies.  Oncho
researchers were able to obtain critical infective material from Foundation-supported
tissue banks when such materials were otherwise unavailable.  Nonetheless, as in schisto,
development of an oncho vaccine also proved elusive, and the Foundation exited the
field, leaving to others a number of research contributions and a well-functioning
consortium of scientific collaborators.
Through the Trachoma Program, the Foundation recently entered into a promising
entrepreneurial partnership with Pfizer.  The partnership is designed to enhance
implementation of the current strategy to eliminate blinding trachoma using Pfizer's
antibiotic, Zithromax®.  When Pfizer decided to donate Zithromax®, the two
organizations created a promising not-for-profit/for-profit “intermediary” organization,
the International Trachoma Initiative (ITI).  The intermediary is designed to marshal and
6coordinate efforts by others, carrying forward the Foundation’s trachoma commitment
through grant support intended to raise funds from other public and private sources to
implement the SAFE strategy in developing nations.  The SAFE strategy was developed
(largely as a result of Foundation research investments) “to address the medical,
behavioral, and environmental changes needed to control the disease:  Surgery to
correct trichiasis, Antibiotics to treat active disease, Face-washing to reduce
transmission, and Environmental changes to improve water supply and sanitation”
(StrategyMaker Associates, 1998).
ITI is the first intermediary organization established by the Foundation, and is a
potential model for the Foundation’s hallmark future strategy of creating and using
intermediaries to help create the elements necessary to advance a field and to strengthen
the capacity of key organizations within fields.  The ITI, under Dr. Cook’s leadership and
with support from the Foundation and Pfizer, is implementing the SAFE strategy in five
countries.  Pfizer is donating Zithromax®, and the ITI is coordinating all elements of the
strategy.
What created the need for this trachoma initiative intermediary? Largely, it is the
struggle by this (and other) foundation(s) to determine how to sustain their efforts after
they decide to exit from a field.  It cuts to the crux of the issue for foundations: How can
they help to create conditions that will sustain progress toward their goals (without
limitless funding) in the absence of a market response?
The lack of a market for products to prevent or control tropical diseases is
reflected in pharmaceutical industry-related data.  Africa, where tropical diseases
flourish, accounts for 1% of pharmaceutical world drug sales, while the United States,
Western Europe and Japan account for 80%.  Between 1975 and 1997 only 13 (1%) of
1,233 new patented medicines were for tropical diseases (McNeil 2000).
What created (s) the lack of a commercial market for vaccines and drugs for
diseases endemic in developing countries?  Largely, it has been attributed to four market-
7related factors that have stood to preclude a sufficient return on investment (ROI) on
these, and on many other, types of products.  One factor is higher research and
development (R&D) costs that resulted from legislation enacted in the 1960s that requires
manufacturers to demonstrate both safety and efficacy of drugs and vaccines.  A second
market-limiting factor is lack of patent protection, which leaves developers open to
competition from identical ("generic") copies that can be produced more cheaply.  Types
of unpatentable products include natural substances, shelf chemicals, and drugs already
“known to exist” (often through descriptions in the literature).  A third market limiting
factor is liability risks, and a fourth is distribution problems, especially for products
intended for use in developing countries.
Market Limiting Factors: Higher R&D Costs
The most significant among these four factors are the 1962 Amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.  Prior to the Amendments, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) only regulated drug safety, and moreover, it was the FDA’s
responsibility to demonstrate that a manufactured drug or vaccine was not safe.  The
Amendments required manufacturers to demonstrate that drugs were both safe and
effective before they could be sold in interstate commerce.
The Amendments strengthened greatly consumers’ access to quality (safe and
effective) products, but at a substantially increased cost to manufacturers and ultimately
to consumers through drug prices.  A casualty was a loss of interest in developing drugs
that were not expected to provide a decent ROI.  While pharmaceutical manufacturers
had become dependent back in the 1950s on producing a few market winners to generate
most profits, other products had to at least break even for firms to remain competitive.
Commenting on the situation in the mid-1970s, Dr. Barry Bloom, a vice-president
for research at Pfizer, said that industry had not been making research progress at a rate
commensurate with current knowledge and resources on major crippling and lethal
diseases, such as products for treating inflammatory diseases (which include some
8tropical parasitic diseases) (Bloom 1976).  R&D costs that had averaged about $17
million per product in 1973, when the TDR Program was just beginning, were estimated
at $54 million by 1976.  This included costs of drug candidate failures, opportunity costs
of not investing funds spent on R&D, and direct drug research and clinical testing costs
(Hanson 1980).  During the TDR Program’s 25-year history, industry cost estimates had
reached $235 million on average per new product (DiMasi 1991).
Another Market Limiting Factor: Patent Protection
Patent protection was the make or break issue when the National Cancer Institute
(NCI) set up a screening program in 1955 to try to interest industry in seeing whether any
of their chemicals might be effective against various forms of cancer, each one of which
represented a relatively small market.  In a dramatic demonstration of the critical role
patent protection played, only one company (Upjohn) participated until the NCI agreed
not to seek assignment of patent rights, and leave these solely to industry. Within a few
years of striking this deal, the program had grown to a $35 million industrial contract
operation (Zubrod 1968), and by 1982, the NCI had played a development role in
virtually every anti-cancer drug that had been marketed.
Even patented drugs intended for use primarily in some developing countries
faced a special obstacle, however. Several countries did not abide by international patent
protection laws, or recognized only patent protection for the process used to make the
drug but not for the drug itself.  In these instances, once the chemical composition of a
drug was determined, the drug could be copied locally, produced, and sold at a low price.
A largely successful effort to resolve this problem resulted in the 1994 Treaty on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (McNeil June 2000).
Vaccine Disincentives: Production, Liability and Distribution Barriers
Uncertain costs, liability risks, and distribution barriers have been especially
problematic for vaccines, leaving government (and a few foundations) to play a
9significant role in their development.  Barriers to industry vaccine development, as
summed up in a 1984 National Academy of Sciences assessment, include difficulties and
expenses in mounting large-scale human clinical trials, high production costs resulting
from the need for separate production facilities, difficult and expensive quality control
methods and monitoring, and highly challenging production problems (Widdus 1984).
Liability risks for vaccines are substantial, even for those primarily intended for
developing (and less litigious) nations. Insurance actuaries have difficulty rating the risk
of administering vaccine to large populations, and judicial rulings have established that
vaccine manufactures can be held liable for failure to adequately warn of risks or for
adverse effects that occur, even in the absence of negligence.  Vaccine distribution is also
vexing, especially in rural areas of developing countries, where transportation is often
uncoordinated, and storage, refrigeration, and availability of trained health workers to
administer vaccines are insufficient.  Add to these factors the anticipated low vaccine
sales revenue from nations with miniscule health budgets, and the coffin becomes sealed.
A 1979 Office of Technology Assessment report concluded that low profits,
coupled with extensive federal regulations and widely publicized liability cases, had
caused the number of vaccine manufacturers to drop precipitously from 37 to 18 from
1967 to 1979.  Only seven of these companies were actively producing vaccines in 1979,
when the Foundation's efforts in Schistosomiasis were in full swing, and just before the
Foundation began to look into additional areas to address.  Those seven companies were
Pfizer, Merck, Parke-Davis, Merrell-Dow, Cutter Laboratories, American Home Products
(Wyeth) and Lederle (OTA 1979).
 As the Director of the Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) Antiparasitic Drug
Service emphasized in a 1977 New England Journal of Medicine article, “Parasitic
diseases are the ‘cancers’ of developing nations, yet total international research
expenditures on tropical infectious disease was only $30 million U.S. dollars in 1975,
whereas one ‘developed’ country alone spends nine times that much on cancer research”
(Schultz 1977).  A World Health Organization (WHO) International Medical Sciences
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Roundtable at about that time reported that the possibility of developing suitable parasitic
disease vaccines had not been explored, although a degree of natural immunity was a
well-established sequel to infection (WHO 1978).
In part deriving from these issues, the federal government's role in vaccine
development dates back to the 1900s, when federally-funded scientists developed
vaccines for Rocky Mountain spotted fever and typhus, while industry developed
vaccines for cholera, plague, and rabies.  Over the years, the federal role has increased
significantly, with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and
the CDC becoming heavily involved in vaccine and immunobiologicals research in the
1970s.  This has led to improved vaccines for mumps, measles, hepatitis B, pneumonia,
and meningococcal A and B infections.
By 1982, when the Foundation was initiating efforts on trachoma and oncho
vaccines, NIAID had participated in 14 marketed vaccines or immunobiologicals and in
26 more still in research, including products for tropical diseases. During that same time,
the CDC had developed two immunobiologicals and was distributing 14 parasitic disease
drugs needed by people in the U.S., including returning travelers (Asbury 1985).
Legislation on Market Protection and Patenting
Drugs of limited commercial but great medical importance came to the attention
of Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Recognizing the many disincentives to
industry, but focusing specifically on products for diseases or conditions that are rare in
the United States, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act, signed into law in early 1983.
The law creates a seven-year period of market exclusivity for rare disease products, even
if they are not patentable, during which time no competitor can market an identical drug
for the same “orphan” condition.  The law also allows tax deductions for 50% of clinical
testing costs (Asbury 1985).  While the law has been associated with a six-fold increase
in drugs and biologicals marketed for rare diseases in the U.S. (Asbury in press), it did
not help alleviate disincentives for vaccines for developing nations.
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At about the same time (1980), Congress directed federally-funded researchers to
take out patents on their inventions or risk having the federal government assume the
intellectual property rights on those inventions.  The Bayh-Dole Act also required that
federally funded researchers license their patented inventions to industry to develop them
into marketed products.  The Act was designed to speed products from bench to bedside,
recognizing that industry alone was capable of turning inventions into mass produced
marketed products for the public. Unless these inventions were patented, however,
industry would not touch them and risk being undersold by competitors who could copy
and produce them at low cost.  In the practice of patenting and licensing, the Clark
Foundation had been way ahead of this curve.
Philanthropic Involvement
Within this lackluster market environment for development of drugs and vaccines
for “unprofitable” diseases and conditions, a few foundation precedents had occurred for
stimulating product development.  The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis
(NFIP) urged Dr. Jonas Salk to mount an intensive investigation into a polio vaccine,
based in part on promising work by NFIP-funded grantees (Schwartzman 1976).  Planned
Parenthood helped to support small-scale testing of progesterone as a birth control pill,
which led to large-scale trials of norethynodral (far more potent than oral progesterone)
supported by The G.D. Searle Company (Schwartzman 1976).  Similarly, in agricultural
advances needed by developing countries, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations had
jointly sponsored research in the late 1950s and early 1960s that led to the development
of new strains of wheat and rice that doubled and tripled production per acre (Porter and
Kramer 1999).
The Role of Philanthropy in the Absence of a Market
The notion that foundations step in when markets fail to create the conditions
necessary for industry involvement is an often-voiced view of the role of philanthropy.
As stated in a 1999 Harvard Business Review article, “Instead of competing in markets,
foundations are in the business of contributing to society by using scarce philanthropic
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resources to their maximum potential.  A foundation creates value when it achieves an
equivalent social benefit with fewer dollars or creates greater social benefit for
comparable cost.”  Later the article states, “Instead of funding research, many
foundations seek to promote innovation through seed grants that are designed to
establish and support specific new programs.  There is little benefit, however, in starting
new initiatives if they do not survive and grow.  Too often foundations…fail to support
the grantee over an appropriately long time span” (Porter and Kramer 1999).
How long is an appropriate time span?  What occurs during that time span that
creates conditions to sustain intended progress once a philanthropic organization leaves
the field? The conundrum of how to create the conditions to sustain the goals of
philanthropic efforts once a foundation moves out of a project, or a field, is the pivotal
dilemma foundations face in working on problems that do not have market potential.
This issue was raised directly in a 1989 Tropical Disease Research Program advisory
committee meeting by Trustee Sidney (Jim) Weinberg.  “The Foundation is doing what
the private sector is not doing, because the private sector is not doing it.  In the absence
of market forces, to guide planning and development of program goals, what is the
substitute for the directing forces of the market? What is the Foundation’s role?”
In reflecting on this dilemma recently, Mr. Weinberg elaborated.  “The quandary
is what a Foundation can do in the absence of a market.  The Foundation did its mission
with distinction.  They had good people.  The advisory committee had the best people in
the field.  They did the best that could be done among foundations that try to do those
things.  They did not try to avoid market correction.  Nobody ducked the issues.  But, it is
not as good as a power saw that will saw off an arm if it messes with the market.  They
had a long-term, sustainable commitment that takes guts.  The question is, what could the
Foundation do, given the mission?”
By implication, the tacit mission was to intercede in the absence of a market to
improve conditions for people living in poor communities.  “It is an unassailable
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positive, how to get at defining the mission to optimize the return on investment? But, it’s
a bottomless pit.  What will sustain the effort?
“Foundations could somehow try to work with the market, create a machine that
will function on its own, create a sustainable condition from an economic, scientific, and
operational viewpoint.  But there are an extremely complex number of variables that
incrementally complicate the situation.  So, in the end, it comes down to a celebration of
good intentions that is so powerful, and so good, that it has an overriding influence on
the condition that is needed to sustain the effort.”
For Mr. Weinberg, this issue of a foundation’s role in filling the void left by the
absence of a market is not confined to drug and vaccines for developing countries.  It is
inherent in the philanthropic mission itself.  “Look at other programs.  The Foundation’s
jail program used litigation, worked with good people.  But nothing more happened with
those efforts once the Foundation left the field.  Litigation doesn’t create a sustainable
condition.  Legislation does.”  When then Foundation President Peter Bell said in a 1989
TDR Advisory Committee meeting that the Foundation should get to a stage and then let
others pick up the torch, Mr. Weinberg responded that “letting others pick up the torch is
different than doing it ourselves.”  His point, he recently explained, is that if a foundation
does not create sustaining conditions, it is leaving to chance the likelihood that others will
intervene.  The question of how to achieve sustainable goals, in the absence of a market,
remains a major challenge for Clark and other foundations.  It is at the heart of the
Foundation’s new efforts to use grant funding to build institutions and fields, starting
with the ITI, the next promising stage of the Foundation’s efforts to control trachoma.
The entrepreneurial approach taken by the TDR Program over the years
emphasized determining what was needed and not otherwise available to pursue vaccine
and drug development, from research processes to patents, and devising means for
creating their availability.  In the Foundation's current parlance, this could be considered
an approach that was helping to build the field for tropical disease products. The
Foundation is now moving to a next stage.  It is seeking to enter a field strategically,
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determining at the outset what is needed to increase the capacity of institutions within a
field, and of a field in general, to continue to progress on their own.
In the 1998 Annual Report, Foundation President Michael Bailin began to outline
the opportunities and challenges of this explicit strategy.
“Historically, many foundations, including this one, have invested
more in the invention of new strategies and in the requisite research
and development that accompanies such invention than in the overall
productivity and strength of our nonprofit partners.  To right this
imbalance, I suggested last year that a more deliberate philanthropic
investment needed to be made—both of dollars and ideas—in the
organizational strengthening of our grantees and the strategic
cohesiveness of the fields in which we work…More and more, our
grants have come to reflect this added emphasis on institution- and
field-building...
“Applying those means, however, leads us into partly
uncharted terrain.  The model of the modern institution- and industry-
builder…is the venture capitalist, who has become in many circles a
favorite pattern for a more entrepreneurial style of philanthropy.
Yet… we’re unlikely to find our course as philanthropic institution-
and field-builders with the borrowed cartography of other industries.
We need a path that is distinctively philanthropic and yet is grounded
in the business disciplines that have built and advanced institutions,
technologies, and markets throughout the world.  That is not an
unreasonable standard, but it demands experimentation and it entails
some risks.
“Though these new approaches constitute a shift in emphasis,
they aren’t entirely new to us.  In fact, the most remarkable event of
1998 at this Foundation—the birth of the ITI—from decades of work in
our TDR Program—is a direct consequence of that program’s decade-
long effort to build a field of activity from disparate but related
disciplines of science, medicine, public health, diplomacy, and
philanthropy.
“We regard the ITI to be an essential, final, step in our work
on this subject.  The organizational health of the Initiative will be as
important an element of our TDR Program as were the years of
medical and social experimentation that brought us to this stage.  So,
the trachoma story, remarkable in itself, is also significant for the
insight it offers…in general: the critical work of research, invention,
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and innovation…is not complete until effective delivery mechanisms
are in place to turn new ideas into effective products and services that
make people's lives measurably better."
The Foundation has articulated a critical notion that institution- and field-building
are necessary to sustain the ability to improve lives through grant-supported efforts.  The
challenge for the Foundation, and the philanthropic field in general, will be to determine
if institution- and field-building are also sufficient for sustaining these efforts in the
absence of a viable market.  If not, there is more work ahead in wrestling with the
dilemma of how to create a sustainable condition in the absence of a market.  Put another
way, can philanthropy help to create favorable market conditions? Or, as Mr. Weinberg
suggested, can a Foundation develop ideas that are so powerful and so compelling that
they have an overriding influence on the condition?
In the chapters that follow, the history, trajectory, successes and lessons learned
from the TDR Program are described within the context of this dilemma, in the hopes that
it will be useful to the Foundation in its efforts to reach this new stage of strategic
grantmaking toward sustainable futures.
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II.  The Schistosomiasis Program ($32.4 million, 1974-1994)
a.  Historical Overview of Schistosomiasis
Schistosomiasis likely evolved in central Africa as a parasite of primates,
spreading through much of that continent in antiquity and to the New World through the
institution of slavery in more recent times.  While encompassing several different species
of parasites, the disease has two principal clinical forms: urinary and intestinal.  In
urinary schistosomiasis, bloody urine is often the early sign of infection; over time the
infection can lead to severe urinary system damage, including kidney damage and
eventual death.  In the intestinal forms, signs of infection often do not appear until late-
stage damage to the liver has occurred.  This may lead to profound dysfunction and
death.
In the 1800s, the disease became a major public health threat in Egypt when the
Nile River was dammed and massive agricultural irrigation schemes were developed in
the Nile Delta.  This expanded the habitat for the snail species that is required to sustain
the complex life cycle of the parasite, and also increased human contact with infected
water.  Humans acquire infection when they come into contact with water and
subsequently the parasite, which, in an early stage of its development, burrows into intact
skin.
During the height of the European colonial era, in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, scientists from several European countries and Japan competed vigorously to
determine the life cycle of the parasite, a critical step towards preventing infection.  The
Japanese discovered the parasite's life cycle in cattle.  The British team working in Egypt
then used this information to demonstrate how humans become infected.  This led to a
focus on snail control to prevent the disease, but it was largely unsuccessful.
Schistosomiasis leapt to American and international attention during World War
II when thousands of American troops became infected during the invasion of Leyte.
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U.S. researchers were concerned that returning troops would introduce the disease,
spurring accelerated research in this country.  While in the immediate post-war years only
Egypt, Brazil, Venezuela and China assigned high priority to the disease and initiated
national control programs, schistosomiasis existed and spread in many regions where it
received less attention than more obvious killers such as malaria.
By the 1970s, when the TDR Program was established, the scientific and public
health communities had been through several cycles of elation and dashed hopes from
various efforts to eradicate disease; the cycle was then in its optimistic phase. The cycle
first began early in the twentieth century when the Rockefeller Foundation established
commissions to eradicate hookworm worldwide (1907) and yellow fever in the U.S.
(1915); both failed and diminished the popularity of eradication efforts over the following
three decades.  But, following the successful elimination of malaria from specific regions
and the development of a stable vaccine for smallpox, the notion that disease eradication
was possible came back into favor with public health practitioners.  When, in the mid- to
late-1950s, the WHO adopted the goals of global malaria and smallpox eradication,
optimism for eradication efforts was high (CDC 1993).
While the vaccine-based smallpox eradication campaign concluded successfully
in 1977, WHO’s malaria eradication effort failed due to a host of factors, including
mosquito and drug resistance and rising costs.  WHO’s failure with malaria—at a cost to
its funders and constituents of  $1.4 billion over ten years—renewed the climate of
skepticism for eradication campaigns.
It was not surprising, therefore, that in the early-to-mid-1970s the view of most
schisto experts was that multi-faceted interventions were needed to control schisto and its
transmission:  The reigning approaches included drug treatment, snail control and other
interventions to decrease water contact and to diminish contamination of potentially
infective waterways.  Recognizing the immense resources required to control schisto
through these approaches, however, some international program architects of the time
favored a “silver-bullet” approach.  Highly focused on a “single solution,” such
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approaches were intended to balance the competing needs of effective health care
provision and resource constraints.
The 1970s also witnessed the emergence of the field of molecular biology and its
application to immunology.  The scientific potential afforded by these techniques
(hybridoma, monoclonal antibody and recombinant DNA) created a climate of
“immunologic exuberance”; although the field was just getting underway, optimism was
high that these advances would help lead to vaccine development over time. The
optimism for a schisto vaccine, at the earliest stage of the TDR Program, arose within this
climate as well as from previous, more-or-less empiric successes in developing effective
vaccines for bacterial and viral diseases, such as DPT, polio, and others.
Ultimately, however, vaccine technology became viewed as the “silver-bullet” to
control schistosomiasis.  The necessary factors seemed within reach, given the known
characteristics of the disease, and a reasonable “scientific likelihood” conferred by the
new technologies.  A vaccine was viewed as preferable, given the complex nature of
alternative approaches to control (such as eliminating the intermediate snail hosts for the
parasite before it infects humans).
b.  Scientific and Historical Context of the Schistosomiasis Program
Ever since scientists learned that snails were an essential part of the life cycle of
the parasite, efforts to control schistosomiasis have been mounted.  The early decades of
control focused on devising methods to kill snails in their aquatic habitats.  While it
seemed reasonable that snails were the most “exposed” part of the parasite’s life cycle,
and vulnerable to attack, decades of research revealed that complete elimination of snails
was virtually impossible in most areas where the disease was common, and that the cost
and ecological consequences of repeated application of molluscicides limited their
usefulness as a control tool.  Furthermore, snail control had no immediate impact on
disease because the adult parasites are long-lived in the human host, and interruption of
transmission could require years, if not decades, of continuous control of the snail (the
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intermediate hosts).  Research on biological control of snails yielded few if any practical
applications.  Drug therapy research did generate  anti-schistosomal agents, but until the
early 1970s their use was limited by severe, potentially fatal side effects and the need for
multiple doses (usually 12) administered by needle.  Scientists targeted alternate points in
the parasite’s life cycle for transmission interruption.  These included preventing the
contamination of fresh water bodies with excreta (sanitation), preventing contact with
potentially infective water (provision of safe water supplies, health education) and
eliminating snail breeding habitats through engineering approaches.  While in theory
these interventions could contribute to control, and generate knowledge that would
benefit other diseases, none by itself could be expected to interrupt schisto transmission.
A number of organizations were active in schisto research around the time that the
Foundation’s program was created.  Some (e.g., the East African Institute for Medical
Research in Tanzania, part of the British Medical Research Council) were vestiges of the
colonial era, and maintained a strong schistosomiasis research program.  Similar groups
existed in or were linked to other European countries including France, Belgium,
Germany and Denmark.  Other centers of schistosomiasis research existed in countries
that recognized the disease as an important public health threat: Egypt, Philippines, Brazil
and China (which ultimately achieved widespread control).  Sizeable schisto control
projects were also carried out in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Ghana and Tanzania.  In addition to
China, a few countries that underwent rapid socioeconomic development enjoyed
successes in eliminating or controlling schistosomiasis; these included Israel, Japan,
Venezuela, and Puerto Rico.
In the early 1970s the international public health community recognized that
malaria, schistosomiasis, and other tropical parasitic diseases were worsening in many
developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.  The Special Programme for
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (WHO/TDR) was formally created in 1975 to
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target research on six tropical diseases1.  Schistosomiasis was considered second only to
malaria in significance within this program.
In the United States, the network of schisto researchers and funders was small.
Pockets of schistosomiasis research expertise were found in the military, the CDC’s San
Juan Laboratories in Puerto Rico, and in several academic institutions (mainly Harvard,
Tulane, Case Western, and Johns Hopkins).  The Rockefeller Foundation had supported a
large schisto project in St. Lucia that was designed to assess alternative control strategies.
Dr. Joseph Cook conducted research for the St. Lucia project prior to moving to the NIH
from where he was ultimately recruited to direct the Clark TDR Program.  Similarly, Dr.
Ken Warren, then at Case Western Reserve, and an early advisor to and grantee of the
Foundation’s Program, subsequently went to the Rockefeller Foundation where he
directed the Great Neglected Diseases of the Developing World Program.  Despite this
scattering of human and financial resources, funding for schistosomiasis was quite
meager relative to that for malaria and domestic health problems.  Furthermore, with the
exception of Rockefeller’s applied research in St. Lucia, no organization was clearly
identified as a focal point for schistosomiasis research.
c.  Initial Goals and Objectives of the Schistosomiasis Program
After determining that one program would focus on the Developing World,
EMCF sought to define its niche according to the following standard:  Given the myriad
problems and enormous population at risk, which problem presented the best opportunity
to make a meaningful, rather than marginal, impact?  Thirteen areas of opportunity were
identified and explored on a preliminary basis; the three most consistent with this
criterion were emergency relief, craft development, and tropical disease research2.
                                                          
1 The formally titled UNDP /World Bank/WHO Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases,
was established to facilitate the intensification of research on tropical diseases, as well as to promote and strengthen
research and training in developing countries.  It was unique in that, as an extrabudgetary program, TDR was not
dependent on the WHO Assembly for funding;  it received broad-based support from multilateral funders, and, in
contrast to other WHO programs, was also a grantmaking body.
2 Other areas of opportunity explored for the Developing World Program included:  literacy, population and family
planning, agriculture, job creation, housing and human settlements,  management and management systems, health care
delivery, nutrition, and the environment.
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Among these three, exploration suggested that tropical diseases would provide the
most dominant area of opportunity for several reasons.  In 1974, more than one billion
people were affected by at least one of twelve prominent tropical diseases, and data from
WHO, NIH and CDC indicated that only $21 million per year were expended annually
worldwide on tropical disease research (IDAU 1973).  Ten major funders contributed to a
broad spectrum of research interests within the field of tropical disease research, but there
was no critical mass of activity or funding in any one area.  Of the twelve “prominent”
tropical diseases, schistosomiasis was identified as one that was prevalent in many areas
and becoming more widespread (in part, concomitant with development efforts), and had
garnered few resources (approximately $3 million per year) (IDAU 1973).  Thus as the
largest, single private funder of schistosomiasis research, Clark’s entrée into tropical
disease research was substantial in terms of credibility and financial impact on the field.
During its first year (FY 1973-’74), staff established three broad objectives
toward the goal of global schistosomiasis control established for the nascent program.
1.  Determine the impact of the disease to influence major funding agencies and
the government to carry out research and control programs in schistosomiasis, by
supplying them with appropriate economic and social data that show the
importance of the disease to development and well being;
2.  Determine whether and how immunity occurs in man as an important first step
in determining whether the development of a vaccine is feasible; and
3.  Increase the quality and effectiveness of control efforts with available
medicines and counter measures short-term to make control more economically
feasible and more effective, and to develop new and better methods of control
longer-term.
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d.  Schistosomiasis Program Narrative
During the Program’s first year, in conjunction with “selected scientists” and
WHO representatives, staff refined the strategic plan and presented it for further
development to invited scientists at a workshop in St. Lucia, the site of a Rockefeller-
funded schisto control research program.  The plan sought to characterize the “landscape”
of tropical disease research and the funding sector supporting it; it also aimed to define a
unique role and leadership position for the Foundation.  Workshop participants were
challenged to consider  and “borrow” the tools and techniques of management consulting
from the private sector by defining program goals in terms of time, desired results, and
financial commitments. As Dr. Hoffman recently described, “I came to the workshop
with problems I wanted to solve, and asked workshop participants to help solve them.”
Participants included experienced and field-seasoned researchers, and a small
number of promising young investigators keenly interested in immunological aspects of
the disease.  Convinced that a “systems analysis” approach, borrowed from the corporate
world, was the most effective way to undertake research directed at disease control, Dr.
Hoffman sought consensus among the participants regarding research goals and
objectives.  A vitally important consequence of the strategic planning process was the
enthusiastic “buy-in” by the participants, providing them, from the beginning, with a
sense of ownership and deep involvement.
By late 1975, the Program plan was in its second iteration.  Its mission,
justification, goals and objectives, and means to achieve them had been rendered more
precisely by Dr. Lehman (Lehman 1975).  At this time, the Program Plan for the
Developing World identified its primary long-term goal as the “achievement of effective
control of schistosomiasis and its elimination as an important disease.”  This would be
achieved by developing the means to control schisto and stimulating and assisting
governments and key agencies to “undertake schisto control on a systematic and
meaningful level.”
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Explicit recognition of probable constraints to schisto research by a broad range
of experts informed and defined the program strategy.  In the 1975 planning document,
Dr. Lehman set forth a basic strategy and a scientific agenda that had four key
components.
 First, Dr. Lehman recognized that EMCF must create a “broad-based,
multidisciplinary attack” on schisto because scientists considered it unlikely that any one
method could effectively control the problem, nor that any single agency would have the
commitment, planning and resources to coordinate the necessary control efforts.  By
virtue of its commitment, EMCF created a leadership position for itself in this broad-
based attack that demanded significant interaction with diverse funders, governments and
other parties acting to advance research and control efforts.  TDR took on the roles of
communicator, organizer and convener of these groups.
The second strategy component, to use the Foundation’s power and authority to
influence (“leverage”) the field, followed naturally from the establishment of the
Foundation’s role with its “partners” in schisto research and control.  During the
formative period from 1973 through 1974, staff intentionally sought to co-opt the
scientific community by bringing leading research and control experts into the planning
process.  This served multiple interrelated purposes.  It provided the Foundation with
access to the expertise it needed, stimulated greater interest and thus momentum in the
field, and exposed participants from research and control to the importance and benefits
of the strategic planning process borrowed from the private sector.  Policy manipulation,
as it affected the control community, was articulated as another important aspect of the
Program’s leveraging strategy.  Staff recognized that the role of catalyst fell more
naturally to WHO, but that “a host of severe constraints” prevented WHO from
achieving that position (Lehman 1975).
The strategy’s third component was comprised of a formal mechanism to inform
the field and the Board through an annual review of research progress.  This included
new trends in science, progress in disease control, and research priorities.  Scientific
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advances were to be reflected in an updated program plan that would constitute the basis
for the Board’s decisions.  In addition to being an endpoint in itself, the review process
would serve to bring together a diverse group of researchers and encourage the exchange
of ideas between those involved in basic research and in control, and, in doing so, would
help counteract the fragmentation recognized to occur naturally in such a diverse field.
The fourth strategy component, basic provision of services to the field, reflected
the need for a single leader among schisto research organizations.  Viewed as most
prominent among the “services,” was the granting process, providing $4 million over the
first two years to a field whose total budget was approximately $6 million during this
same period.  The strategic plan for schistosomiasis was another “service,” guiding
applicants by supplying both current knowledge and identifying gaps in the knowledge
base.  This strategic plan was envisioned as both a prototype product and process for
other, future, TDR disease efforts.  Organization and sponsorship of technical workshops
for laboratory and field-based control investigators was a third service provided to the
research community.  The Foundation also functioned as an information clearinghouse,
sponsoring compilation, library-building and dissemination efforts.
Over time, strategic planning and co-option of the scientific and relevant political
communities were accomplished systematically through the use of workshops, Task
Forces and Advisory Committees (to be discussed in detail).  Additionally, select grants
were made to pilot test area-specific control strategies.  The options posited by Lehman
created the opportunity for engagement on a broader but less controllable level.  In the
end, the Program opted for tighter, more focused interaction with international agencies
and governments, and in doing so, was possibly able to wield greater influence and
control than would have been likely operating in situations with a greater number of
partners.
In the November 1975 Program Plan for the Developing World, Dr. Lehman
identified six objectives to pursue the means to control schisto, the ultimate goal.  The
first four further defined the principal areas of research: (1) determine whether immunity
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exists in or can be induced in man and whether human schistosomiasis can be prevented
or ameliorated by immunological means; the long-range objective was development of a
practical vaccine; (2) develop safe, inexpensive, easily delivered, curative and
prophylactic anti-schistosomal drugs; (3) increase the effectiveness of other control
measures that interrupt or reduce transmission of infection to prevent development of
clinical disease; and (4) determine the economic and public health significance of
schistosomiasis.
The fifth objective was to “present and update a plan for research (the Strategic
Plan for Research on Schistosomiasis) which systematically addresses the four research
objectives above.”  The initial Strategic Plan was revised into a June 1975 edition that, in
its preface, states “The plan provides a basis for all decisions by the Foundation on
grants and contracts.  It provides a framework for prioritizing research in an area where
the need greatly outstrips resources.”  This (second) edition was also the first to
incorporate target dates of benchmarks for research-related decisions, actions and
products.
A final, sixth, objective was to “develop advances in national and international
policy and funding; long-range objective is national, regional or global control
schemes.”  While broadly addressed in Chapter VIII of the Strategic Plan (Global
Control), these broader objectives were not strictly part of the plan.
The use of strategic planning to guide research on biological processes and
disease control was a new and, for some, radical innovation.  According to Mr. Emery,
“Don Hoffman thought that it was shocking that medical research was being carried out
as a cottage industry.  Our goals were to address the needs of the underdeveloped world,
and to try to bring a scientific focus on diseases affecting the underdeveloped world…We
were attracted to a strategic planning approach to disease control on three levels.  It
would help focus on relieving the misery of people suffering from tropical diseases.
Second, we wanted to draw more attention by the western scientific community to
tropical diseases.  And, in science, where so much had been accomplished on vaccines
and disease control, why should the scientific community be blind to the strategic NASA
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approach?  We decided that adopting a NASA-type planning approach would be a useful
way to go…When we encountered barriers, we took an entrepreneurial approach to
removing those barriers.  It was ‘seat of the pants’.”  NASA had utilized a highly
targeted and specific engineering plan to propel its space exploration mandate using
extant technology.  The task was to organize and integrate it to achieve specific
objectives, and to do so within a precise time frame.
As Mr. Emery continued to explain, “At the start of the Schisto Program, and for
about the first two years, we were supporting traditional vaccine research techniques and
didn’t anticipate that the science would be so rapidly evolving with molecular biology
techniques.  When the sunburst of molecular biology did occur, we may have, or should
have, reassessed our plans to account for the likely changes that this new science would
bring.”
Biomedical research did differ somewhat in that all the necessary technology for
the molecular biological approach to vaccine development did not yet exist.  Instead,
contemporary funders supported investigator-initiated research that was scientifically
rigorous and considered to address important questions.  The Program’s “directed
research” was considered by some scientists to be counterproductive and infeasible.
According to one informant, “The idea that you tell anyone what to research was
anathema.”  The outcome of scientific experimentation, reasoned this informant, can not
be anticipated.  According to one skeptical grantor, "Donald Hoffman believed that with
good management, one could accomplish anything in research."
One NIAID official recently indicated that "in the early 1970s, NIAID was not
working on a schisto vaccine.  We decided science didn't know enough about the
parasite's effects on the host immune system and whether protective immunity could be
conferred.  So, NIAID concentrated on basic research that might help guide a vaccine
approach…The NIH philosophy has been that investigator-initiated free-ranging
research should get us farther down the road, since you never know where the advances
will come from.  For example, the monoclonal antibody technique came from research on
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multiple myeloma.  The researchers were interested in cancer.  They didn't set out to
develop monoclonal antibodies.  We decided the most unproductive way to work toward a
vaccine was strategic planning, because there was no room for serendipity and chance."
How then did the staff and Board decide that these six objectives were realistic
within the time and resources anticipated?  Planning documentation from 1973 states that
“entry into this area will require a commitment of at least 5 to 10 years.”  From recent
interviews it appears--at least in retrospect--that few Board members, staff, advisors,
collaborators or grantees actually expected the vaccine-related objective to be met within
the timeframe envisioned.  Rather, the objective was often viewed as something to be
achieved in the distant future.  For instance, according to one Board member, "Molecular
biology burst onto the scene.  But, there was no indication provided at the outset that any
vaccine was possible.  So, scientific optimism drove it."
This was confirmed by Dr. Hoffman.  "There was no scientific indication,
evidence, or experience to date that a vaccine was feasible within 5 to 10 years, I didn’t
think development that soon was feasible.  Rather, I was trying to create an environment
within which vaccine research could progress, flourish.  By getting immunologists and
molecular biologists to think about schisto and adapt their work to the field, we could
help create that environment."  He added, "Implicit in our early plans were to get good
people…immunologists who had not previously worked in schisto … to adapt their
interest and work to schisto and thereby transform players and the thrust of the field."
Dr. Lehman re-emphasized the long-term nature of the challenge in a 1976
discussion with the Board.  "The number of basic research questions is formidable, and
will require considerable, long-term investment on our part."  But long-term to Dr.
Lehman meant that  “development of an effective vaccine was as much as ten years
away,” as he wrote in his 1978 Program Update.  He was more optimistic than most.
But not more optimistic than a newly trained scientist recruited into the field by
its promise and its importance.  Looking back on that time, the scientist recently said,
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"We were very naïve back then.  We figured that as soon as you identified an antigen you
would be able to make a vaccine.  Everything that had worked to that point had been
straightforward such as measles, mumps., rubella, pertussus, smallpox, polio."
As Dr. Cook recently commented, "We had very definite goals and expectations
to do certain things by a certain time.  Not all were successful…As the process evolved,
we got more explicit in honing objectives and strategies…Immunologists would tell us
that a vaccine was about five years away.  The problem was, they told us that every five
years."
Once established, the strategic plan was first reevaluated in 1976 by the staff who
determined that the “basic directions and priorities [are] sound, revision [is]
unnecessary.”  While the periodically updated strategic plans for schistosomiasis
research did contribute importantly by involving scientists in the planning process, and in
building partnerships based on shared interests, they were unsuccessful in forecasting
scientific progress in the basic research domain of immunology and vaccine
development.  Anticipation of scientific progress in that domain was greatly influenced
by the enthusiasm and inherent optimism of talented, goal-oriented scientists who firmly
believed that with adequate support, questions could be answered and technical obstacles
overcome.  As one investigator commented, "Scientists were not too sure how serious the
Foundation was in trying to be doing a strategic plan.  Most scientists probably didn’t
pay too close attention.  Most were immunologists or parasitologists rather than people
who really understood the steps along the way and places that get bogged down in
vaccine development."
Evidence also suggests that the role of the strategic plan in guiding progress of the
Program was less transparent to some Advisory Committee members and scientists in the
field.  One informant recalled being “both impressed and worried with the strategic
plan’s inordinate detail.”  As a result, strategic planning was perceived as far more
successful in guiding applied as opposed to basic “bench” research.  In this way, the
strategic plan served the dual purpose of a framework and unifying “umbrella” document.
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It appears that the Clark Foundation’s approach to strategic planning may have
influenced that adopted by the newly-created (1975) WHO/TDR Program. “Unlike other
Scientific Working Groups of the Special Programme, schistosomiasis research
throughout the world in recent years has been oriented, if not actually guided, by the
‘strategic plan’ for schistosomiasis research developed by the Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation” (WHO/TDR 1980).  Although alternate sources of the genesis of strategic
planning at WHO/TDR were offered by some informants, most acknowledged Clark’s
role.  In either case, there is broad agreement by WHO/TDR officials that strategic
planning has made a vital contribution to biomedical research designed to create and
improve tools for control of tropical infectious diseases.
Just prior to Dr. Lehman’s death, the Program Plan was reviewed by leading
bench and field scientists at a 1977 meeting in Bellagio, Italy.  A report of the
proceedings, entitled “Optimal Strategies for the Control of Schistosomiasis,” was
published a few months later.  In a good example of effective exchange between
scientists with differing perspectives of schistosomiasis research and control, meeting
participants resolved that the Foundation should stay in schisto research and provided
recommendations on how best to proceed.
Bellagio meeting participants concluded that major gains in control of schisto
could be made with current technologies in major endemic areas.  Maintenance of control
in most endemic countries, however, and establishment of new control programs in less-
affected countries, would require the development of less expensive modalities that
needed little monitoring.
Thereafter, a five-member advisory committee convened in June, 1978 to
consider questions posed by Foundation President Dr. Jack Coleman regarding the
optimal path for the Schisto Program over the next few years.  Committee members
concluded that it was in the Foundation’s and field’s best interest to remain in schisto.
Follow-up recommendations from the Bellagio workshop focused on mechanisms to
strengthen the existing program by adding a technical advisory committee to work with
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staff on various aspects of Program evolution, including strategy and funding mix for the
four existing sub-areas of immunology and vaccine development, biochemistry and drug
development, control and impact.  As Dr. Coleman recently reflected,  "Maybe it was a
product of my ignorance or arrogance, but I didn't find it [the task of conducting an
international program] daunting.  At the time, about the only other funder was
Rockefeller.  I thought, ‘Hey, this is probably worth doing.’  I don't frighten easily.”
Based on recommendations provided at the Bellagio meeting and thereafter, Dr. Coleman
selected Joseph Cook, M.D. as Program Director.  Dr. Cook was recruited shortly after
his arrival at the NIAID and joined the Program in November, 1978.
e.  Schistosomiasis Program Processes, Operations and Tools
Throughout the Program, the grantmaking tools used to carry out the directed
efforts to develop a vaccine, create improved drugs and more effective control measures
varied for each sub-area and continued to evolve with experience. Grants for the fourth
objective, determining the economic costs and public health significance of schisto, never
got underway as the difficulty of the task became realized.  Instead, grants were awarded
to explore various policy-related questions pertaining to product cost-effectiveness, cost-
benefit, production and marketing.
Grants for immunology and vaccine development dominated in terms of total
funds and number of grants throughout the Schisto Program ($16.5 million versus $10.1
million for epidemiology and control and $5.7 million for drug development; in addition,
the average immunology grant was 54% larger than grants in the other two subprograms).
For the first decade, 1974 to 1983, funded applications for vaccine research were
submitted by leading researchers from the several major academic centers in the U.S.,
England and France, where this work was largely concentrated.
In 1983, as the Foundation began to narrow efforts as a prelude to exiting the
field,  the TDR Program initiated a competitive grants program narrowing the focus of
vaccine-related research grants to molecular biological techniques.  Applications were
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either for using molecular biology techniques to identify protective antigens or for using
recombinant DNA methods to produce adequate quantities of these antigens. According
to Dr. Cook, the process also provided an opportunity to bring new researchers into the
field.
Six of 18 invited applicants were funded in 1983, based on the criteria of
scientific merit and chance to succeed.  Additional competitive rounds were held in 1985
and 1987, the year that the Foundation moved the process outside by providing a grant to
Vanderbilt University (Dr. Daniel Colley) to establish a Task Force to coordinate and
oversee vaccine research as part of the Foundation’s schisto exit strategy. Researchers
were told that future support would be for the Task Force, not individual research
projects.  Through this ten-year competitive grants process, the Foundation was able to
support closely-related research on several promising vaccine candidates, and stimulate
interaction among grantees while the Foundation’s efforts were winding down. At the
time the Program ended, three potential antigen candidates had been identified, one of
which was being tested in primates.
Workshops became an integral part of information exchange among vaccine
researchers, with $116,000 provided over time for both self-administered and institutional
grants to convene the sessions.  Following an initial workshop jointly convened with
WHO in 1974, the Foundation funded a self-administered grant in 1980 to convene a
workshop on immunology related to developing a live, attenuated (weakened) vaccine.
(Self-administered grants were a way to maintain direction and control within the
Foundation, rather than acting through a grantee who would have broad discretion.)  Four
workshops funded by grants to universities followed from 1981 through 1986.  The
subjects included vaccine immunology, an "antigen lab" workshop, molecular biology
techniques, and "progress reporting.”
Grants to develop improved drugs supported a variety of interrelated activities,
from research to policy development, and patent to liability protection.  Addressing
market-constraints, the Foundation became problem solver and entrepreneur.  Drug
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development tools essentially reproduced the process that industry used to search for
promising drug agents.  These included $523,000 in support to Parke-Davis (later
Warner-Lambert/Parke Davis) between 1974 and 1979 to prepare chemical compounds
that might lead to development of drugs that were safer, more effective, and easier to use
compared to those then available.  Because two of Parke-Davis' products had been found
to be carcinogenic in mice, grants to academia supported evaluation of simple biologic
systems for detecting potential carcinogenic effects, while other academic grants
supported testing of compounds in mouse and monkey models.
Contracts were used as early as 1979 to obtain legal assistance in patenting
products to gain market protection for those developed.  Patents were initially filed for a
diagnostic radioimmunassay test for antigen detection developed by Case Western
Reserve University grantees.  Also patented was a metabolite of the drug niridazole,
originally developed by Ciba-Geigy, which was found by Case Western grantees to have
immunosuppressive activity.  The metabolite was then licensed to Sterling Drug.
Contracts for legal assistance gave way to a self-administered grant to handle this work
internally as the number of potentially patentable products increased over time.  The
Foundation's patent practice preceded the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which sought to
advance market availability of federally-supported products of research by requiring
academic grantees to take out patents on their potential products, so that industry would
be more likely to develop them further and market them, or risk losing intellectual
property rights to the government.  Prior to the Act, NIH had discouraged its grantees
from seeking intellectual property rights to products financed by public funds.
After the drugs praziquantel and oxamniquine became available in 1982 for
human use in treating schisto, but at high cost relative to developing country health
budgets3, a new tool was invoked.  The Foundation awarded grants to try to create a new
process for synthesizing praziquantel which had been developed by the German
pharmaceutical company Bayer under license from Merck.  These grants were not
                                                          
3 In 1978, Praziquantel retailed for $6.50 per 600 mg dose; discounted pricing for WHO in 1981 was 90
cents per dose  (Reich 1997).  Since that time, the price has dropped substantially and is now at about 10
cents for a 600 mg. tablet (Cook 2000).
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successful.  But, some years later, a Korean pharmaceutical firm, Shin Poong, devised a
means to synthesize the drug that differed from that used by Bayer.  Because Bayer had
patented the production process rather than the compound itself, Shin Poong was able to
compete directly against Bayer with its newly synthesized product for the retail and
public (government) sector markets.  For example, in Egypt, Shin Poong licensed its
product to the Egyptian International Pharmaceutical Company which began to market
the drug in 1987, resulting in significant price declines in that country (Reich 1997).
In light of the availability of praziquantel and oxamniquine, essentially single-
dose oral drugs4, the Program phased out of drug development and grant emphasis turned
to the systematic improvement of control strategies using the available drugs.  For a
decade beginning in 1980, various institutions received grant funds to (1) measure the
effectiveness of mass chemotherapy using oxamniquine; (2) test the effectiveness of
praziquantel in controlling S. japonicum and S. haematobium; (3) study the effectiveness
of various combinations of drugs; and (4) expand the use of national drug treatment
programs.
Also during this time, grants were provided to academic institutions to develop
inexpensive, easy-to-use field tests for diagnosing urinary schisto.  These included tests
for immunodiagnosis of schisto, the GIST (galactosidase immunosorbent test), blood
tests, a diagnostic test kit for S. haematobium, and ultrasound for diagnosis of secondary
liver fibrosis in people with schisto.  In addition to developmental grants, the Foundation
supported a conference on immunodiagnostic tests, and research to isolate antigens
leading to diagnostic methods.  One of these products, a Case Western immunodiagnostic
technique for field use, was patented.
Grants were used also to determine ways to overcome market obstacles to schisto
drug development, vaccines, and diagnostic agents.  These included a 1978 survey of
                                                          
4  Recommended treatment protocol for S. haematobium and S. mansoni is 2 doses (20mg/kg) in one day; S.
japonicum and S. mekongi require 3 doses (20 mg/kg).  S. mansoni may be treated with single dose
(15mg/kg) oxamniquine or in N/E Africa one (20mg/kg) dose x 3 days.  Source:  Sanford Guide to
Antimicrobial Therapy, 1998.
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U.S. drug companies on their research on drugs and vaccines for use in tropical diseases
and barriers to this work.  This survey was extended later to European companies. A
1979 study explored the potential for developing a purchasing cooperative among
developing nations to put them in a better bargaining position regarding drug charges,
and a grant-supported symposium was held to discuss this possibility.  Additional studies
examined drug marketing, funding and distribution practices, and cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness assessments of drugs and vaccines.  To prepare for potential vaccine
development and distribution, a 1988 grant was awarded to identify and evaluate the
capacity of companies in Brazil and Egypt, where schisto prevalence was high, to
produce vaccine.  Companies' capitalization, existing product lines and market
capabilities were analyzed.
From the beginning, grant efforts were accompanied by communication activities
designed to keep scientists in the field informed and involved. Communication grants
began in 1974 with an anthology of schisto research progress and a review of schisto
control projects.  These became the basis of schisto libraries in medical schools and
ministries of health in infected areas.  Grants supported publication of journals (Tropical
Doctor), and of research results, first in the Schisto Packet and later in the Schisto
Update.  The latter was cited by many informants as useful, particularly in the field
where it was difficult to access the literature.  The Program also supported a PBS film on
schisto, and more than nine scientific conferences and symposia for basic and field
researchers.  Additionally, the Foundation supported educational courses on parasitic
disease, primarily schisto, from 1979 to 1991 through grants to the Marine Biological
Labs.  The Foundation did not, however, seek to use communication systematically to
develop a more committed public constituency for schisto research, or for bringing down
the price of praziquantel.  Commenting recently on this, Dr. Coleman explained "The
Clark's didn't want publicity.  Trying to make a case about the need for lower drug prices
probably would have been unacceptable at the time.  I did bring in a director of
communications, but this was to help grantees get their stories out."
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This interrelated and flexible use of a broad array of grantmaking tools that were
tailored to achieve specific objectives enabled the Program to direct the $32 million
devoted to schisto in a highly strategic fashion.  The Program combined industry support
for compound development with competitive support for academic research targeted to
drug and vaccine development objectives. Self-administered grants to carry out patent
protection efforts helped to foster the ability to bring products, particularly diagnostic
tests, through development and to market.  Funding for academic researchers and for
research Fellowships, combined with educational courses provided by the Marine
Biological Labs, helped to attract and train scientists in the field.  A Task Force to
oversee and coordinate vaccine work, workshops for investigators to discuss common
problems, conferences and symposia to address research and policy issues, and research
updates for the field fostered efficiency which contributed to the systematic pursuit of
vaccines, drugs, diagnostic agents and other means of control.
f.  Schisto Exit Strategy
General discussion of potential future directions for the TDR Program, first
discussed at the 1977 Bellagio meeting and a 1978 Advisory Committee session,
emerged again during the 1979 review process.  Pursuant to discussions at several prior
Board and Advisory Committee meetings, the Board decided in September 1981 to phase
out the Schistosomiasis Program.
The question of an exit strategy for the drug development objective, now that
praziquantel and oxamniquine were marketed for schisto treatment, was first raised by a
Board member at the March 1981 Advisory Committee meeting.  The Foundation
diminished funding for drug development that year and ceased it altogether in 1983,
except for three grants to develop a new, simplified process to synthesize praziquantel.
In an August 1981 pre-Board memorandum, Dr. Cook advised President Coleman
that “our rate of exit from the schistosomiasis field should be determined by our progress
toward initiation of control programs….”  Dr. Cook also indicated that while the (basic)
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research component had not yet yielded any “knowledge that could be translated into
field application,” it had produced “striking new knowledge” [in immunology] that “may
provide the long-term definitive answer to control.”  Dr. Cook also pointed out that Clark
support had clearly “developed a critical mass of first rate investigators…this solid
foundation is one we should and are examining carefully before abandoning further
support” (Cook 1981).  As Dr. Coleman recently reflected, "I was fully prepared to go
slow in this case.  There was an identifiable goal, to develop a vaccine.  As long as there
was hope, that persuaded me that we were right to stay the course."
Following the Board’s September 1981 decision to phase out of schisto, the Board
requested that TDR staff explore other potential opportunities for the TDR Program.  In
response, staff initiated a series of exploratory grants using 10% of the schisto funds that
the Board reallocated to exploratory investments5.  Topics included acute respiratory
infection (ARI), amoebiasis, blindness prevention, leishmaniasis, refugee and migrant
health, and toxoplasmosis.  Upon examination by staff and the Advisory Committee, it
became evident that none of the diseases under exploration met the Foundation’s criteria:
As protozoal agents, leishmaniasis and toxoplasmosis were inconsistent with the
Foundation’s experience with schisto and thus did not provide the type of niche to which
the Program aspired.  Amoebiasis and ARI, given their multifactorial nature, had the
potential to become too diffuse.  Refugee and migrant health, staff concluded, received
support from an array of public and private entities, some of which were more
strategically positioned than the Foundation to make an impact.
In November 1983, the Board approved a plan for gradual withdrawal from
schisto and a plan for the development of a program to control two major infectious
causes of blindness: oncho and trachoma.  Archival and interview data indicate that the
withdrawal plan was designed to support the conclusion of important ongoing research
                                                          
5 Exploratory grant clusters: ARI:  11 grants between 1982-86; 8 in 1983-84, 1 in 1982, 1 in 1986.
  Leishmaniasis: 1 grant, 1982.
  Amoebiasis: 5 grants, 1982-83.
  Blindness Prevention Opportunities: 1 grant, 1983.
  Refugee /Migrant Health: 2 grants, 1980 and 1982 respectively.
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while preparing the schisto research community for the eventual phase-out of schisto
funding.  By 1985, the exit strategy for the Schisto Program—which represented 39% of
the TDR budget that year--had become more refined, and specific goals for the Program
were identified that would signal the conclusion of the Program’s three main
components.  In Epidemiology and Control, the Program would support tests of specific
control strategies and facilitate the transition of pilot control efforts into public health
activities through 1988.  Staff recognized two salient issues were residual to the schisto
work: drug resistance and drug delivery.  Although  praziquantel and oxamniquine
offered a substantial advance in disease control efforts, delivery was still an obstacle in
areas of high endemicity requiring annual retreatment.
Foundation President Peter Bell said in a 1987 Advisory Committee meeting that
the "Trustees decided to withdraw from schisto slowly, but we were clear now that we
have a responsibility to stay with it in a more narrowly focused way…the Foundation
feels some responsibility to maintain a role in control of the disease, since we are not
sure that we'll be successful in developing a vaccine.”  Asked recently about these
statements, Mr. Bell said, "Increasingly we doubted we would be successful in vaccine
development. But we decided to stay in the field, given the need to bring the work on a
possible vaccine to an orderly conclusion and the new possibilities from advances in
epidemiological research and lower-cost drug therapy.  We decided it would not be
responsible to cleave it off, so we decided to attenuate instead."
During the withdrawal period, support in immunology and vaccine development
would be provided to identify and test antigen candidates through 1987, at which point a
decision would be made on whether to pursue one or two vaccine candidates for further
development.  In  communication, the Schisto Update would continue through 1989, if
“still essential.”  In an effort to maintain momentum and solidarity within the grantee
community, the Schisto Vaccine Task Force (SVTF) was established at Vanderbilt
University through Foundation support in 1987.  This support continued through 1991, at
which time the Task Force and its funding were transferred from Vanderbilt to WHO
where it was supported through 1993.  The rationale for the transfer was that as WHO
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would be ultimately responsible for the delivery coordination of any successful vaccine,
“it made sense for WHO to assume greater responsibility for guiding future efforts at
vaccine development,” according to the Program Plan.  Despite exit plans, staff proposed
as late as 1990 a vaccine research agenda for the Board’s consideration.  Staff indicated
the need for a review of the current approach to advancing immunological research on
schisto utilizing recombinant antigens, or whether  “a different pathway, if any” should
be pursued.
Advances in the commitment to and application of scaled-up schisto control
efforts had met resistance within countries.  As of 1990, only Brazil and China had
implemented national control programs.  In 1988, staff reported that pilot control
programs in Kenya had demonstrated that the treatment of school age children was the
most cost-effective approach to controlling morbidity from schisto.  In response to this
opportunity, the TDR Program staff changed tactics.  Instead of total schisto withdrawal,
staff sought to apply the geographic-centered approach that had been adopted by the
Foundation as a unifying theme among domestic programs.  This geographic-centered
approach was also a means of building on WHO’s concept of regional control.  It is
unclear from available documentation why national control efforts did not make it onto
the “agendas” of afflicted countries, nor how a regional approach might succeed where a
national one had not.  Staff also suggested that an expansion of integrated parasitic
disease programs might offer an alternative means to promote schisto control.
The “geographic-centered approach to funding” adopted by the Foundation in
1991 was used to focus on control efforts in two distinct locales, East and West Africa.
According to Peter Bell, "I was concerned about the disjunction between domestic and
international programming and thought a geographic focus could help to bridge the
differences, with an aim to move toward control of certain infectious diseases or health-
related  problems. But, this would have implied something different from our science-
based activities, and it was difficult to try to make that shift."
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At the same time, the Task Force for Child Survival in Atlanta was planning an
expanded school-age child chemotherapy program aimed first at schisto and secondly,
oncho and intestinal helminths.  The Task Force’s plan presented an opportunity for the
Program to remain focused on schisto control while meeting the criteria for geographic-
centeredness.
The schisto withdrawal strategy had been predicated on several assumptions: (1)
that praziquantel and oxamniquine now filled the niche for a simple, effective
chemotherapeutic means of control; (2) further investment in chemotherapy was no
longer warranted except for treatments in the presence of resistant strains of schisto; and
(3) WHO would and could carry the mantle for schisto vaccine research forward.
Response from the field was mixed:
“In retrospect, we started too early on a vaccine; when [Clark] left the field, there was
not a perception that the money wasn’t well invested in vaccine research, rather that they
needed to get out.”
“We knew they would phase out; because Joe dragged his feet, we had time to adjust,”
but “we weren’t prepared to find new funding; this was difficult because the pool of
funders was shrinking…Clark’s withdrawal was detrimental…[their] moral support was
as important as financial.”
[One informant] identified one misconception in the Foundation’s approach: “They
believed that “someone else” would step in to support schisto [when they withdrew] but
it was not the case.  Although the European Union support for research linkages in
Europe did emerge, this source offered no support for the U.S.-based investigators, nor a
means for those Clark helped start to continue.”
[This informant] attributes this misconception in part to the “corporate MBA-like
assumption” [by Dr. Hoffman] “that foundations should change directions every 5-10
years; this may be true in the corporate world, but not in bio-medical research…Clark
could not understand this.”
As one of the researchers attracted to the field primarily by the security that funding
beyond that of NIH provided said recently, "It came as a shock to the research
community that foundations don't operate the same way as NIH. We assumed the
program would go on forever.  It was hard to accept that foundations go in with a goal to
energize a research area (or maybe a product) rather than support research for the sake
of research……Rockefeller has moved out, MacArthur has moved out. So, now scientists
realize that foundations aren't a steady bet for future career funding.”
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A statement from another researcher voiced similar concerns: “The withdrawal of a
major funder is very destructive to the field and related fields …[it] would be
irresponsible to get out after 10 [years] because it plays games with scientists’ careers, it
is a very capricious approach and ultimately discourages scientists…[a funder] must pull
out in a gradual and orderly fashion.”
One colleague from the foundation world saw Clark’s exit from schisto as a tribute to Dr.
Cook’s integrity and respect for the research community as “client”:  “It’s a tribute to
Joe that while two major funders abandoned the field—Rockefeller had no exit strategy--
and thereby increased the pressure on Clark, Joe was able to stay the course and manage
an exit strategy responsibly.”
As Peter Bell reflected recently on the Foundation's withdrawal from schisto in a
highly deliberate and slow way, "Governments and foundations were turning away from
interest in developing countries and international public health.  We were more trying to
keep a tradition of commitment alive, an increased sense of responsibility to stay with it.
We believed that a steep and rapid decline in our grantmaking would be viewed as the
withdrawal not only of financial, but also moral, support at a time when we had a
disproportionate importance to the field because we were among the few private
supporters.”
While withdrawing gradually from schistosomiasis, the TDR Program segued into
the trachoma and onchocerciasis fields. The Schisto Program was finally concluded in
FY ’94.
g.  Schisto Program Outcomes
The TDR Schistosomiasis Research Program can be credited with an impressive
list of accomplishments, both concrete and abstract.  Although the Program did not meet
its ultimate goals—to create a vaccine or drugs to control schistosomiasis—it fulfilled its
self-appointed role as a catalyst in the field, in part by providing an estimated one third of
all funding for schisto vaccine research (Barrett 2000).  Outcomes included enlarging the
cadre of researchers and stimulating the interest of international organizations and
governments in schisto control; both were envisioned as “end products” and long-term
investment opportunities within the broader schisto field.
Figure 2.  Schistosomiasis Program Expenditures, 1974- 1994
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The Foundation’s investment nurtured the creation of an “invisible college” of
schisto researchers who, individually and as a group, have brought the science underlying
vaccine development and schisto control far since its inception.  By becoming a secure
funding source for more than a decade, the Foundation helped to attract new scientists
into the field. "EMC helped to get us interested.  In the field, there aren't a lot of funding
sources. So, the Foundation's funding was critical to making people feel like it's a solid
career choice since there now were options apart from just NIH (Clark, MacArthur,
Rockefeller, and now Burroughs Wellcome Fund).  That contributed to a sense of security
in selecting an area of relatively obscure interest.  A lot of people directed their research
toward schisto vaccine because of Clark.  The Foundation had sound stature in the field,
and that was very reassuring.”  According to others:
“The Foundation …encouraged first rate researchers to focus…at a time when few
Foundations were.  That has been a major contribution.”
“The NIH hasn’t taken up the role of trying to get young investigators into this field. NIH
does have training awards in parasitology and a few might be in schisto, but no disease
target in training grants to fill the void of the Foundation."
“There have been shifts [decreases] in funding, in part because people like Dan Colley
have gone elsewhere [into government].  I believe new people are still coming in, but
they are not being recruited into helminths at the same rate as protozoa.”
The TDR Program also contributed a disproportionate share to the fields of
immunology and schistosomiasis research.  In a recent editorial, researcher James
Bennett referred readers to an oft-quoted pun:  “‘It is not what immunology can do for
parasitology but what parasitology can do for immunology’.  This is especially
applicable to the development of a schistosomiasis vaccine, which has done much to
support the field of immunology, but which, in reality, has done little to alleviate the
disease” (Barrett July 2000).
Barrett’s point is underscored by an impact analysis conducted in 1986 which
found that Foundation-supported schisto investigators accounted for only 3% of the
schisto researchers identified in Medline files, yet were responsible for 32% of the total
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literature between 1970 and 1984.  Within specific literature search categories, this
group was responsible for 55% of immunology, and 18 and 9% of the epidemiology and
control and biochemistry/drug development literature respectively (Goffman 1985).  In
total, Program investments resulted in 270 schistosomiasis publications.
Other Schisto Program outcomes included both processes and tangible products.
Processes included enhancing information available to field and bench researchers
through Foundation publications (most notably Schisto Update) and through workshops
and meetings.  Products included an improved grading system for determining the
severity of schisto infection using ultrasonography.
While a schisto vaccine still remains elusive 27 years later, five of the six antigen
candidates that have been found to be promising were identified, at least in part, by
Foundation-supported researchers.  The duration of the Foundation’s tenure in the area of
schisto vaccine research was a source of much discussion among key informants.  One, a
self-acknowledged “vaccine skeptic,” stated “Immunology is phenomenology.  Ken
[Warren] used to say this…The only parasitic vaccine ever was for hookworm in dogs
and the vets killed this…Often the answer is good old solid public health, yet vaccination
is the holy grail.”
Other dissenting arguments include the proposition stated in “Antischistosomal
vaccines: beyond the laboratory” published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, which points to the need for “a compelling
epidemiologic and/or economic justification” in choosing preventive strategies when
alternate interventions (such as antischistosomal drugs) exist (Basch 1993).  A highly
controversial March 2000 article by Gryseels, “Schistosomiasis vaccines:  A devil’s
advocate view” explores a series of complex epidemiological, methodological and ethical
issues.  In seeking to “generate fruitful debate” before current vaccine candidates
undergo human trials, Gryseels contends that vaccines contribute little added benefit, are
difficult to assess in terms of safety and efficacy, and may lead to a false sense of
security.  Gryseels concedes, however, that “schistosomiasis immunology remains a
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fascinating and relevant subject, even without a vaccine. Considerable long-term
investments may not have yielded a practical vaccine, but the spin-offs have made it
worthwhile, and no harm has been done-- so far” (Gryseels 2000).
Fruitful debate has indeed ensued.  One response to Gryseels’ paper offers the
following counter-argument:  “We feel that schistosomiasis cannot be defeated with
chemotherapy alone, but rather than arguing the advantages of drugs versus vaccines,
we suggest that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, as drugs provide short-term
reduction of morbidity, while vaccines hold the promise of long-term prevention”
(Hagan, et al. July 2000).  The arguments presented by these scientists, and others, are
largely based upon epidemiologic and chemotherapeutic data that have been around for
decades or longer, much of which is contained in one form or another in the strategic
plans for schistosomiasis research.
Relative to its earliest stated ambitions, the Program successfully contributed to
the determination of schistosomiasis’ public health, social and economic effects on its
hosts, while spearheading an effort to get these data into the hands of those who could act
on it: other international agencies and government officials.
Since the TDR Program’s formation, new schisto control strategies have been
developed, refined and implemented, typically using praziquantel, or less commonly,
metrifonate and oxamniquine.  Although WHO/TDR reports a decline in prevalence
(WHO 1995), schisto control remains a significant public health problem, particularly in
impoverished areas characterized by poor sanitation and inadequate water supply.
Molluscicides and other vector-directed strategies generally proved to be neither effective
nor sustainable approaches to control.
Feasibility of control efforts, as identified by one informant, was a significant
tension that was difficult to avoid.  “Where we missed the train is having a diagnostic
product that is feasible to use, because selective treatment is a better approach than mass
treatment.”  The rationale for investing in a diagnostic tool was to improve surveillance
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outcomes and targeting.  This informant felt that the diagnostic test was not used as much
as one would have expected because of the relatively high cost of screening, stating that
under conditions where the prevalence of schisto is greater than 25%, it is cheaper to
mass treat than to screen.  The question remains to be seen whether it would have been
worthwhile to invest in bringing the cost of the test down further.
Outcomes also included a number of activities that contributed to helping to build
the field.  The Foundation stimulated pharmaceutical company research on schisto
compounds through direct support when no companies were undertaking this on their
own.  It established the precedent for patenting Foundation-supported products and
development processes to help pave the way for eventual commercial licensing, leading
to production and marketing.  It established a means to test for product carcinogenicity, a
vital part of R&D. It created centralized information resources, critical to helping the
field incorporate the latest research results into on-going efforts.  And, it fostered the
security of a stable funding resource, in addition to NIH, which was considered necessary
to attract new investigators into the field.
Alone and in combination, these were important contributions to help build a field
from among otherwise disparate and independent research efforts.  Nonetheless, these
efforts were not systematic enough, or financially secure enough, to continue on their
own once Foundation funding was removed.  Program staff recognized this, and realized
that while they had stimulated the field's growth, they had not put in place the means to
perpetuate that growth without a direct influx of funds.
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III.  The Onchocerciasis Program ($21.6 million, 1985-1998)
a.  Historical Overview of Onchocerciasis
Working on Africa's west coast John O'Neill, a physician in the British Navy,
examined microscopically skin from men with "craw craw", a debilitating dermatological
condition common in the area.  To his dismay, he observed tiny "worms" contorting
violently! In 1875, the British medical journal, Lancet, published O’Neill’s observation’s
in an article entitled "On the presence of a filaria in 'craw-craw'".  These were the
microfilariae, or baby worms, released by much larger adult female worms (Onchocerca
volvulus) living in nodules under the skin.
Microfilariae, found primarily in the skin, also move through tissues to other
organs, including the eyes, where they can be found superficially as well as in deep
structures of the eye.  The death of the tiny microfilariae stimulates the immune system of
the human host to react with acute inflammation.  The cumulative effect of this,
especially in heavily infected individuals, gradually leads to striking changes in the skin
and diminished vision or blindness.  A French physician in the late 1800s described the
disease as one that “made young men look old, and old men look like lizards.”  Severe
itching is characteristic; patients may scratch themselves constantly and some have
committed suicide because of the unrelenting character of the itching.
The parasite that infects humans, Onchocerca volvulus, is believed to have
evolved in African cattle.  It is transmitted when Simulium flies (black flies) ingest
microfilariae when feeding on the skin of an infected individual.  After development of
the larval stage of the parasite within the black fly, it becomes infective and is passed on
when the insect feeds on another human.  Because black flies breed in flowing water
habitats (their larvae are attached to the river banks and derive oxygen and nutrition from
the flowing water), and they generally are not strong fliers, the disease onchocerciasis is
typically distributed on and near the banks of waterways: hence the common name River
Blindness.  In some areas, especially in West Africa, the impact of the disease has caused
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enormous areas of fertile land to be abandoned because it was uninhabitable; half of the
adults were blind.  An estimated 18 million people are infected, almost all living in
Africa.  Relatively small foci of onchocerciasis, generally not associated with blindness,
are found in parts of Mexico, and in Central and South America.
b. Scientific and Historical Context of the Onchocerciasis Program
Unlike malaria, and later schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis received minimal
attention by researchers or public health officials in the post-WWII era.  This is largely
because onchocerciasis occurs predominately in remote, isolated regions with minimal
infrastructure and limited political power.  Some 98% of the world’s cases occurred in
Africa, where most of the blinding disease was found.  Lack of safe and effective therapy
prevented meaningful intervention; indeed the available drugs typically caused severe
side effects.  Additionally, the disease was difficult to study outside of endemic countries
because inexpensive animal models were lacking, and the long (about one year) life cycle
and difficulty in obtaining parasite material for study made it an extremely difficult
disease for university-based investigators in developed countries to pursue.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, research was carried out in Kumba, Cameroon
on humans and chimpanzees, supported largely by the British Medical Research Council.
Epidemiological and clinical studies were carried out in  Chad and Zaire.  But largely, it
was a neglected research area, as indicated by the lack of scientific literature, which
trailed that of malaria, schisto and leprosy by at least 3 to 1 (WHO 1980).
The first major control effort was the Onchocerciasis Control Project (OCP),
which was launched in 1974 by the World Bank, other donor agencies and developing
country governments in seven countries of West Africa.  OCP was a massive and
ambitious effort to “reclaim” vast uninhabited agricultural regions by using chemicals
released from airplanes or helicopters along immense river systems to kill the black fly
larvae.  OCP has been called by some the “largest and most successful human disease
control program currently being executed” (Molyneux 1995). Nonetheless, OCP has
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faced its share of challenges in maintaining its advances while withdrawing vector
control activities.  For example, Burkina Faso and four other countries once rid of the
black fly later became reinvaded.  More importantly perhaps, OCP created new interest
in, and recognition of, onchocerciasis and its severe negative impact on the health and
economic stability of affected populations.
Oncho was one of six diseases targeted for research and training by the
WHO/TDR Program.  WHO collaborated actively with the OCP and took responsibility
in 1978 for an OCP-supported chemotherapy research unit in Tamale, Ghana.  The
WHO/TDR Program placed limited priority on immunological studies with the exception
of immunodiagnosis.  Modest resources were directed at protective immunity or vaccine
development.  Instead, this program focused primarily to increase knowledge of
microfilariae-induced inflammation, antigen isolation, in-vitro maintenance and animal
models of onchocerciasis.  Because large quantities of biologic materials, particularly
infective larvae, would be essential for research leading to vaccine development, recent
advances in the ability to produce and preserve live larvae (by freezing) offered modest
encouragement.  Consequently, an EMCF staff member was advised during a visit to
WHO in 1979 that oncho vaccine development would be a good area for the Foundation
to consider because it was not  targeted by WHO/TDR.
The WHO/TDR Scientific Working Group (SWG) actively encouraged the
pharmaceutical industry, including Parke-Davis, Warner-Lambert, Hoechst, Wellcome
and others to pursue development of anti-filarial drugs.  In 1987 a major treatment
breakthrough occurred when Merck decided to donate its microfilaricide Mectizan,
which made it possible to treat onchocerciasis safely, effectively and with a single dose.
Prior to this, two drugs were available and both had severe side effects.  Diethyl
carbamazine (DEC), could cause severe side effects and sometimes resulted in blindness.
The other, suramin, was known to cause kidney failure and death.
The Mectizan Donation Program (MDP) was precipitated by Merck’s initial
failures in obtaining support from governments, international organizations, or
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foundations to support distribution of the drug at low cost in developing countries
(Collins 1999).  As an alternative, Merck opted to donate the drug through the Task Force
for Child Survival.  Through the program, Merck has made the drug available indefinitely
and free of cost to those who need it for onchocerciasis.  The donation program also
created a new model for building partnerships for disease control: it brought together
private industry and public organizations to focus on a specific objective.  While the
Foundation deliberated whether to support the MDP, it eventually decided that a vaccine
offered the best long-term solution to the problem of oncho control.
c. Onchocerciasis Program Narrative
The Oncho Program developed in circumstances significantly different from that
of schisto and trachoma.  In contrast to these, the Oncho Program was targeted solely on
vaccine development.  Although OCP was well underway in Africa and field trials of
Mectizan  held significant promise for the control of transmission, Dr. Cook contended
that neither “constituted a solution for the long-term.”  Oncho transmission dynamics--
which would require yearly treatment for seven to twelve years to successfully interrupt
transmission-- and the enormous cost of insecticidal spraying implicated the need for a
vaccine (Cook, et al. 1986).
Based on Foundation-supported workshop proceedings held earlier in the year,
TDR Program staff defined an initial aim for the Onchocerciasis Program in April 1985.
They sought to determine whether it was possible to define the immune response to O.
volvulus in experimental animals and to separate protective from deleterious antigen
effects within four years.  This required the availability of substantial amounts of research
material (stocks of infective larvae and cDNA from adult worms), as emphasized by
workshop participants.  As a result, this component was incorporated later into the
strategic plan and several grants were awarded to establish research repositories of
parasitic materials.  These included a DNA repository of six strains of onchocerciasis
from Africa and Central America.  The strains were used by investigators seeking to
characterize protective antigens that are present in the parasite only in small quantities.
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Recombinant DNA technology facilitated production of adequate quantities for testing.
To aid in characterizing the immune response in animals, scientists at Johns Hopkins and
Cornell produced and distributed third stage O. volvulus larvae (L3s), key to this effort.
Ultimately, provision of research resources became a significant  part of oncho funding,
constituting nearly one third of the oncho budget in later years.
By 1986, the Program had four research components aimed at developing an
oncho vaccine:
1.  Animal Models of Protective Immunity, which supported basic studies that would
define the components of the immune response;
2.  Immunology and Molecular Biology, which sought to identify, characterize and
reproduce protective antigens;
3.  Epidemiology and Pathology in Humans, which aimed to increase basic knowledge
of pathogenesis as well as variation in human and species responses through
assorted geographic studies; and
4.  The Vaccine Testing Program, which would test candidate antigens on chimpanzees.
For the next three years, staff reported that scientists were struggling to identify a
suitable animal model for oncho infection which would represent a major advance for
vaccine testing efforts.  Work to develop a large-animal model using chimpanzees and
cattle proved elusive, however.  A major setback occurred when scientists were unable to
induce protective immunity in chimpanzees using live attenuated (weakened) parasites.
The chimpanzees developed infection but not the disease. According to one informant,
the unique contribution of EMCF to oncho research was that  “by focusing on an area
[vaccine development], and supporting needed but not always ‘sexy’ research such as
animal model creation [which likely would not have been supported by NIH or other
grantors], they could accomplish more than other research funding organizations.”
Merck's creation of the MDP in 1987 brought two questions to the fore later in
that decade:  1) Is there a role for the Oncho Program in evaluating or distributing
Mectizan ?; and perhaps more significantly, 2) Does the availability of Mectizan “make
the rationale for the vaccine program less compelling?”  For the first time, the
Foundation was confronted with a major choice in oncho:  support efforts to inform
improvements in the distribution and evaluation of an effective control agent in hand, or,
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maintain the single course toward development of a long-term prevention measure.  After
these questions were debated at the April, 1989 Advisory Committee meeting, the group
concluded that “a vaccine to prevent infection still presents the best long-term solution
and that the prospects for a vaccine justify our continued investment” (Cook, et al. 1990).
The Program adhered to this rationale as it refined its Program Plans over the next few
years, deliberating the specter of Mectizan resistance and the need for a macrofilaricide
that potentially could halt transmission more effectively than Mectizan.
Although the option of participation in the MDP effort was discussed by advisors
and staff, documentation suggests that it was not a serious consideration.  Rather, the
MDP was apparently viewed as an interim measure and therefore a motivation and
rationale for continuing the vaccine efforts.  In retrospect, there may have been an
opportunity cost for the field by the Foundation not collaborating in either distribution or
evaluation of the MDP effort.  While the MDP has distributed enormous quantities of
drug, few if any formal evaluations have been conducted to assess whether the
distribution has been successful in halting transmission, and if not, what operational
barriers limit its success.  Relative to these questions, advisers to the TDR Program had
identified two operational issues previously encountered in the OCP relevant to MDP that
may have merited consideration: (1) the effects of lack of coverage for women of child-
bearing age; and (2) whether institutional capacity was sufficient to identify pockets of
disease.  Both of these issues bode a problem for control.  Given that the MDP has been a
model for several more recent drug donation initiatives, including ITI, exploration of
such questions could have informed these and future efforts.
As the earlier programmatic investments in basic vaccine research began to yield
returns, staff narrowed its recommendations to four areas representing a tightly focused,
but potentially richer opportunity to meet the ultimate goal of an oncho vaccine: (1)
antigen identification and production; (2) animal models for screening these; (3)
immunological studies in animals; and (4) immunological studies in man.  The change
reflected the successful development of a small animal model, using infectious (L-3)
larvae implanted in diffusion chambers in mice to screen recombinant antigens.  This
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advance permitted a tighter focus on identifying and screening larger numbers of
candidate antigens.
Through 1993, the Program focused on antigen screening activities, recognizing
that this “tight rifle shot” approach to vaccine development carried a greater risk of
failure than a broader one.  The Board recognized this and while some members voiced
concern in September 1991 that “if we focus narrowly and miss, what will we have
accomplished?,”  the prevailing opinion was to stay the course.
This choice presented a second opportunity cost, also discussed by the staff and
Advisory Committee, which was to decide against investing in a macrofilaricide (to kill
adult worms) given questions about the sustainability of the current control approaches
offered by OCP and MDP.  At that time, amocarzine, under development by Ciba-Geigy,
looked promising, but failed trials in humans due to toxicity (Ottesen 2000 pers. com.).
 Drs. Hoffman and Eric Ottesen, working through the Onchocerciasis Task Force
(OTF), reviewed the Program in March 1994 as part of a larger effort to redesign TDR.
(Plans were to redirect 25% of the trachoma budget in 1995 when chlamydia
immunology research concluded.)  Both reviewers found that the Oncho Program had
advanced the field forward sufficiently such that its sustainability, competitive edge and
continued productivity would be ensured (Cook, Mecaskey 1994).  This review signaled
the earliest formal designs on an exit strategy for oncho.  The next Program Update (June
1994) reflected this shift from development to departure: “Our role in onchocerciasis
will shift gradually to support for program facilitation rather than direct research…we
expect that funding would end in 1999, the year in which the Foundation would have
completed 15 years of support toward a vaccine for onchocerciasis” (Cook Mecaskey,
1994).
Following this announcement, the Oncho Program’s scope of work shifted to
support of three areas: individual labs developing research resources and/or antigen
identification; specific research resources (e.g., DNA library) ; and coordination by the
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OTF.  In lieu of a final competitive round of grants to individual laboratories, staff
proposed to identify “a single international organization to carry on oncho vaccine
development activities into the next century” (Cook 1996).  According to planning
documents, this institution would step into the Foundation’s and OTF’s shoes to manage
the Oncho Program and utilize its position and financial resources from EMCF to raise
additional support from other funders for the vaccine effort.  It appears that the plan to
identify an organization to carry on the oncho work was infeasible, however, and
according to grant records, the staff instead concluded the program with a final round of
grants to individual labs.  The last oncho grants were made in 1998.
d.  Program Operations, Processes and Tools
As in the Schisto Program, staff supported a Vaccine Development Task Force. In
contrast to the Schisto Task Force, however, which was established as part of an exit
strategy, the Oncho Task Force played a pivotal role in facilitating and coordinating
oncho vaccine research and collaboration.
The need for a task force was emphasized by recognition that the worm's
successful adaptation had made it a difficult target for vaccine development (only two
vaccines had been developed to protect against parasites—sheep lungworm and dog
hookworm).  A highly coordinated process was needed to separate protective antigens
from deleterious ones. This was the rationale for integrating research resources into the
formation of the Task Force in 1988, supporting efforts such as collection, storage and
distribution of sera from infected and naturally immune people in endemic areas to help
characterize the nature of protective immunity.  The Task Force coordinated activities of
a nucleus of about ten academic research institutions in the U.S. and Europe for more
than a decade.
Competitive funding of vaccine researchers and support of private companies
were two other tools used in schisto and subsequently in oncho.  TDR’s competitive
grants program, coordinated by the OTF, began in 1992 with seven grantees (about one-
53
third of applicants) and ended with support for 14 grantees by the third and final
competitive round held at the end of 1995.  Two private companies received support, one
to produce promising antigens, and the other to evaluate analogues of dog heartworm
antigens for their potential use in an onchocerciasis vaccination.  This support to for-
profit companies was still a rare practice among foundations.
The TDR Program employed a few additional tools to potentiate the effectiveness
of the OTF, based on experience with the Schisto Program and on opportunities that
arose in this field.  One of these was communication.  Commensurate with the Oncho
Program start-up, the Foundation supported publication of an oncho research
bibliography to inform laboratory and field scientists.  A 1986 grant supported
subsidization of Parasitology Today subscriptions to 400 scientists in the developing
world.  As in schisto, the Foundation published the Oncho Update, highly acclaimed by
scientists in the field as a major scientific resource.  Similarly, the Foundation-supported
Greene Sheet (developed by and named after the OTF director, Bruce Greene) drew high
praise as a valuable clearinghouse for researchers. These communication efforts were
developed to serve specific needs of bench and field researchers and were viewed by
them as an important contribution.  Aware that a more systematic approach to
communication was needed in all its programs, the Foundation in 1988 awarded a self-
administered grant to disseminate information on the Foundation's programs in general
(including oncho) and to provide assistance to grantees.
Policy analysis was another ancillary tool used to further the program.  One of
three such grants supported a study of the social and economic conditions and
consequences of blindness in Mali and Guinea.  A second emerged from the debate on
whether to support Merck's MDP, and while the Foundation had decided not to play a
role, a 1993 grant to the River Blindness Foundation supported an operations research
study to assess the long-term impact of Mectizan on oncho in Nigeria and Cameroon.  In
large measure, according to Dr. Cook, this grant was made in response to requests by
other funders to be a “team player.”  While the grant supported annual Mectizan
treatment in Cameroon from 1993-95 as well as the expenses associated with clinical and
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parasitological evaluation of the treatment population, staff viewed this not as a departure
from the commitment to avoid direct service delivery, but rather as supporting what
advisors considered to be operational research for the MDP (Cook 2000 pers. com.).  The
third policy grant, awarded in 1997, was intended to mobilize European funding for
vaccine research at the time that the Foundation was exiting the field.
While workshops were an essential tool for information exchange between 1986
and 1991, they became the vehicle to create awareness among grantees of the
Foundation's plans to exit the field. This decision was based on results of the formal
evaluation of the Oncho Program undertaken in early 1994 by Drs. Hoffman and Ottesen,
a former grantee, Advisory Committee member and OTF Director.
As a grantmaking tool, formal evaluation was a rarity. Yet in the case of oncho, it
proved valuable by providing the Foundation with an "outside" perspective (although
both reviewers had direct involvement in the TDR Program).  The evaluation provided
vital assessments of approach and progress, successes and limitations, and
recommendations based on those. And, it provided an important view for grantees to
realize that the changes to come in their direct funding were not capricious and random,
but thoughtfully determined.  It set the stage for an exit strategy.  The assumption behind
this exit strategy was that the strength of the Task Force collaboration would position
grantees strongly to compete for NIH funding.  Although both evaluators made it clear
that the development of a vaccine was a long way off, they emphasized that the Oncho
Program established and met several goals that moved the field forward to the point
where it could effectively “stand on its own competitively.”
e.  Onchocerciasis Program Outcomes.
Among the Program's achievements, according to Drs. Hoffman and Ottesen,
were that it had successfully “assembled materials and reagents for use” in vaccine
research,  fostered the “understanding of host immune response,” and like the Schisto
program, had assembled a cadre of top-notch researchers.  In addition to its stipulated











goals, the reviewers identified several other achievements—establishing good
communication networks among oncho researchers, fostering competition, and correctly
targeting bottlenecks.  According to Dr. Hoffman’s review, substantial gains were made
by 1994, as summarized in the following table.





Animal Models 1 2
cDNA libraries 0 4
 More recently, among some of the more tangible outcomes of the Onchocerciasis
Program are:
• Information and access to materials available to investigators via OnchoNet
• A table of 26 characterized O. volvulus antigens, with detailed information about
the type, source, investigators and references
• O. volvulus antigen database that assists researchers, using a simple search engine,
to access current information
• Available O. volvulus cDNA and genomic libraries: listing the currently available
six libraries (five different stages of O. volvulus and one of O. ochengi L-3 stage
larvae)
• Contacts: a list of researchers currently working on onchocerciasis as of April
2000
• OnchoNet Bookmarks: connections to other filarial and parasite-related web sites
• The Williams Laboratory: the O. volvulus Genome Project based at Smith College
56
•  Highly successful production and preservation of infective stage (L-3) larvae
• Over 50,000 produced for use by researchers
•  Developed and validated two rodent models for antigen screening:
• (1) diffusion chamber in mice and (2) A. vitae infection of jirds (small rodent)
• More than 50 antigens identified and characterized
•   8 have entered evaluation in the cattle model (using O. ochengi homologues) after
having been shown to generate protective activity in the diffusion chamber model
in mice
•   Serum bank at Swiss Tropical Institute
•    A rich publication legacy including 86 journal articles and
•  The Greene Sheets: published from 1992-1995,  these newsletters contained a
wide range of information about onchocerciasis
Scientists working on vaccine development, especially for relatively large
parasites that have a multitude of antigens and potential vaccine targets, generally believe
that creation of effective vaccines (and drug targets) are likely to be greatly facilitated by
detailed genetic information about the parasite.  In this context, the array of scientific
resources listed above, including the genomic libraries, are expected to accelerate
progress.
Subsequent progress that has been made in the Onchocerciasis Program, reported
at the final Foundation-supported Woods Hole Workshop in March 2000, provides
considerable encouragement that the vaccine development effort will be sustained in the
absence of EMCF financial support.  The potential is greater than when the Foundation
exited schisto.  The exceptionally strong and highly collaborative research network is
recognized by many as being unique.  “This group is ahead of many groups at NIAID in
terms of sharing knowledge, parasitic materials and reagents.  EMCF has helped to
catalyze and sustain the research effort;  NIH has not provided all the mechanisms
needed to sustain such sharing and interactions,” according to Dr. Michael Gottlieb
(Division of Parasitology and Tropical Diseases, NIAID) a participant at the recent
Woods Hole workshop.  Communications and resource accessibility within this group is
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greatly facilitated by the EMCF-supported OnchoNet website that provides, among other
resources, a great deal more genomic data than were available for schisto.  OnchoNet is
also linked to many valuable resources, including the Filaria Genomic Network and a
data bank of research materials.
New funding sources and organizational relationships have also emerged.  For
example, the European Union (EU) has established a new, $1.5 million/year (for 3 years)
onchocerciasis program to support research linkages between EU investigators and
developing country partners.  Four such linkages have been established.  Professor David
Taylor, University of Edinburgh, said “These programs could not have started without
the initial Clark support.  Clark was the catalyst.”  While EU funds cannot be used for
their travel expenses, American investigators will be invited to two scheduled meetings
sponsored by the EU, and alternate funding mechanisms exist to facilitate meeting
attendance and ongoing collaboration between European and U.S. scientists.
NIAID, through its International Collaboration in Infectious Disease Research
(ICIDR) program, recently has created “pathogen specific groups” (PSG), including a
filariasis PSG, that will serve as a focus for agent-specific collaboration.  Although the
funding is modest, it can be used to support meetings, workshops, and visiting scientists
from developing countries.  The goals of the PSG are to facilitate communication,
sponsor small meetings to establish research priorities and “state of the art activities”
such as creation of “white papers”, and also provide access to new “opportunity grants”
on a competitive basis.  Dr. Gottlieb (of NIAID) stated “NIAID programs, including its
International Centers for Tropical Disease Research Network, while not a replacement
for EMCF, can contribute importantly to maintaining linkages and productive
relationships between members of the oncho/filariasis research community.”  Further, a
newly created NIH resource, the Vaccine Special Emphasis Panel, reviews and
recommends grant applications for extramural funding for the development of vaccines
against infectious diseases.  New genome-sequencing resources at NIH also may
facilitate oncho work in the future.  One key member of the oncho research community
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has an NIAID grant to create a “consortium” to pursue a major funding effort targeting
foundations and other potential grantors.
Finally, important research “breakthroughs” have opened an exciting new range
of avenues for research to control onchocerciasis and other filarids.  Scientists have found
that a rickettsial organism, Wolbachia, lives symbiotically within probably all filarids,
including O. volvulus.  This organism is crucial to the development, viability and fertility
of filarial parasites.  Currently there is an explosion of promising and highly fundable
research planning related to Wolbachia, much of which involves sophisticated molecular
and genetic approaches in seeking new targets for attack.
Although the Foundation did not directly support the wolbachia work, the
discovery very likely would not have occurred if it were not for the oncho research
network it created.  According to one scientist, informal exchange within this group
helped lead to the “breakthrough.”  Another  investigator indicated that as a group, the
oncho genomic scientists might approach a major private funder to support genetic
mapping of wolbachia from O. volvulus.  According to this researcher, having the full
genome may identify targets for vaccines, and wolbachia might be used as a vector to
move genes, an area of research likely to receive high priority.
While the impact of Wolbachia research on oncho control remains to be
determined, the first effort to use the new knowledge to successfully treat onchocerciasis
in humans was published in the April 8, 2000 issue of the Lancet by a German
investigator previously supported by EMCF, Dr. Achim Hoerauf.  Professor David
Taylor, Univ. of Edinburgh, observed “were it not for EMCF’s investment in
onchocerciasis research, O. volvulus would have become an “orphan parasite.”
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IV. The Trachoma Program
a.  Historical Overview of Trachoma
Trachoma is the leading cause of preventable blindness in the world today.  It is a
chronic, progressive disease acquired early in childhood, but with serious manifestations
appearing later in life.  Chronic eye infection by C. trachomatis produces inflammation
which progresses to scarring of the conjunctiva and the growth of a membrane with blood
vessels over the cornea.  The conjunctival scars cause deformity of the eyelids so that the
eyelashes turn in and rub against the cornea.  This constant abrasion leads to corneal
ulceration, often with infection by other destructive bacteria that worsen the degree of
corneal scarring and loss of vision.
While the precise means of transmission of C. trachomatis are not fully
understood, it is clear that the disease is closely associated with rural poverty, inadequate
disposal of human and animal waste, poor personal hygiene, arid environments and
limited access to water.  In some regions, eye-seeking flies that feed on ocular discharges
appear to play an important role in transmission.  Direct transmission from eye to eye
occurs when ocular discharges are spread by fingers and shared towels.  Although partial
immunity occurs with infection, children and adults are often re-infected.  Young
children are disproportionately infected and serve as the main reservoir of the organism.
Typical late complications, such as in-turned lids and vision loss, increase progressively
in older people although they no longer have active infection.
The disease has been well known since antiquity and in the 19th century was still
widespread in Europe.  In the early 1900s the disease was recognized as a major cause of
blindness in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean countries, Middle East, India and China.
Blinding trachoma was also common in the U.S. among the European- descended
population of Appalachia and the mid-South, and in Native Americans of the plains and
Southwest.
60
First identified in 1907, and isolated in 1957, the causative agent of  trachoma
belongs to a group of organisms known as Chlamydiae.  Initially believed to be viruses
because of their small size and their need to grow within living cells, they are now
classified as bacteria.  One species (C. trachomatis) causes a range of human diseases.
Specific subtypes (serovars A, B and C) cause trachoma.  Other serovars (D through K)
are sexually transmitted strains that cause tubal infertility in adult women and pneumonia
in newborns; lymphogranuloma venereum strains (serovars L1, L2 and L3 ) are also
sexually transmitted but cause extensive disease of the genital tract and  the immune
system.  A second human species (C. pneumoniae) causes pneumonia and heart disease
in adults.  A third species (C. psittaci) infects birds and other vertebrates but occasionally
causes human pneumonia and abortion.
Disease severity and prevalence decline dramatically and disappear as economic
conditions improve.  However, blinding trachoma continues to be a major public health
problem among the most impoverished inhabitants of developing countries in much of
the world including Africa (both north and sub-Saharan), parts of the Middle East and
Indian subcontinent, South-East Asia, certain regions of China, and among Australian
aborigines.  Currently, 600 million persons are at risk of acquiring trachoma, 150 million
are infected, 11 million have in-turned eyelids requiring surgery and 6 million are blind
from it.
b. Scientific and Historical Context of the Trachoma Program
Despite its recognition since antiquity, trachoma attracted minimal attention from
the research community.  With the disease impact mostly in remote, impoverished
regions, and seemingly insurmountable obstacles to its control, blinding trachoma was
largely ignored except for a handful of investigators and public health workers.
Maintenance of chlamydiae in animals and tissue culture for research purposes was done
in only a few specialized laboratories. By the 1920s, a number of control programs were
established in Egypt and North African and other countries, using a system of base and
mobile hospitals and clinics.
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The WHO was a strong, early supporter of trachoma control and treatment
programs.  Its trachoma program, initially based in Copenhagen, moved to WHO, Geneva
about 1958 as the Trachoma Program in the Division of Bacterial Diseases.  Control
projects were carried out in a number of African and Mediterranean countries.
Additionally, Trachoma Expert Committees met periodically.
A major breakthrough in trachoma treatment occurred in 1937 with the
demonstration that the antimicrobial, sulfanilamide, was highly effective in curing
inflammatory trachoma in children and adults.  Treatment programs using this drug
carried out by the U.S. Indian Health Service during 1938 to 1942 eliminated trachoma in
many tribes.  When active trachoma was found again in 1956 in tribes in New Mexico
and Arizona, antibiotic-based control programs among Indians were started again in
1960, and achieved elimination by the mid-1970s.  This provided an important lesson,
however, that control and elimination of trachoma can be an on-going, cyclical process.
Because allergic reactions to oral sulfa drugs were relatively common, however,
most WHO-associated community-wide treatment programs changed to topical
tetracycline, even though topical treatment required longer periods of use and was less
effective.  Treatment programs in the Mediterranean and elsewhere were assisted by the
WHO and by governmental and non-governmental organizations, but in general they
were assigned low priority and enjoyed limited success and sustainability.  The use of
tetracycline was considered less than optimal by one informant: “Tetracycline was just
hopeless, sticky, painful…there are probably little kids that still run away when they see a
white man coming…it was just torture for the kids.”  Some national programs included
health education and offered limited surgical services to prevent in-turned eyelashes from
causing corneal trauma, secondary bacterial infection, and blindness.
A second major breakthrough occurred in the 1990s when a single oral dose of
Pfizer's Zithromax  (azithromycin, an erythromycin derivative) was shown to be an
effective and safe treatment for active trachoma.  This antibiotic became the
recommended treatment for genital chlamydial infections in the late 1980s, and by the
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early 1990s Zithromax® treatment trials for trachoma were carried out in the Gambia,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.  A subsequent trial of community-wide treatment (the “ACT
trial”) in three African countries, funded in part by the Clark Foundation, confirmed the
high therapeutic effectiveness of this antibiotic in treating blinding trachoma.
Other important advances include the development of DNA amplification
diagnostic tests for genital C. trachomatis infection which are now available, and which
have a high degree of accuracy. These tests provide a valuable tool for diagnosis of
individuals’ infection, and for monitoring the impact of control programs.
Between 1961 and 1998, at least nine major research meetings on trachoma and
chlamydial infections took place in North America and in Europe.  With the recognition
in the 1970s that C. trachomatis was a major cause of sexually transmitted disease (STD),
the emphasis in these meetings and most chlamydial laboratories shifted from trachoma
to STDs.  Nonetheless, several other chlamydial laboratories are currently involved in
trachoma research including two American, two British,  and L’Institut d’Ophtalmologie
Tropicale de l’Afrique (IOTA) in Mali.  These laboratories collaborate actively with
investigators in trachoma-endemic regions of the world.
The WHO effort, now called “Programme for Blindness and Deafness,” has been
directed since 1981 by Dr. Bjorn Thylefors.  Various WHO documents were developed to
assist national programs including three funded by the Clark Foundation.  Early vaccine
trials begun in the 1960s ended in the 1970s when they failed to demonstrate success in
curing or preventing trachoma.  These efforts, which ended about the time the
Foundation's TDR Program began, were carried out by several academic centers and their
developing country partners with funding from the NIH, and other public and corporate
funding sources.  With the recent (1998) publication of the complete genome of C.
trachomatis, however, new vaccine candidate proteins now have been identified.
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c.  Program Narrative
Following the Board’s decision to withdraw gradually from schistosomiasis
research, staff initiated the design phase for the new trachoma program in early 1984, a
year in which neither the NIH nor WHO made any grants to support research on blinding
trachoma (Cook, et al. 1986).  Based on their reputation in the schisto field, the
Foundation’s presence was welcomed:   “Clark took on orphan diseases when no one
else would.  NIH didn’t give a [hoot] about trachoma…there was very little funding
outside of Clark for trachoma …without them, there would’ve been nothing.”  As another
informant pointed out, "Funding was drying up.  Clark rescued the field.”
The Foundation’s approach to trachoma appears to have been heavily guided by
the staff’s experience in developing the Schistosomiasis Program.  Similar strategies were
employed, such as early co-option of leading scientists and workshops to develop a
scientific agenda and encourage networking between bench and field researchers.
A Foundation-sponsored workshop organized by the International Center for
Epidemiologic and Preventive Ophthalmology was convened at Coolfront, West Virginia
in 1984 to consider and establish research priorities for trachoma control.  Leading
investigators reviewed the state of knowledge about the disease and its causative
organism, providing an invaluable starting point for developing the strategic plan for
trachoma research.  Control rather than elimination of trachoma was targeted as the goal
because elimination was considered unlikely, given the virtually intractable living
conditions associated with the most vulnerable populations.
The 1985 strategic plan for trachoma focused on two major areas, (1)
Pathogenesis and Immunology and (2) Epidemiology and Control.  Because the
pathogenesis of trachoma involved immunologic mechanisms, a potential vaccine could
aggravate as well as protect against disease.  Thus, much of the early research (in animal
models) focused on the mechanisms by which trachoma caused eye disease.  This was an
effort to separate protective antigens from potentially damaging ones.  From an
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epidemiological perspective, emphasis was placed on identification of specific risk
factors for disease, such as facial hygiene.  The relative advantage of systemic (orally
administered) versus topical antibiotics in preventing blindness at the community level
was explored.  Recognizing the critical importance of community participation, cultural
and behavioral research needs were also included in the plan.
Unlike the initial outline of goals and objectives for schisto or oncho, both the
pathogenesis/immunology and epidemiology/control areas in trachoma were
accompanied by a rationale and timetable for completion that would signal subsequent
steps.  Potential bottlenecks were identified at the outset and the program strategy became
a series of logical steps to reach the two goals.  For example, staff recognized that
accurate field diagnostic techniques were essential to epidemiological surveys and
ultimately program design and evaluation.  Thus, an early, significant investment for the
program was to develop a simplified system to diagnose clinically and grade signs of
trachoma for use by paramedical field staff.
By 1988, WHO was ready to implement the grading system in a 12-country
training program, and data from Clark-supported epidemiological studies of risk factors
had identified poor facial hygiene as a significant risk factor for trachoma infection.  At
this juncture, staff decided to test this hypothesis through support of a community
intervention trial of face-washing in Tanzania.
Staff recommended and received approval from the Board in 1990 to refine and
narrow the research questions addressed by the Immunology and Vaccine Development
subprogram, citing “budgetary restraint” as a factor.  In contrast, staff recommended
expanding the Epidemiology and Control subprogram that had yielded important data in
several diverse areas relevant to control efforts.  For instance, although not cited in the
original strategic plan, the value of tarsal rotation surgery in preventing blindness from
trichiasis and the feasibility of  having nursing staff perform the procedure were
established through Foundation grants.  The grading system, important to screening and
surveillance efforts, was distributed as teaching materials in 12 endemic countries.  Field
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trials verifying that trachoma transmission could be controlled and sustained by face-
washing suggested a role in developing and disseminating a plan for community control.
TDR sought to work with UNICEF and WHO on demonstrations that might
include community mobilization, hygiene and water use, treatment and prevention,
through existing primary health systems.  In addition to the program’s accomplishments,
an unanticipated factor in control –the promise of Pfizer’s (oral) Zithromax to replace
tetracycline antibiotic ointment—also became apparent.
Progress in the Immunology subprogram was incremental by comparison, and
staff reported that “unless a trachoma candidate vaccine for human trials is forthcoming,
research on immunology and vaccine development will merge with existing efforts on the
increasing problem of chlamydial infections of the genital tract and lungs.  We therefore
expect trachoma work to end in 1995” (Cook 1991).  Dr. Cook stated that although the
NIH was already quite active in chlamydial research, funding might increase given the
increasing prominence of STD research adjunct to HIV investigations: “When chlamydia
was identified as risk factor for HIV it took off.  Our contributions were not as
important—we had a deliberate exit strategy based on NIH’s presence.”  Thus Dr. Cook
anticipated that increases in the NIH budget for chlamydia would “soften the blow” when
Clark eventually began to decrease funding for this subprogram (Cook 1992).
After initial evidence suggested that Pfizer’s long-acting single-dose antibiotic
Zithromax might be effective in treating trachoma, the Foundation hosted a meeting
with NIAID, the National Eye Institute and Pfizer to develop plans for assessing
prospects for the drug’s use in trachoma control.  As stated in the November 1992
Program Update “We have initiated discussions on how Pfizer might contribute to
trachoma control in a manner similar to Merck’s participation in oncho control.  The
market is already ripe in the industrialized world, we hope to capture Pfizer’s interest
and good will and humanitarian benefit through careful use of the drug in trachoma
control.”
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Within three months, planning for an NIAID-funded multi-center community trial
of Zithromax had commenced.  Plans were to test the drug through clinical trials in
Tanzania, Egypt and Gambia, coordinated by Helen Keller International (HKI) a major
non-governmental organization (NGO) whose mission centers on vision and eye health.
In addition to assessing the efficacy of Zithromax in a field setting, the group sought to
attain WHO’s imprimatur for the use of Zithromax as part of the SAFE strategy.  In
WHO’s GET 2020 (Global Elimination of Trachoma by the year 2020) Alliance, the
original plan had been to use tetracycline for the antibiotic component6.
In an exceptional public-private collaboration orchestrated by the Foundation,
Pfizer and NIAID supported the Zithromax® trial while the Foundation assisted research
teams in these countries to develop a standard protocol.  Abbott Laboratories provided
the test necessary to identify the chlamydia antigen.
At this time, staff recognized that funding for control efforts might require
extension beyond the 1995 deadline and suggested a number of drug-related avenues of
investigation to explore within a broader operations research model.  These included
impact studies, cost-effectiveness analyses, data collection, surveillance and monitoring.
In 1994, staff presented the Advisory Committee with what they referred to as the
“dilemma” of trachoma’s “future orientation.”  Staff’s attention had turned “to promoting
and facilitating the integration of trachoma control into national primary care systems.”
The establishment of regional resource and training centers to further promote the
strategy seemed a likely vehicle.  The pros and cons of linking these centers to WHO was
presented to the Board and advisors.  Staff made the case that an independent institution,
though lacking the WHO imprimatur and dependent upon Clark funding, would be less
burdened by the bureaucratic and political considerations incumbent upon a WHO
collaboration.  This was based on the assumption that the centers could “enhance the
                                                          
6  Countries that participate in the WHO GET2020 alliance to eliminate blinding trachoma, that have not
been selected to work with ITI, typically continue to use tetracycline ointment.
67
capacity of countries to undertake their own [trachoma control] efforts” (Mecaskey and
Moise 1994).
Thus began the program’s exit from the Epidemiology and Control subprogram,
by shifting the balance of responsibility for action to the countries themselves through a
determined focus on capacity-building and continuing efforts to raise awareness of
trachoma among funders.  “If we do manage to raise trachoma’s profile by 1998, we
would expect other agencies to join in support of control efforts. We will wind down
support with a terminal set of matching grants” (Cook and Mecaskey 1994).  In June
1994, the Board approved a plan to facilitate trachoma control through primary care
systems via support of training and operations research.
Just over a year later, in September of 1995, Dr. Cook reported that Pfizer had
expressed interest in a donation program along the lines of Merck’s MDP.  Morocco,
which had recently set the year 2000 as a target date for the elimination of trachoma,
became the candidate for the trial donation effort.
In December 1996, staff presented a five-year, four-part plan for concluding the
Trachoma Program.  The plan’s primary objectives were to advance the SAFE strategy,
support its replication, and advance WHO’s GET2020 goal utilizing the SAFE strategy
by working in select countries.  Additional objectives were to increase investments by
mobilizing and coordinating other technical and financial resources for trachoma control
efforts, and to “develop an institutional locus for advancing the GET2020 goal.”  Each
aspect of this strategy implied a deliberate effort at crafting a responsible departure that
would perpetuate the SAFE strategy by ensuring that SAFE would be accessible,
replicable and sufficiently endowed.  In this way, the TDR Program systematically
attempted to create a sustainable future for its efforts.
Through continued collaboration with Pfizer, it became evident that the
Program’s role in securing the future of SAFE was unique:  “Our challenge is to
continue to ‘smooth the road’ so that Pfizer remains comfortable with its philanthropic
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investments in trachoma, satisfied with the results, and therefore willing to increase its
commitment to the elimination of disease.”
The need for an institution to continue the highly intensive work of the Trachoma
Program also became increasingly evident, as did Pfizer’s preference for an independent,
rather than WHO-based, institution.  Eighteen months into the five-year exit strategy,
Pfizer committed to moving forward in four to six countries, through the Trachoma Task
Force.  Through discussions with staff and Pfizer representatives, the Board and Pfizer
decided to establish the International Trachoma Initiative (ITI) as a 501c3 organization
with Dr. Cook and TDR Program Officer Jeffrey Mecaskey at the helm and designated
ITI Board members from Clark and Pfizer. These plans were announced in February
1998 and reported widely.
As one member of the Clark Foundation and ITI Boards recently commented,
"When ITI first surfaced, I was one of its strongest proponents. It was a fantastic way to
improve our efforts.  The Foundation likes to leverage other resources. So, we try to pick
our shots very carefully.  When the idea of working with Pfizer came up…we realized it
would combine Pfizer's resources with the expertise of Joe and Jeff [Mecaskey] in
dealing with ministries of health in Africa.  It seemed to be a fantastic opportunity.  Pfizer
is a world class pharmaceutical company… I hope it will be a forerunner of other
Foundation efforts, and other foundations' efforts too, not just Clark.  That's the measure
that we'll be able to lay out."  This reflected sentiments of another Clark/ITI Board
member as well, who said "It was fortuitous and timely.  I wouldn't have planned it this
way, but once Pfizer decided to donate Zithromax, it was a “no-brainer.”  I'm not sure
where trachoma would have gone if this hadn't come about, but the opportunity arose in
part because Joe had his thumb on the entire field.  It was logical and fortuitous because
Joe made it so.”
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d. Trachoma Program Operations, Processes and Tools
The TDR staff employed many of the tools used in the schisto and onchocerciasis
programs, but tailored them to facilitate implementation of the several products that
became available during the life of the Program.  Because Epidemiology and Control was
such a significant aspect of the overall strategy, staff adapted them to reflect this
emphasis, for example using communication measures to inform and train health
workers.  With implementation of the Program’s exit strategy, emphasis moved
increasingly toward a focus on control and ultimately toward building an institution (the
ITI) to catalyze and facilitate trachoma treatment in targeted developing countries.
The Task Force mechanism was invoked in 1987 to coordinate and oversee
trachoma vaccine development through immunology and antigen studies, animal model
studies, and research resources (although this latter area was much less pivotal than in the
Oncho program).  A 1990 competitive grants program produced 11 vaccine-related
research projects, whose scientific direction had been greatly informed by a workshop
held the year before.  Among the critical next steps identified by workshop participants
were the need to work out the structure of a particular surface antigen, other possible
antigens, and to determine what role mucosal immunity plays in chlamydia infection.
This direct interaction between workshops and grant–making directions persisted
throughout the program.
Largely because the vaccine-related work failed to generate early success, while
simultaneous efforts in epidemiology and control became highly promising, the
Trachoma Task Force was shifted to Helen Keller International (HKI) in late 1992. As
noted to the Board by staff, "Recent developments in the field point to a need for the
Trachoma Task Force to make a transition…[This] will allow staff to take advantage of
HKI's extensive field network in trachoma-endemic Africa and its working relationship
with the WHO Programme on the Prevention of Blindness."
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Some in the field, however, were not as comfortable with the selection of HKI or
Clark’s lack of transparency in making the decision:  “A lot of people thought WHO
should have played secretariat, rather than HKI. The process was not transparent— the
end run around WHO seemed odd to a lot of people.”  According to recent comments by
Dr. Cook, a pivotal factor in selecting HKI was the organization's flexibility, along with
continuity provided by a key Task Force director who was moving from Hopkins to HKI.
"We stumble, though," Dr. Cook said, "when we don't keep the field informed.  In
retrospect, we needed to bring people into the process of decision-making.  But, there is
always a balance between keeping lines of communication open and making decisions.
People think the only strings foundations have are those that tie the money bag."
The striking advances in control from grant-supported demonstrations of the
efficacy of face-washing, surgery to correct trichiasis, and the simplified trachoma
grading system, were enhanced by related health education of communities and training
of health workers.  HKI, with its expertise, network, and flexibility was seen as the best
opportunity to help countries implement these control techniques.
Another addition to the Program's toolbox was the highly developed
communication strategy that spanned information to the scientific community, health care
workers, and people in poor communities afflicted by blinding trachoma.  Not only were
materials produced, as in the other two programs, but funds also supported training of
nurses in the surgical technique, health care workers using diagnostic tools, and those
undertaking health education efforts.  The communication efforts with trachoma were
strategically designed to include training for some of the field projects.
The Program also used its convening function to facilitate the early, essential
discussions between the NIAID, the National Eye Institute and Pfizer in 1992 on clinical
trials of Zithromax, essentially brokering a critical public-private partnership that paved
the way for Pfizer's subsequent drug donation program.  By supporting HKI to coordinate
the multi-center trial to assess Zithromax's efficacy (which staff considered necessary to
receive WHO's endorsement of its use), the Foundation played a pivotal role.  Fully 22











grants made between 1996 and 1999 supported further assessment of the drug, its
implementation, and assessment of its effectiveness as part of the SAFE strategy.  This
highly structured and purposeful strategy proved an effective and efficient march toward
creating the conditions necessary for the prevention of blinding trachoma in the future.
e. Trachoma Program Outcomes
Of the three disease research programs, the products of the trachoma prevention
effort have received the most prominence by virtue of their immediate and widespread
application.  Development and dissemination of several key products, and the means to
implement them on a broad scale, have created a systematic approach for controlling
trachoma and helping to prepare the field to perpetuate its continued control in targeted
countries.  The trachoma grading system, one of the earliest programmatic efforts, has
been employed by WHO in multiple countries, improving the accuracy of epidemiologic
surveys as intended, and serving as a training tool for community health workers.
Development and refinement of the SAFE strategy has also contributed enormously to
the body of knowledge surrounding low tech, sustainable preventative measures
protective against blinding trachoma.  Evaluation of a surgical field technique has averted
untold cases of blindness from trichiasis.  The establishment of Regional Resource
Centers in Africa, as well as numerous other resources such as WHO technical manuals
and a four-part CD-ROM tutorial on blinding trachoma for health workers, have all
helped to develop in-country capacity for trachoma control.
With the Foundation’s support, trachoma immunology research also was
advanced during the life of the program.  Chlamydial proteins that could generate an
immune response were identified, and the gene for one of these proteins, the major outer
membrane protein (MOMP) was cloned and its immunologic structure mapped.  The
portions of the molecule responsible for immunity conferred through antibodies and
certain white blood cells were identified, a significant advance towards selecting
appropriate antigens for animal trials.  While progress was achieved in developing a
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small animal (mouse) model, the continuing absence of a suitable model continues to
hamper vaccine development against blinding trachoma.
Foundation-supported research also contributed important knowledge about the
role of mucosal immunity in preventing or clearing infection, and the contribution of cell-
mediated immunity in clearing infection and in the development of blinding trachoma.  In
total, 122 peer-reviewed journal publications contributed to the fields of trachoma
immunology and epidemiology.
Telephone queries to several individuals knowledgeable about preventable
blindness in developing countries, many of whom are affiliated with international eye
NGOs, indicated that the Foundation’s efforts have “unequivocally increased awareness
of,” and concern about, trachoma relative to the other common causes of preventable
blindness.  While acknowledging the difficulty in quantifying impact, one informant said
“I believe that Clark’s commitment to trachoma has prevented a lot of blindness, and
certainly it has raised trachoma on the radar screen.”  Another expressed the view that
trachoma is more global in distribution than onchocerciasis and Vitamin A deficiency
and, as such, merits more attention.  Consequently, the ITI has provided a new and
needed force in the community of “blindness” NGOs.
f. Advancing Outcomes Further:  The ITI
The ITI is the critical vehicle established to sustain the progress of the trachoma
outcomes generated by the TDR Program.  It has both remarkable opportunities and
daunting challenges, and it will be vital to the Foundation to have evaluators in the future
assess the extent to which ITI has fared and helped to advance the field.  This will require
anticipating likely problems and means to address them.
One of these challenges is attaining self-sufficiency.  As currently designed, the
ITI is expected to secure future funding from other sources.  By virtue of its independent
status as an intermediary organization, it can be viewed as a stand-alone organization that
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potential funders might be interested in supporting whereas they might be less likely to
do so if ITI were a Clark Foundation subsidiary.  There are ample precedents for this,
such as the Corporation for Supportive Housing model that has been described to the
Board by President Michael Bailin.
Additionally, if Pfizer is planning a long-term commitment for Zithromax
donation that is similar to Merck's commitment for the MDP, the presence of a long-term
private sector funder may be a strong magnet for attracting other foundations’ funds.
Successful outcomes from the initial five countries also would be likely to strengthen
funding prospects.  WHO's imprimatur may be an additional incentive for international
donors to participate.  At this writing, the Foundation is awaiting creation of a fully
developed business plan from ITI.
Reflecting on the financing issues, one joint Clark/ITI Board member said, " ITI is
eventually to become self-sustaining. That's an important matter of interest to both Clark
and Pfizer.  If we achieve success, there should be contributions coming in from others,
like the U.N.  We'll be keeping a look out on where support may come from.  We welcome
contributions now.  They either need to be consistent with our goals, or if the goal is
broadened by others' involvement, we have to make sure their contributions are sufficient
to achieve that expanded goal.  We'll cross that bridge when we come to it.  I hope the ITI
will stand at the forefront and attract other funding over time."
Another potential challenge is maintaining the conditions necessary to preserve
the partnership with Pfizer. The ITI is highly dependent on continued drug donation by
Pfizer.  Yet several factors currently recognized, and others not yet known, may influence
Pfizer's continued commitment.  For instance, Pfizer will lose its international patent in
April 2001, and its U.S. patent is scheduled to expire in 2005.  Both situations open the
way for manufacture and sale of inexpensive generic versions of Zithromax®.  This is
anticipated to decrease revenues substantially from all uses of this highly profitable drug.
In turn, this may diminish Pfizer's resources for continuing to donate large amounts of the
drug.  As a Clark/ITI Board member recently discussed, "Patent limits are a challenge.
74
…It might bring price down and bring in other sources of inexpensive drug.  But what
we're setting up is a model that can be used as a template for other programs.  It's a
moving target going forward.  It may look different 10 years from now.  It's flexible and
we're learning as we go along that we'll have to be responsive, watch after our
investments.”
 Other factors that may influence Pfizer are the multiple obstacles being faced by
several companies that have been or recently began donating drugs.  These include
problems with distribution, customs taxes, expired drugs, market “leakage” (diversion),
and in one case, liability claims.  Are companies likely in the future to begin to look for
other incentives such as tax breaks on U.S. sales revenue, or longer patent protection to
offset these disincentives?  These issues, if they arise for the ITI partnership, may lead to
creative new approaches rather than breaking the joint effort apart.  Insight from a joint
Clark/ITI Board member addresses this.  "There are hazards, challenges too.  It's true
that most joint ventures don't work well over time.  The parties' interests begin to diverge,
and partners split up over time, at least that's the classic business experience.  But we've
built protections to protect Pfizer and to protect Clark.  Both have to agree on major
decisions.  So far, it is working beautifully, and I remain enthusiastic…”
“One reason why this may be different from a classic business example (of broken
joint ventures) is that we're not in this to make a profit.  While sometimes (in business
ventures) a clash of egos causes the split, usually it is economic issues that cause parties
to diverge.  While Pfizer has its own business interests, and these may in the future lead
them to select certain countries to work in, or we might prefer some countries that Pfizer
does not want to work in, our joint goal is preventing blindness from trachoma."
Pharmaceutical companies are taking a beating in the press over high U.S. drug
costs and lack of attention to diseases afflicting people in developing countries.  Such
press can either stimulate a greater commitment by companies to enter into and maintain
donation programs, or it can discourage them from entering because of the bad press that
will ensue if they decide to leave or if their efforts are dismissed as miniscule relative to
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the need.  Communication strategies, a challenge and opportunity, will be essential. As
one informant commented, "[foundations] rely too much on news (print media)
conveying information but not persuading and connecting.  It's through the latter that
communication can help in field- and institution-building."
Another challenge for ITI in strengthening the field's capacity to decrease
blinding trachoma will be navigating the complex relationships among the various ITI
stakeholders, multinational organizations, in-country governments and NGOs, other
potential funders, and potentially other private sector partners.  Creating the conditions
for all of them to continue to share the same essential goals, and to be willing to sustain
their commitments over time, may require intermittent development of incentives and
removal of obstacles.  There are many unresolved issues that these stakeholders will have
to tackle.  For instance, ITI, a member of WHO’s GET2020 alliance, has been criticized
by WHO for its unilateral selection of the five ITI demonstration countries.  ITI will be
challenged to strike a balance between meeting its institutional needs and fulfilling its
obligations as a member of the alliance.
Additionally, according to one informant, ITI faces the "black hole" phenomenon
that is intrinsic in vertical (single disease) programs.  When treatment and prevention are
successful, prevalence drops, and field monitoring then becomes less vigilant.  This leads
to a resurgence of disease, as occurred with trachoma control efforts among Native
Americans noted earlier.  This requires sustained political will in targeted countries to
continue to monitor and address trachoma control.
It will be important for ITI to identify early on these and other issues that arise
and to think imaginatively about how best to create conditions to sustain progress.  An
evaluation of ITI's role in advancing the field will need to capture these.  Two joint
members of the Clark/ITI Boards provided a sense of what information will be important.
"Can we work effectively in the countries we're working in? There is corruption…
squabbles about who gets what resources when the test is over.  It's difficult to be sure
the money is well directed.  I believe Joe and Jeff have figured out ways to do this…Are
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countries putting their own money into the project?  When you go away, will the effort
disappear?  Those will be outcome measures I would like to see as part of the progress
toward a self-sustaining effort.  We will begin to break the cycle of infection, but the
efforts will have to be maintained or blindness from trachoma will reappear.  If we are
able to document savings and the contribution of blindness averted, we will justify having
politicians in these countries put some money in the budget for sustaining the program.
We need to be sure the credit is shared with others, including the politicians, so that they
will want to be seen as part of this effort.”
"ITI is going to have to come up with data to show this is working, that it's
making an impact in saving sight.  Then we could be a model for others to contribute to,
or to emulate.  Other foundations should want this type of data to see if it works.  Part of
the SAFE strategy is environment, and other foundations may want to work on this…It
could be very beneficial in addressing an important part along with the other three."
"…This effort needs a champion.  In Joe, we have that.  He is universally admired
as a terrific international practitioner.  That is very important.  Of course, it's also a real
issue, because it makes ITI very person-dependent.  Let's hope we don't have to worry
about that for a long time."
  The ITI and the Foundation are poised to make a fundamental contribution to
strengthening the trachoma control field, and to strengthening the field-building field.  It
is a wonderful opportunity. As one Board member commented, "With ITI, we have seized
the moment, and have developed a partnership that is carrying progress forward through
this intermediary. It is elegant. We don't care who gets the credit, it's creative and the
best form of modesty."
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V.  The Independent Commission for Health Research and Development
Clark’s leadership role was typified by a series of grants in the mid-1980s that
gave rise to the Essential National Health Research (ENHR) movement.  Dr. Cook
requested funding for a new budget category—a “small venture into other efforts”—
during FYs 86-88.  Three opportunities were proposed, including a revolving fund for
health technology, a research leadership initiative, and an international health research
group modeled after the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR).
Staff sought to frame the salient issues of health and development within a
broader, integrated context for international health (IH) funders involved in or interested
in research efforts; after consideration of various alternatives, staff pursued the CGIAR
model as most proximal to its interests.  Dr. Cook reasoned that there was a compelling
need within the field to examine formally the opportunities and barriers for research in
the developing world, and that these data could help guide future efforts by other IH
funders.  Embedded in this exploration was the need to wrestle with the controversy of
whether to build in-country research or perpetuate the assumption that the field would
progress faster through investment in the research resources of developed countries.
A commissioned strategic planning document identified the “serious health
need” and “misallocation of existing resources” in the developing world.  Although
research and development were recognized to be a “key factor” in improving health in
lesser developed countries, only a fraction of potential resources had been mobilized:
“The health community is not doing an adequate job in presenting the case for research
and development to either the funding agencies or the scientific community” (IDAU
1985).  Staff concluded that a close examination of the organization, funding and
execution of research and development activities for health was needed:  “Whatever
mechanism emerges should also serve as forum so that interested donors can have access
to authoritative assessment and identification of opportunities…an annual review will
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provide advocacy function, enhancing participation in the field and strengthening
existing programs” (IDAU 1985).
Given the collaboration required for such a broad endeavor, staff recognized that
the proposed study must have cooperation of, but independence from, multilateral
organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The World
Bank, and WHO.  Thus in 1987, the Foundation, in conjunction with the International
Development Research Centre of Canada and 16 other sponsors, formed the Independent
Commission for Health Research and Development to “review the history, needs and
opportunities for research that can improve health in the developing world.”
The Commission set four goals for its two-year life span:
(1)  “produce an independent, comprehensive, expert analysis of current
strengths, weaknesses and gaps in research and development activities
concerning health problems in developing countries…
(2) promote action to fill gaps, enlarge existing activities, or otherwise
strengthen research and development efforts and their links to field and
community programs…
(3) define the needs for greater health research capacity in developing
countries, with a special emphasis on Africa, and to propose means by which
the needed capacity may be progressively achieved…
(4) consider the desirability, sponsorship and working methods for a
continuing system of periodic assessments of research and development
efforts concerned with health problems in developing countries…[in order to ]
determine priorities, increase the resources devoted to research and
improving the effectiveness with which such resources are used.”
The Commission’s final product, a report entitled Health Research:  Essential
Link to Equity in Development, was published in 1990.  The Independent Commission
had four recommendations:
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1.  Essential national health research conducted by all countries;
2.  International partnerships to mobilize and focus scientific capacity;
3.  Larger and more sustained financial support to supplement investments by developing
countries; and
4.  International mechanisms to monitor progress and promote the agenda of financial and
technical support for research on health problems.
The Commission’s findings inspired the Foundation’s reconsideration of current
grantmaking efforts and consideration of future efforts through this lens.  Given the
heavy emphasis of the Foundation’s TDR Program on technology—primarily generated
within the industrialized world—the Commission’s recommendations challenged TDR
staff to find new opportunities to focus on in-country capacity-building within the
existing programmatic framework.  This shift in focus—from the development and
exportation of basic research to the fostering of research capacity—set the stage for the
Foundation’s applied work in Ghana and Tanzania.
Following the dissemination of the Commission’s report, the Task Force on
Health Research for Development was established to maintain international focus on
ENHR by promoting, facilitating and supporting ENHR in countries that wish to
undertake it; developing and evaluating longer-term mechanisms for the support of
ENHR; and promoting synergism between research on global health problems and
ENHR.  Although the Foundation did not foresee a continuing role for itself with regard
to the Task Force’s work, the promotion of ENHR became a part of the goal-setting
process within the TDR Program: “We expect that our future work in control—support
for applied research and training in operational research—will reflect the Commission’s
recommendation of increased support for ENHR and capacity-building in select
countries” (Cook, Mecaskey, Ehle 1992).  ENHR also provided a framework as added
rationale for undertaking the Health of School Age Children Program.
Although efforts to establish the Commission were not central to the pursuit of the
TDR Program’s disease-specific goals, the pursuit of the Commission, as well as the
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results of this activity, had far reaching effects both within and outside of the Clark
Foundation.  The Commission was a concerted effort to gather the real “players” in
international health to work in a complementary fashion to identify gaps in the field
strategically.  This process benefited each participant organization by providing data to
inform their unique efforts as well as collaborative ones.  Foundations have been
criticized for being “too individualistic,” a disservice to each other and to their clients.
The Commission’s work was predicated on the notion that what is called for, at times, is
a systematic approach to identify gaps in the field and the strengths and weaknesses of
the players on that field to enable each entity to do what they do best in the interest of the
larger good.
A subsequent Foundation grant of $200,000 supported further work on ENHR
opportunities in Africa through the Task Force for Health Research for Development,
which had been established to promote ENHR.  Two additional research forums ensued;
today, the Commission’s work is carried out by the Council on Health Research for
Development (COHRED), based at the United Nations Development Programme office
in Geneva (COHRED 2000).  The Foundation's $400,000 investment, combined with
those from 11 other funders, created a long legacy that continues to the present in the
form of the Global Forum for Health Research, convened to examine funding priorities
and inequities between developed and developing countries.  As one informant summed
it up:  “This is Joe’s baby without question, no DNA test required!”.
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VI.  The Health of School Age Children (HSAC) Program ($4.3 million, 1993-1998)
a.  HSAC Program Context
One year before the development of Clark’s strategic plan for schisto, a Brazilian
physician coined the term “selective chemotherapy” to describe a control strategy for
schisto, based on the fact that the distribution of worms varies in populations; thus, a
more effective approach to morbidity control might be to focus on those most heavily
infected.  Participants of a 1979 conference in Bellagio, Italy reiterated that control
should aim at markedly reducing intensity of infection through treatment and reduction of
transmission, rather than though the total eradication of worms in individuals or
populations; these findings led to the targeting of children because they tend to bear the
heaviest burden of infection.  In the next few years, this approach was evaluated in
several small studies of s. mansoni, s. japonicum and s. haematobium, and endorsed by
the WHO.
The cost-effectiveness and health effects of deworming received increasing
prominence from the international health community during the 1980s.  The United
Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization took a particular interest in
parasite control with regard to school-readiness and performance; the World Bank and
UNDP were pursuing similar approaches to assessing the effects of helminths and their
control in school children.
One of the TDR Program’s early goals for the Schisto Program had been to focus
on the quality, effectiveness and economic feasibility of control efforts.  During the early
years of the program, grants for epidemiology and control projects had focused on the
collection and expansion of basic knowledge of the epidemiology, impact, morbidity,
natural history, and the role of water in transmission.  With these fundamental data in
hand, the Program’s focus shifted to issues of greater complexity designed to advance the
field by building upon existing knowledge; these included epidemiological surveillance
surveys, transmission dynamics and modeling, and early assessments of
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chemotherapeutic control measures.  Interest in chemotherapeutic approaches had
garnered more funding through a series of grants in the mid-1980s to early 90s, including
some for workshops and symposia on various aspects of control including cost-
effectiveness, organization, management, and other operational research issues.  In 1991,
however, when the Schisto Program adapted the “geographic-centered” approach of the
Foundation’s domestic programs into a “country-centered” effort, it focused on Ghanaian
(West Africa) and Tanzanian (East Africa) control efforts.
That same year, Ghana’s Expanded Program in Chemotherapy (EPC) was
established.  The EPC focused on the treatment of school age children for intestinal
helminths and schistosomiasis because prior research indicated that these children, a
relatively neglected group, often bore a larger burden of parasitic disease.  The concept
was modeled by Dr. Donald Hopkins, of the Task Force for Child Survival at the Carter
Center, after the WHO’s Expanded Programme on Immunization.
In August 1991, a meeting was convened in Bellagio, Italy by a number of public
and private funders to review recent advances in expanded treatment programs for
children and to make recommendations for program strategies.  A broad international
effort funded by the UNDP, WHO, the Wellcome Trust, and the Rockefeller, McDonnell
and Clark Foundations among others, emerged from the meeting committed to improving
the health of this age group through micronutrient supplementation (e.g., Vitamin A
capsule distribution) and health education in addition to deworming.  This effort became
known as the Partnership for Child Development (PCD).  The PCD strove to establish
and pilot test a model for parasitic disease control in four to six countries; PCD’s model
was based, in part, on findings from research initiatives in Kenya funded by the Clark
Foundation.  Their aim was to evaluate the pilot intervention by documenting costs and
benefits in the host countries, and to assess the likelihood of going to scale.  In 1992, the
Ghanian EPC joined the PCD, and Ghana became one of the PCD’s four pilot countries.
The Partnership also became “the vehicle for [Clark’s] country-centered strategy of
field-based operational research” (Cook and Mecaskey 1994).
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This was consistent with the Independent Health Commission’s Report which had
inspired TDR staff to reexamine its current and prospective efforts.  As a result, the
Foundation sought opportunities to focus on capacity-building, primarily through
strengthening existing control programs.  Integrated parasite control, focusing at least in
part on schisto, was a natural segue for the TDR Program both operationally and
materially.
b.  Program Strategy and Plan Development
The Health of School Age Children Program was chosen from among a number
of opportunities presented to the Advisory Committee and Board in 1994, including the
health of displaced people, tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases, acute respiratory
infection, and cardiovascular disease.  The Program, designed to help build capacity, had
school age children as the focus and operations research as the primary tool.  The idea
was to move developing countries forward by helping them to identify problems, and
develop economically feasible and sustainable opportunities to improve their health care
systems using existing tools.  This represented a major shift in emphasis for the TDR
Program.
The Program strategy architecture was guided by several lessons learned from
preceding efforts in the three disease programs.  First, there was an explicit recognition of
the futility of vertical approaches (i.e., single-disease programs) in the presence of limited
resources and the need for integrated health services.  Staff also saw that data were
imperative to inform and help influence decision-making and policy formulation.  The
role of political will and self-determination posited that externally conceived and
managed projects were doomed to failure, while programs that were designed and
implemented by host-country nationals had a far better probability of being sustained and
successful.  Recognition of the importance of using data to inform policy also shaped the
Program’s contours.  According to staff: “the challenge for us is to nourish an
understanding of what research can contribute to policy and to foster a demand for that
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knowledge.”  The final lesson referred to the requirement for capacity-building endorsed
by the Commission.
The Advisory Committee and Board deliberated the tension between essentially
two foci—capacity-building/operational research and school age children--for more than
a year.  By May 1995, the Foundation had agreed that the program would focus on the
health of school age children but incorporate a capacity-building component.  The
program was launched  with an eye on developing a strategic plan within the first
eighteen months of its implementation;  this initial phase, characterized by the
organization of country-specific steering committees and data collection, was intended to
inform the strategic planning process.
Within a year, however, staff reverted to the original focus on capacity-building
and diminished the emphasis on the health of school age children, after recognizing that
“making measurable changes in the health of school age children in two countries is
unlikely in the short run and is truly a long term effort” (Cook and Mecaskey 1996).  The
revised program would address institutional capacity-building and  public health training
(the curriculum for which would be informed from the results of operations research
grants made in the prior year).  By December of 1996, staff also backed away from this
approach, citing the  “emergence of a major window of opportunity in trachoma control,
coupled with awareness that progress will be slow at best in public health capacity-
building in Tanzania and Ghana,” and proceeded to outline an exit strategy for HSAC
after a short period of “modest investment”.
Given that the HSAC portfolio was relatively narrow, and the main component—
the PCD—had other means of support, Clark was able to execute a relatively seamless
withdrawal by making some terminal grants to support analyses and publications of the
findings from Tanzania and Ghana.  It is unclear however, whether any other funder was
able to “step-up-to the plate” with regard to the public health training initiative for Ghana
and Tanzania.
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c.  HSAC Outcomes
Of all of TDR’s endeavors, several key informants characterized this program as
TDR’s most diffuse effort and one with an “opaque” strategy guiding it.  While Clark’s
activity in this area has been attributed as “useful in getting helminth control on various
agendas,” …“No one adequately appreciated how little Ministries [Health and
Education] interacted with each other…The idea of intersectoral collaboration was an
erroneous assumption.”   Others indicated that the problems lay with the Partnership
approach:  “The PCD has never been able to move from a research phase to a national
program…There have been problems in scaling up at the country level.  WHO and
UNICEF have not been brought on as much at the regional/country levels, but have been
at the international level.”   Another informant felt that the PCD was ill-fated from the
start: “They designed a study that was so bad you could see it would produce
nothing…the Bank was in its arrogant phase, tended to know it all, make judgements in
house.”  Another criticism was levied at PCD’s  “blanket approach” to the treatment of
worms that have distinct epidemiological profiles and may require a more customized
approach.
Conversely, the project is credited by one informant with creating momentum for
other regions like Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, which have been able to secure
a regular budgetary post for worm control at WHO.  In addition, the Program supported
27 related publications and informants generally felt that the operational research
component made a good contribution to understanding the effects of helminths on
anemia.  “With regard to its sustainability though, as soon as outside funding stops, it
will collapse.”
Another important, but unintended contribution of the Program was the
experience staff gained in negotiating with multiple partners, in this case particularly,
SmithKline Beecham with regard to pricing for an important antihelminthic drug for the
program.  Staff later utilized this knowledge of two-tier pricing schemes to help orient
negotiations with Pfizer for the donation of Zithromax to combat trachoma.
86
VII.  The Importance of People and Processes
The shape and trajectory of the Foundation's Developing World/TDR Program, as
in all of the Foundation's programs, ultimately rested on decisions made by the Board in
executing its stewardship role.  These decisions were based in large part on
recommendations of program staff and their advisors, within the context of the
Foundation's overarching mission and aims.  This places a critical emphasis on the
importance of the program directors' orientation, experience, knowledge, talents and
skills, and on the processes used for interchange between Board members and program
directors.
Perhaps more than in other Foundation programs, however, the highly technical
nature of tropical disease research posed significant challenges for Board members in
exercising their stewardship role, and for staff and advisors in providing the Board with
an informed basis for making decisions.
The selection of Dr. Hoffman to create the Developing World Program appears to
have reflected an interest in taking a managerial, entrepreneurial approach. His training in
biophysics and consulting experience in a developing country provided the kind of
orientation, experience, talent and skills sought.  Because he was not an expert in tropical
diseases, and because his systems approach to management involved bringing leading
scientists into the planning process, outside experts exerted a major influence on helping
him chart the initial scientific direction and plans.  Nonetheless, Dr. Hoffman was not a
"captive" of his advisors' enlightened self-interest.  He combined their recommendations
concerning which disease to target and what scientific leads to follow with his interest in
incorporating the new science of molecular biology.  The means he chose, in contrast to
the investigator-initiated process of the NIH, were more akin to those used in industry
and consulting: goal directed, sequential, and bounded by anticipated timeframes.
Dr. Cook was recruited with research expertise in the field, in-country experience
working on a (Rockefeller) Foundation-supported grant, prior experience working at the
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NIH, and a method of operation that has been cited as truly collaborative. The Foundation
chose him to lead the program based on this perspective and experience.  He has been
viewed by many as a master in determining strengths of potential collaborators and
crafting roles for them accordingly, and in navigating complicated international
relationships.  According to one informant, Dr. Cook had the “management capacity to
actualize his vision—this makes all the difference—look at Churchill, he was a high
school dropout.”  Dr. Cook’s acumen has earned him the respect and trust of colleagues
from every sector the Foundation’s work has embraced.  One member’s comment during
a Board meeting speaks volumes to this:  "I am supporting Joe's recommendation on this
because I trust him."  Similarly, as Dr. Coleman recently commented, "I have faith in
people who can explain in plain English what they are doing.  Joe was the model of a
person who could tell you why something was important.  My confidence in the Program
was based on my confidence in Joe.  I never once suspected that he overstated
accomplishments.  He was modest and solid.”
Major vehicles for the Board to gain information and advice were the Strategic
Plan and regular Program Updates, participation by designated Board members in
Advisory Committee meetings, memos from the Foundation presidents and TDR
Program directors, and occasional site visits to in-country projects.  With the
establishment of the ITI, the level of direct Board involvement has escalated
substantially, with three of the Foundation's Board members serving on the ITI Board.
The Developing World Program Strategic Plan oriented the Board to goals and
objectives, and a timetable for achieving benchmarks.  As the Program evolved into
TDR, the Strategic Plan remained the basis for gauging progress.  Program Updates
prepared by staff became the primary vehicle for regularly informing the Board on the
status of grantmaking efforts. When Oncho and Trachoma were recommended as new
program areas, the rationale, description and preferred approach were conveyed through a
Program Update.  Through the Updates, staff tracked progress toward achieving
benchmarks and provided recommendations for mid-course refinements or new
directions.
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Written for a non-scientific audience, these Updates clearly described the target
diseases and explained the rationale for pursuing specific avenues.  They provided an
assessment of successes and disappointments and a thoughtful discussion of problems
and plans for addressing them.  They also described new opportunities and
recommendations for pursuing those.  Board decisions at key program junctures were
often precipitated and informed by the Program Plans and Updates.  By having vested in
the Task Forces the responsibility for determining technical direction, choosing
competitive grants program awardees, and coordinating research resources, the Board
could concentrate on determining if results were on target rather than having to weigh in
on technical decisions.  Dr. Coleman recently stressed that when Boards are overseeing
programs that are based on highly technical information, "Boards should never be shy
about asking.  Boards cannot be afraid to ask when they don't understand. Joe's success
in communicating with the Board and me was because he explained things with modesty,
directness, simplicity…I never doubted that we had full support of the Board.  That was
attributable to Joe."
The composition and mission of the TDR Advisory Committee, as well as its
relationship to the Board and staff, were factors of central importance in guiding the
Program.  In a 1980 memo to the Board, President Coleman addressed what he viewed as
the Advisory Committee’s mission and role:  “…to bring to our Trustees that kind of
broad oversight and independent, knowledgeable review that was unlikely to come from
..the board who are perhaps too close to what’s going on to maintain perspective… New
voices, new ways of looking at things, a mixture of expertness in the specific field and of
more general knowledge…Naturally, we hoped for polite people on the committees.  But
more, we hoped for toughness, independence, openness and vision.”
The selection of good candidates for the Committee was a challenge, particularly
with regard to schisto.  At the time, staff felt that the size of the field limited the choices,
and although it was considered less than optimal to have grantees serve on the Advisory
Committee, this seemed unavoidable if staff were to secure the “best and brightest” as
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advisors. President Coleman voiced concerns about this potential conflict with reference
to both the Foundation’s domestic and international programs.  “We need to re-think the
question of committee make-up…Find ways to resolve possible overlapping roles of
committee members and grantees.  In the case of Schistosomiasis, we have no alternative
(nor do we want one) but to include some grantees, given the fact that so many of those
who do know about the disease are our partners.”  Internal documents suggest that this
issue continued to resurface over the years, and although President Coleman’s earlier
inclination was that advisors “would never be so taken in by our money our
commitments, or experience or our style that they would yield an ounce of their critical
acumen,”  nonetheless, he noted that  “Occasionally committees seem to have forgotten
their roles as overseers and constructive critics of what we’re doing.  Punches have been
pulled, tough issues ducked, and information-sharing and mutual admiration have been
substituted for hard, purposeful discussion on our means and ends.”
Participation by designated Board members in Advisory Committee meetings was
a direct means for those members to obtain a sense of Program progress and barriers. The
nature of Board participation has changed over time due to differences in philosophy and
lessons learned from experience.  Under President Coleman's tenure, Board members
were involved in the discussion between staff and advisors, and then met privately with
the advisors. “…we probably ought to find a way by which each committee can report
directly and privately to our trustees.  The committees are here to serve the trustees.
That means there should be times when they can share, in confidence, their overall views
of how well we in the staff are doing our jobs, how appropriate our priorities are, and
where we ought to consider going next.  Sometimes this sharing can be in the form of a
brief written report at a meeting’s end.  Other times it should be in a face-to-face meeting
between trustees and advisory committees alone.”  According to recent comments from
Dr. Coleman, "I find people in whom I have confidence, and then tell them to go ahead,
but tell me what you're doing.  Let me hear your advisors' comments…It did work for me
to hear advisors directly. I learned a lot from them."
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According to one informant,  "No one was comfortable with Jack Coleman's
approach of using the executive session as a sort of 'report card' on staff.  No one thought
it was a good way of doing business.”  One of Peter Bell's first changes as president was
to eliminate this private session.  "It was clear to me that advisors should be advisory to
staff.  But Board members could sit in and learn, and that was useful."
While informants were generally in agreement that most vehicles for informing
Board members worked well in enabling them to make decisions, informants differed
widely on the utility of direct participation in Advisory Committee meetings.  Some
informants questioned the utility of having Board members participate in advisory
sessions.  "Foundations should let information flow up to the Board, and Foundation staff
should have the responsibility for ensuring that the information is put together well,” one
informant stated.  A Board member emphasized the utility of that approach for the Board.
"Technology is not transparent. We had to rely on experts for their technological
judgment and integrate that into our governance process.  The experts, advisors and staff
were very skillful in helping the Trustees understand the issues well enough to be good
stewards."
According to another informant, "People wouldn't say in open meetings that they
disagreed with something, for fear that Board members might misunderstand their import
or implications.”  Several informants expressed this view in several ways. One Board
member stressed that the concept of the Board having direct involvement was a good one,
but didn't work as hoped.  "The Board is composed of ‘generalists,’ people who are not
specifically expert in any of the Foundation’s fields.  The Board felt it could function
better if its members did not represent a particular constituency.  Instead, Board
members were looking to bring experts into the orbit, and to ask them to ‘think of
themselves as Trustees’ and look at programs the way a Trustee would.  It was a great
concept but it didn't work in practice.  Both staff and advisors were uncomfortable with
it.  Without some direct involvement with advisors, though, we close an important
window…Trustee participation in Advisory Committee meetings was a way to keep the
windows open, to enable the Board to see if things were on track."
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Occasionally, the Foundation president or TDR Program director would
communicate key issues to the Board through a memo sent in advance of the next
scheduled meeting.  Memos covered a range of issues.  For instance, a February 1979
memo from Dr. Cook described Foundation patents for schistosomiasis-related products
that were of possible commercial interest, while a 1981 memo discussed Dr. Cook's
thoughts about what factors should be considered in determining whether to exit from
schisto.
An additional means of input was the occasional participation by a few Board
members on a site visit to grantees in major tropical disease-endemic countries.  This
first-hand exploration of issues and accomplishments directly with grantees would be
chronicled in site visit reports written by staff, and commented on directly by involved
members in subsequent Board meetings.  The effect was captured by Dr. Coleman in
recent comments:  "Not long before I left, Joe took me and John Emery and Lucy
Nesbeda to Africa (Egypt, Sudan, Kenya).  To go into a village and have students lined
up and singing a song of thanks to the Foundation because they knew that they weren't
going to have to suffer like their parents did, then you knew you were doing the right
thing.  It was a searing experience.”  An often-reported observation by Board members
was how well-regarded Dr. Cook was by those grantees and the ministries of health and
other in-country officials who worked with them.
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VIII.  Lessons Learned
Several useful lessons have emerged from the TDR Program's 25 years of
experience.  Presentation and discussion of these lessons is undertaken with a healthy
respect for the maxim that “hindsight is always 20/20.”  As Mr. Emery cautioned, "trying
retrospectively to recreate the path from TDR to ITI as a map for the future would be like
cold fusion.  Serendipity played a role."
Although these lessons have arisen from an international program focus, and from
the relatively technical field of tropical disease research, they address some fundamental
aspects of grantmaking that may provide helpful insight for the Foundation's new
approach to helping to strengthen the field of youth development.  For the most part, they
can be distilled into six key elements.  A few examples are used within each to illustrate
the points.
1. Strategic planning provided an essential framework.  It worked best,
however, when assumptions were made explicit, and when the planning
process was flexible enough to take advantage of opportunities and to adjust
to a constantly changing environment.
The strategic plans for each of the TDR programs served several essential
purposes.  They provided a focus and direction that oriented the Board, staff, and
grantees to the goals, objectives and means for each of the programs.  They also provided
a mechanism for scientific leaders to contribute to the planning process, and to share
"ownership" of the approach. Nonetheless, assumptions--both scientific and operational--
were not always made explicit.  This made it more difficult to challenge the
"conventional wisdom" and the assumptions underlying it, and to adjust the planning
accordingly.
• Scientists assumed that resistance to the drug praziquantel would occur over time
[diminishing the role of drug therapy in schisto control efforts].  This provided a
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rationale for pursuing a schisto vaccine as essential to long-term disease control.
Resistance has not yet occurred to a significant degree, however.  It is unclear
whether this assumption was reexamined during the extended 13-year
commitment to vaccine development through 1994.
• While plans relied on the likelihood that industry would undertake further
development and production of vaccines once promising candidate antigens were
identified, this crucial assumption did not seem to have been investigated
explicitly.  NIAID is currently encountering difficulties in stimulating industry
interest in developing experimental vaccines to test the several antigens identified
to date, most of which were initially explored by Clark Foundation grantees.
• The projected timeline for vaccine development was estimated early in the
evolution of molecular biological and immunological tools.  It is not clear
whether a critical assessment of these tools' applicability to vaccine development
was reevaluated over time as the complexity of the underlying basic science
became better understood.  Experience, such as that revealed by NASA's strategy
to land a man on the moon, suggests that a strategically directed research agenda
may work best when the essential scientific components are known and mainly
need to be coordinated. The TDR Program's directed approach was a much higher
risk since it appears to been ahead of the "readiness" of the science.
• Nonetheless, calculated risk-taking can pay a crucial role in philanthropy, which
has the "luxury" of resources regardless of program outcomes.  For instance, risk-
taking in the School Age Children's Program did not result in anticipated program
outcomes, but it did produce some unanticipated benefits when staff explored
prospects for a two-tier pricing system for SmithKline’s albendazole, the
recommended drug treatment.  The knowledge and experience gained through this
negotiation process was of tremendous advantage when the opportunity to
collaborate with Pfizer arose.  A foundation colleague summed it up aptly:  “In
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the grantmaking business, if all your programs succeed, then you're not taking
enough risks.”
• Assumptions were made explicit in the “rifle shot” approach of the oncho vaccine
program.  Staff and the Board made the explicit decisions to pursue a narrowly
focused effort, which was a high risk/high yield approach.  Narrow approaches
run the risk of becoming a funding “sink-hole,” particularly for niche players, yet
unanticipated successes or even incremental products can justify the investment in
the end.
• Additionally, the Oncho Program's initial plan--which assumed that essential
research resources were available--was challenged by workshop participants.
This resulted in development of a highly coordinated research resource capacity
that has been credited with greatly accelerating progress on differentiating
protective from deleterious antigens.
• The strategic updates late in the Trachoma Program reflected a plan to phase out
of the sole remaining area of epidemiology and control because research had
established the potential utility of the SAFE program, which was being
incorporated into the WHO's GET2020 Initiative.  Yet, TDR Program staff
recognized the exciting potential of Pfizer's Zithromax® to improve the antibiotic
component of the program, and rapidly and effectively catalyzed clinical trials
that demonstrated its superiority over existing products.  This ability to recognize
and foster opportunity, and the flexibility to adjust plans accordingly to coordinate
the trials and to establish a partnership with Pfizer, has been a striking advance for
the field.
• The Health of School Age Children Program was an attempt to merge the notion
of geographic focus, a domestic program theme, with the notion of helping to
build in-country capacity.  The Foundation assumed a shared theme among
domestic and international programs would work, however, this approach forced
95
artificial similarities that were not practical or in the best interests of the
participating countries.  Problems in developing necessary in-country
relationships and the support of major stakeholders emphasized the mismatch
between the Foundation's objectives and the countries' internal priorities.
2. Assessing, or "field testing" innovations to determine if they work in practice
provided vital feedback for refinements.
Undertaking development of disease control tools, such as drugs and diagnostic
agents, was most successful when it was followed by operations research to determine
optimal means for implementation.  This has critical implications for sustaining field-
building efforts.
• The rationale for developing a diagnostic tool for schisto was to improve
surveillance outcomes and targeting of treatment with praziquantel. But, the test
developed was underutilized, largely because the cost of praziquantel failed to
decline to affordable levels, rendering the test irrelevant.  This and other
information on praziquantel did, however, lead the TDR Program to support
efforts to make a cheaper version of the drug.
• Operations research was used to assess the efficacy of surgery undertaken by
nurses in correcting trichiasis (inward-turning eyelashes) in trachoma, followed
by nurses training.  Subsequent studies have established the effectiveness of this
surgical intervention in preventing blindness from trachoma.
3. Formal, external evaluation was rarely used, and the TDR Program missed
an opportunity for information that might have helped guide or alter its
course.
The TDR Program did not involve evaluators prospectively, during program
design and implementation, and it appears that staff did not develop an explicit
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understanding of whether, and if so how, desired outcomes were to be measured.  By
failing to define operational definitions of expected Program outcomes, it is likely that
grantees did not understand fully the criteria that would be used to determine if they
should continue to be funded.  Instead, the TDR Program used progress toward scientific
benchmarks.  While this provided critical information on tactics, it did not assess overall
direction and relevance within a changing environment.
• When scientific objectives were not met, there may have been a tendency to focus
on redefining means rather than on reassessing objectives.  In the one formal
evaluation undertaken, of the Oncho Program, outside evaluators' assessment
produced a shift in the Program's direction to concentrate on key areas of
opportunity that would advance the field and position it to garner competitive
funding from other sources as an exit strategy.
• The absence of formal evaluations places even greater reliance on post hoc
analyses of quantitative data reflecting the status of specific aims.  The process of
an evaluation, however, can be valuable in revealing qualitative aspects that may
be otherwise overlooked.  Even simple outcomes analyses can provide useful
ongoing status updates, such as the schisto immunology literature review
conducted in 1986.  Although this report provided strong evidence of the
contribution of Foundation-funded grantees to the field's scientific literature, such
studies were rare.  Additionally, there was no explicit tracking and no attempt
made to count the number of new scientists attracted into tropical disease
research, even though this was an explicit objective of the TDR Program.
• Independent verification, through outside evaluations, can be an important adjunct
to information available to the Board to carry out its stewardship role, particularly
in highly technical fields.  Board members have relied upon the excellence of and
trust in the TDR Program directors, and on input from program advisors who are
recognized to have to balance their self-interest against "objectivity."  This
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process is generally acknowledged to be imperfect but largely effective.  Program
evaluations will not perfect the situation, but would be additive.
• Planning and evaluation of the ITI’s activities is based, in part, upon
epidemiological data provided by each of the pilot sites.  Strategic plans should
include quality control measures to assure the availability and reliability of
necessary data.  Because the ITI is in an early stage of development, serious
consideration should be given to developing and undertaking a prospective
evaluation.
4.  With experience, the exit strategies became progressively better developed
and implemented.
Staff recognized over time that exit strategies were needed to help strengthen the
capacity of researchers to build upon Foundation-funded gains and to progress in the
absence of continued funding.  The ITI may represent the first exit strategy to identify
fully the factors that are both necessary and sufficient for continuing to progress toward
the goal(s), and by determining feasible means to assist these efforts to become self-
sufficient.  As such, the ITI may provide an important model for the Foundation's newly
evolving institution- and field-building approach.
• While schisto researchers were grateful for the gradual withdrawal from the field,
the only mechanism developed to facilitate continued progress on a schisto
vaccine was establishment of the Schisto Vaccine Task Force and short-term
support to WHO to sponsor it.  This was insufficient to promote continued
progress.  NIAID and the European Union have continued to support schisto
vaccine research, but have not been successful in finding industry sponsors to
undertake development of promising antigens.  Thus, neither the public nor
private sectors has created conditions necessary to sustain the work.
98
• Lessons learned from the Schisto Program informed development of a strong exit
strategy for the Oncho Vaccine Development Program.  That Program's exit was
facilitated by its grounding in a progressively more tightly focused strategic plan,
and the early creation of mechanisms to produce and provide research resources
and to foster collaboration.  Nonetheless, the Foundation recognized that even
while these advantages would put the researchers in a stronger position to
compete for NIH funding, continued progress on an oncho vaccine was not
assured.  While in the short-term funding for oncho vaccine development will
decline, the potential for sustained progress is greater than it was for schisto.
Evidence of this includes newly created funding sources and organizational
linkages, current NIAID funding of key investigators, recent scientific
“breakthroughs,” and the exchange facilitated by the OnchoNet website.  It is
clear, however, that the ultimate goal of a safe and effective vaccine for human
use lies far in the future, and will be difficult to achieve (as with schisto), without
active participation of industry.
• Initially, the exit strategy for trachoma was similar.  For the vaccine work, the
strategy was to leave future research efforts to the NIAID where they might be
incorporated into ongoing chlamydia research on genital tract and lung infections.
But with the promising early studies of Zithromax in treating trachoma, the exit
strategy took a major turn and focused on helping to establish the drug's efficacy
as part of the SAFE strategy.  It then progressed to development of a partnership
with Pfizer to design and implement a drug donation program as part of this
strategy.  This institution and field-building effort will become dependent on other
funding partners, on effectively managing complex relationships with a host of
international and in-country agencies and NGOs, and on continued commitment
of Pfizer to donate the drug for the long-term.  An assessment of these and other
factors necessary for sustaining progress toward trachoma control would be a
valuable contribution to the field of field-building.
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• For instance, the ITI has, in essence, “captured the field” by virtue of its exclusive
arrangement with Pfizer to utilize Zithromax  in the elimination of blinding
trachoma.  However, Pfizer will lose its worldwide patent for Zithromax in 2001
and its U.S. patent in 2005.  What are the long-term implications of these
eventualities for Pfizer's continued donation and for funding from other sources?
If necessary, will ITI have the funding to responsibly exit the field?
5.  Strong, clearly-defined working relationships were an essential hallmark of
successful TDR Program activities.
The TDR Program demonstrated that successful collaboration required knowing
the strengths, limitations, public perception, and culture of collaborating
organizations, and designing collaborations accordingly.  This has critical
implications for institution- and field-building strategies.  Providing pilot or
small-scale grants to potential collaborators was an often used and effective
means for assessing their strengths and limitations.
• Strategic alliances with the WHO were based on first-hand experience with
WHO’s Tropical Disease Research and Blindness Prevention Programmes, the
context within which they operated, and on an understanding of which goals the
two organizations shared, or conversely, what unshared goals might be
complementary.  For instance, knowing the financial and political factors that
limited WHO/TDR’s long-term commitment to oncho vaccine development
created an opportunity for the Foundation that its colleagues at WHO welcomed.
• Pilot grants provided to collaborating organizations helped identify strengths that
were later called upon in larger scale efforts.  This included the NGO Helen
Keller International's expertise, flexibility, and strong networking in the field that
were revealed by earlier grants and later called upon to provide the initial home of
the ITI.  When establishing multi-party alliances, the TDR Program evidenced
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knowledge of the partners' strengths, organizational capacity, and mission and
balanced these against weaknesses and potential conflicts.
• Important to the successful partnership with Pfizer in creating the ITI partnership
was a well-honed understanding of the shared goals of the two organizations, and
of an appreciation of one another's objectives and the rationale for these,
according to the recent Harvard Business School case study (Barrett, Austin,
McCarthy 2000).  As one Board member indicated, this partnership is predicated
on the common goal of preventing blindness from trachoma, and the economic
issues that usually contribute to the breakup of joint ventures is not likely to be
present.
• In contrast, in the Health of School Age Children's Program, the Foundation's lack
of understanding of the partners' capabilities, objectives and means of operations
hindered collaboration and limited the Program’s success.
6. The TDR Program's entrepreneurial approach to grantmaking sought to
create sustainable conditions, in the absence of a viable private sector
market, and this may stimulate ideas for working with industry to help build
capacity in other fields.
• In one approach, the Foundation sought to "take matters into its own hands" by
supporting research on the development of a cheaper alternative to praziquantel
for treatment of schistosomiasis.
• In another approach, the Foundation developed its own industrial process, by
providing support to industry (Parke-Davis) to work on drug development
directed by the Foundation, and grants to academic institutions to carry out
carcinogenicity and animal testing functions that are an essential part of drug
development.
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• The Foundation took out patents on grantee product therapeutic and diagnostic
innovations, to help facilitate industry willingness to further develop, produce and
market products by barring competition from cheaper copies.
• In the case of ITI, the Foundation first catalyzed the studies necessary to
demonstrate efficacy, and then developed a working partnership with Pfizer to
develop, coordinate and assess drug donation incorporated into the SAFE
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DATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE BOARD of TRUSTEES
1974
James F. Henry, President
John Hannah, J. George
Harar, Ken S. Warren
H, J, &VA Clark, Emery,
Henry
1975 John Hannah, J. George
Harar, Ken S. Warren
H, J, &VA Clark, Emery,
Henry
1976 John Hannah, J. George
Harar, Ken S. Warren
H, J, &VA Clark, Emery,
Henry
1977
John R. Coleman, President
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery, Kennedy
1978 Bradley, Hoffman, Phillips
SM,  Stein
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery
1979 Bradley, Hoffman, Phillips
SM, Rosenfield, Stein
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery
1980 Bradley, Hoffman, Phillips
SM, Rosenfield, Stein
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery, Wilson
March 1981 Bradley, Hoffman, Phillips
SM, Rosenfield, Stein
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery, Wilson
October 1981 Bradley, Colley, Mahmoud,
Rosenfield (chair), Stein
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery, Wilson
May 1982 Bradley, Colley, Mahmoud,
Rosenfield,  Stein
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery, Wilson
October 1982 Colley, Guerrant, Jordan,
Mahmoud, Rosenfield
H, J, &VA Clark, Coleman,
Emery, Wilson
April 1983 Alleyne, Colley, Guerrant,














October 1984 Alleyne, Grayston,
Guerrant, Jordan,
Rosenfield
H &J Clark, Elliott, Emery,
Nesbeda, Rothschild,
Weinberg, Wilson
April 1985 Alleyne, Grayston,
Guerrant, Jordan,
Rosenfield, Ottesen
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December 1985 Alleyne, Dawson,
Grayston, Mahmoud,
Ottesen, Rosenfield













October 1986 Dawson, Grayston, Lucas,
Mahmoud, Murray,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen




March 1987 Dawson, Grayston,
Hopkins Lucas, Murray,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen




October 1987 Dawson, Donelson,
Hopkins, Lucas, Murray,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen




April 1988 Dawson, Donelson,
Hopkins, Lucas, Murray,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen
Bell, H &J Clark, Days,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Rothschild, Weinberg
October 1988 Donelson, Hopkins, Lucas,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen,
Taylor, Wirth
Bell, H &J Clark, Days,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Rothschild, Weinberg
April 1989 Donelson, Hopkins, Lucas,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen,
Taylor,  Wirth
Bell, H&J Clark, Days,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Rothschild, Weinberg
October 1989 Donelson, Lucas, Hopkins,
Nussenblatt, Ottesen,
Taylor, Wirth
Bell, H&J Clark, Days,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Rothschild, Weinberg
March 1990 Donelson, Hopkins, Lucas,
Ottesen, Taylor, Thylefors,
Wirth
Bell, H&J Clark, Days,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Rothschild, Weinberg
October 1990 Donelson, Lucas, Martinez-
Palomo, Ottesen, Taylor,
Thylefors, Wirth
Bell, H&J Clark, Days,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Rothschild, Schmultz
April 1991 Lucas, Martinez-Palomo,
Ottesen, Taylor, Thylefors,
Wirth
Bell, H&J Clark, J.Clark Jr.,
Days, Elliott, Emery, Nes-
beda, Rothschild, Schmultz
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September 1991 Lucas, Martinez-Palomo,
Ottesen, Taylor, Thylefors,
Wirth
Bell, H&J Clark, J. Clark
Jr.,  Days, Elliott, Emery,
Nesbeda, Rothschild,
Schmultz
April 1992 Donelson, Jamison, Lucas,
Martinez-Palomo, Sommer,
Thylefors
Bell, H&J Clark, J. Clark
Jr.,  Days, Elliott, Emery,
Nesbeda, Rothschild,
Schmultz, Wooden
September 1992 Donelson, Jamison, Lucas,
Martinez-Palomo, Sommer,
Thylefors
Bell, H&J Clark, J. Clark
Jr.,  Days, Elliott, Emery,
Nesbeda, Rothschild,
Schmultz, Wooden
March 1993 Bloom, Donelson, Jamison,
Krogstad, Martinez-Palomo
Sommer
Bell, H&J Clark, J. Clark
Jr.,  Days, Elliott, Emery,
Nesbeda,  Proctor,
Schmultz, Wooden
October 1993 Bloom, Donelson, Jamison,
Krogstad, Sommer, Toubia
Bell, H&J Clark, J Clark Jr.,
Elliott, Emery, Nesbeda,
Proctor, Schmultz, Wooden
March 1994 Bloom, Donelson, Jamison,
Krogstad, Sommer, Toubia
Bell, H&J Clark, J Clark Jr.,
Emery, Nesbeda, Proctor,
Schmaltz, Wooden
November 1994 Bloom, Donelson, Jamison,
Krogstad, Sommer, Toubia
Bell, H&J Clark, J Clark Jr.,
Emery, McKee, Nesbeda,
Proctor, Schmultz, Wooden
May 1995 Bloom, Hsiao, Krogstad,
Nyi Nyi, Sommer, Toubia




 (CFO interim Pres)
Bloom, Hsiao, Krogstad,
Nyi Nyi, Sommer, Toubia
H&J Clark, J Clark Jr.,
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Nyi Nyi, Sommer, Toubia
Bailin, H&J Clark, J Clark
Jr.,  H.L. Clark, Emery,
McKee, Nesbeda, Proctor,
Schmultz, Wooden
November 1996 Gardiner, Hsiao, Nyi Nyi,
Sommer, Toubia
Bailin, H&J Clark, J Clark
Jr.,  H.L Clark, Emery,
McKee, Nesbeda, Proctor,
Schmultz, Wooden
May 1997 Gardiner, Hsiao, Nyi Nyi,
Sommer, Toubia
Bailin, H&J Clark, J Clark
Jr.,  H.L Clark, Emery,
McKee, Nesbeda, Proctor,
Schmultz, Wooden
October 1997 Henderson, Nyi Nyi,
Sommer






1972:  Robert F. Goheen, EMCF President.  Recommendation to Board to create an
international program.
1973:  December Board, recommendation adopted.  Aims: Developing World Program
with tropical disease emphasis.  Efforts to broaden into other areas approved
longer term. FY73 funding was $350k prior to definition of program objectives.
1973:   Two new schisto drugs approved by FDA for adult worms.
1974:   James (“Jim”) F. Henry, EMCF President.
1974:  (March)  Board approves recommendation by workshop participants to concen-
trate on schisto because of importance of disease and opportunity it presents.
Rationale:  200M people affected, spread by development projects, some
important groundwork done, offers point-of-entry opportunity (few major funders
of comparable size funding this area).  First schisto grants awarded in June, 1974.
1974:  (March-November)  Strategic plan for research developed, program officially
announced, contacts initiated with WHO, pharmaceutical companies, most labs in
US, UK and some LDCs. Funded 15 grants for $1.96M, FY74.
1974:  WHO becomes Executing Agency for Oncho Control Program (OCP).
1975:  WHO, UNDP, and WB organize and fund jointly the WHO Special Program for
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (WHO/TDR) to “develop new
methods of preventing, diagnosing and treating selected tropical diseases and
methods that would be applicable, acceptable and affordable by developing
countries.”  Program also aims to strengthen--through training and institutional
support—capability of LDCs to undertake research to develop new disease
control technologies.  Six disease groups: malaria, schisto, filarials, trypanasomes,
leishmaniases, leprosy.  [TDR has five advisory groups: a Scientific and
Technical Advisory Committee, Joint Coordinating Board, Steering Committees,
Scientific Working Groups and Research Strengthening Group].
1975:  (May)  Foundation provided 2-year consulting agreement for Dr. Hoffman as
interim director until replacement found.
1975:   (October)  Dr. J.S. Lehman takes over as Director of Developing World Program.




Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1976:  (October)  Re-evaluation of strategic plan. Patent applications filed for Niridazole
and immunologic test for schisto diagnosis.
1976:  (November)  Jimmy Carter, elected U.S. President.
1977:  (June) John R. (“Jack”) Coleman, EMCF President.  Developing World Program
renamed Tropical Disease Research Program.
1977:  (September)  President Coleman proposes EMCF establish its own public relations
effort rather than continue to rely on outside consulting firm.
1977:  (October)  Bellagio conference on “schisto state of the science,” co-sponsored by
Rockefeller Foundation and EMCF.
1977:  (October)  WHO declares smallpox eradicated.
1977:  (November)  Bellagio recommendations to remain in schisto presented to EMCF
Board.
1978:  (March)  Executive session of Board to discuss future of TDR program, following
Dr. Lehman's death.
1978: (April)  Meeting held on schisto drug development opportunities/challenges.
(Pfizer's oxamniquine and Bayer's praziquantel on market and in wide use.)
1978: (July)  TDR Advisory Committee recommends continuation of TDR Program
under new leadership.
1978:  (September)  President Coleman appoints Dr. Joe Cook as TDR director, to begin
November, 1978.
1978:  Alma-Ata International Conference on Primary Health Care.  Dr. Halsdan Mahler,
Secretary General of WHO urges “Health for All by 2000”.
1978: Annual report TDR statement by Dr. Cook describes shift from lab to field,
resulting from findings of joint Clark-Rockefeller workshop that pointed to
improvements in control methods meriting further investment.
1978:  TDR/OCP/Merck joint animal trials for ivermectin.




Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1979:  Schisto spending worldwide up to $7M/year.
1979:  (December)  Grant to study costs of anti-schistosomiasis drugs, and prospects for
developing joint purchasing arrangement for governments and bilateral aid
agencies.
1980:  (January)  Merck decides to proceed with Phase I trials for ivermectin.
1980:  (February)  President Coleman discusses with Board clarifying role of advisory
committees, improving methods for gaining advice on whether programs going in
right direction, and when to change direction.
1980:  (November)  Ronald Reagan, elected US President.
1980:   Schisto Update in circulation and considered to be meeting real need.
1980:  Praziquantel and oxamniquine recognized to be in wide use for schisto  treatment;
staff recognizes need to shift support away from drug development.
1981:  (February)  Dr. Cook begins appointment on NIAID National Advisory Council.
1981:  (April)  President Coleman raises question of whether to put 25 percent of schisto
funding into another disease, increasing to 50 percent the following year.
Advisory Committee reviews potential new directions for TDR.  Options include:
amoebiasis, leishmaniasis, pulmonary disease in infants and children.
1981:  (September)  Dr. Cook recommends to President Coleman that schisto funding be
reduced 10 percent, but that EMCF continue immunology work and assess
whether control efforts working, with further reduction totaling 25 percent in four
to five years.
1981:  (September)  Grant to explore simplified method for synthesizing praziquantel, as
an opportunity to provide the drug at a reduced price.
1981:  (December)  President Coleman looks for potential common thread(s) for the three
domestic programs.
1981:  AIDS syndrome identified by Centers for Disease Control.
1982:  Subject of withdrawal from schisto and program expansion raised with AC.




Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1982:  (December)  Grant to NIH to support a molecular biology post-doc working on
immunology.  (NIH/FAES incorporated in 1959 as non-profit by a group of NIH
investigators to promote advanced education for investigators and to serve as
fiscal agent for outside funds awarded for NIH intramural scientists' work.)
1983:  (April)  Board proposal for schisto withdrawal and programmatic expansion
approved, to include the two major infectious causes of blindness—oncho and
trachoma.  Refugee health care, migrant population health, leishmaniasis, and
ARI explored but declined.  Grants approved to convene workshops to develop
research agenda in 1984-5 for the two diseases.
1983: (June)  Dr. Cook indicates he is dropping support for development of live
attenuated vaccines. Will concentrate on molecular biology approaches to
vaccine, developing protective antigens using monoclonal antibodies, and
recombinant DNA to produce adequate amounts of the protective antigens.
1983:  (November)  Board members split on whether to withdraw from schisto quickly or
slowly and deliberately.  Dr. Cook summarizes status of field: great progress on
drugs (3 available), EMCF-sponsored contributions to field diagnostics, and a
vaccine promising (with molecular biology advances) but not imminent.
1984:   (July)  First trachoma grant made.
1984:  (November) President Reagan re-elected.
1984:  Workshop on trachoma to develop strategic plan.
1985:   (January)  First grant made for oncho research.
1985:   (February)  President Coleman announces he will leave in mid-89.
1985:   (April)  Grant to survey pharmaceutical companies with operations in Brazil and
Egypt to determine if any have capacity for schisto vaccine production.
1985:  (April)  Grant awarded to produce Oncho Update, quarterly bibliography of oncho
papers, beginning with 1984 references.
1985:  (September)  Strategic plans for oncho and trachoma distributed to Board.




Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1985:  New Initiatives sub-program.  Ideas included International Health Consultative
Group, leadership development, fund for health technology in developing world.
1986:  (February)  Oncho molecular biology conference sponsored by EMCF.
1986:  (April)  Peter Bell becomes EMCF President.
1986:  Trachoma workshop advisors suggest investigation of surgical techniques.
1986:  (April)  Grant proposal introduced to Board to support International Development
Research Centre (IDRC), Canada, to do study of developing country health needs.
Proposal deferred after Board discussion concerning fit with TDR mission.
1986:  (September)  Workshop to initiate and foster trachoma epidemiology research.
1986: (September)  Launching of the IDRC's Independent International Commission
(IIC) to examine health needs of developing world.  Later known as Commission
on Health Research for Development.
1986: Statistics on worldwide tropical disease research funding: $100M in US;
WHO/TDR average annual budget since 1975 still $20-25M.
1986:  Howard Hughes Medical Institute grantmaking program established, Perpich at
reins. EMCF organizes Schisto Task Force.
1987:  (June)  Dr. Cook anticipates that further support to labs working on schisto
vaccine would be in form of coordination rather than direct lab support.
1987:  (July)  Planning meeting for IIC in Switzerland; funded by UNDP, Rockefeller,
and Swiss Development Agency.  Participation by many US-based international
health funders, several European bilateral aid agencies, Bank, UNDP and WHO.
1987:  Phase IV trials for ivermectin proceed; Merck announces Mectizan Donation
Program in October.
1988:  (September)  Grant for surgical treatment of trichiasis clinical trial.  EMC makes
self-grant to coordinate preparation, prosecution and maintenance of patent
applications for inventions conceived of during the course of EMC support for
TDR Program.  Board approves IDRC grant.
1988:  (November)  George. Bush elected U.S. President.  Trachoma grading scheme




Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1988: (December)  American Society of Tropical Medicine urges U.S. to increase
funding for tropical diseases.
1989:  Task Force for Disease Eradication formed in April at Carter Center. Targets
polio, guinea worm, yaws, measles and rabies. Dana Foundation early contributor.
1989: Dr. Cook proposes five more years of schisto funding at 900K/year due to
promising results in vaccine development.
1990:  Question raised regarding further support for recombinant antigen approach to
schisto vaccine development.
1990:  (May)  Commission on Health Research for Development releases report in May
promoting broad vision of the interdependence of health and development.
1990:  (December)  Mr. Bell named Chairman of Board at CARE.  (Bell remained at
Clark Foundation until 1995, when named President of CARE.).
1991:  (March)  WHO to assume responsibility from Vanderbilt for Schisto Task Force.
1991:  (May)  Board discusses when/how programs should change direction.  Concludes
Board decides when direction should change, based on advice from program
director and his/her advisors.
1991:  (September)  Oncho Task force to move from U. Alabama to FAES, with PI's
move to NIH.
1991: Task Force for Child Survival plans a National Expanded Program in
Chemotherapy in Ghana.  Will focus first on schisto then oncho and helminths.
EMCF starts to focus on “capacity-building” as follow-on to ENHR report.
1992:   Partnership for Child Development (PCD).  Research findings from EMC projects
have contributed to organization of PCD—“a loose confederation of agencies and
foundations interested in improving health in the developing world by fostering
programs for control of helminths and micronutrient supplementation.”  School-
aged children Program concept introduced to Board.
1992: (September)  Helen Keller International (HKI) to assume the administrative





Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1992:  (November)  Bill Clinton elected US President.  Domestic health policy reform
key agenda item.
1992:  (December)  Report to Board recounts disappointment of WHO/TDR schisto
grant; questions whether to continue funding to WHO for role in Task Force.
1992:   Pfizer’s Zithromax approved by FDA.
1993:  Dr. Michael Reich reports on policy formulation in Ghanaian program (decision
mapping). First mention of Pfizer emulating Merck with Zithromax.   WB’s
World Development Report: Investing in Health published.  Burden of disease
measurement “DALY” introduced.  Report prompts further discussion of new
directions for TDR.  First HSAC grant.
1993:  (March)  Under new NIH guidelines, FAES will no longer administer external
support for NIH intramural scientists' research.
1993:  (March)  Grant to HKI to coordinate activities in preparation for multi-center
(“ACT”) trial of Zithromax for trachoma.
1993:  (September)  Final grants for trachoma vaccine research.  Staff expects to wind
down trachoma funding in 1995.
1993:  (December)  Initiating independent review of Oncho Program to decide on
whether to curtail work on oncho vaccine.
1994:  (March)  Seven commissioned papers re new directions reviewed.  Health-of
School-Age Children opted for exploration.  Grant to WHO to produce and
disseminate technical training materials on control of trachoma.
1994:   Oncho review workshop.  Staff, thereafter, recommends shifting EMCF role from
direct research to support of research resources.
1995:  Mr. Bell announces departure to CARE; Dr Lawrence departs Rockefeller for
JHU.  APOC established.
1995:  (March)  Grant to Harvard to build on school-age children findings, and facilitate
consultative meetings on health of school-age children in Sub-Saharan Africa.
1995:  (April)  Board retreat to examine what EMCF programs have tried to achieve, how
they have gone about it, what they have achieved, and whether and how the




Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1996:  (February)  Michael Bailin succeeds Peter Bell as EMCF President.  Capacity
building through public health now on table.  TDR working with Ghanaian SPH.
Pfizer commits to the Moroccan national trachoma elimination plan.  First  hints
of Program closeout for TDR as whole. GET2020 Alliance formed.
1996:  (June).  Mr. Bailin proposes that Board address planned revision of TDR strategy,
shifting from school age children to public health training and institutional
capacity building.  SAFE strategy, validated over the years, provides opportunity
to institutionalize trachoma control.  This might be alternative to capacity-
building strategy in Ghana and Tanzania, or both might be pursued.
1996:  (September)  Mr. Bailin highlights opportunity to reinvest in trachoma, building
on Foundation's successful meeting on trachoma control and Pfizer's interest in
donating the drug in Morocco.
1996:  (November)  U.S. President Bill Clinton re-elected.
1997:  Staff cancels final cycle for vaccine development proposals, and decides no further
oncho grants would be recommended.
1997:  (March)  Joe Cook, Mike Bailin, Ed Schmults, Larry Clark meet with control
experts and Pfizer representatives regarding trachoma control using SAFE,
including Zithromax. Dr. Cook indicates to Board that Public Health capacity-
building a long-term approach, and EMCF should instead pursue trachoma
control opportunity.
1997:  (May)  Final AC meeting for TDR.  AC to be reconvened with trachoma experts.
1997: (June)  Grant to Harvard to assess criteria for selecting trachoma control
participation countries.
1997: (August)  Board retreat, President Bailin talks about institutional-and field-
building, tying the exit of a program "to the creation of some lasting institutional
strength that the field has previously lacked.”
1997:  (December)  Grant made to support planing of a trachoma control initiative in
Tanzania, in collaboration with Pfizer, should they expand their donation program
beyond Morocco.
1998:  (March) President Bailin plans "stocktaking" and "life cycle" discussion with





Narrative Timeline Of Important Events
1998:  (June)  Board approves plans for up to $4M grant to HKI for the International
Trachoma Initiative with Pfizer, with all ITI activities transferred from EMCF to
HKI by June 1999.  Board agrees to leave to Mr. Bailin, in consultation with
Board member Ed Schmults, all decisions concerning ITI's staffing, Board
appointments, and  processes.
1998:  (September)  Negotiations completed with Pfizer, and Board approves $3.2M for
HKI for the ITI, an example of field-building that creates an intermediary
organization, ending EMCF's direct involvement in trachoma.
1999:  (January)  ITI Board representatives from EMCF are Mr. Bailin, and Board
members Ed Schmults and Larry Clark.
1999:  (May)  Dr. Cook provides presentation to Board on ITI progress.  Dr. Hunter,
assessment director, and Mr Bailin describe three projects to extract lessons
learned from TDR.  Support for on-going efforts concerning capacity-building in
Ghana and Tanzania, and for oncho vaccine development will end at the end of
1999.
1999:  (September)  Board dinner to celebrate accomplishments of the TDR Program, and
Dr. Cook's leadership.  Dr. Cook provides Trachoma Program Update Strategy
and indicates that he is hopeful that continued progress over the next year will
provide reason for EMC to sustain support for ITI beyond September 2000.
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APPENDIX C
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation
Tropical Disease Research Program:
Important Events 1972-2000
 Foundation           Developing World         1st Schisto        WHO/TDR     Bellagio J. Cook      Schisto Drug        Trachoma     1st Trachoma       1st Oncho   Independent
Established         Program             Grants Established, Schisto        Recruited Development       Oncho                   Grant         Grant                Commission
                       Established                                     Lehman Director          Conference           Program Ends    Approved            for HRD
   EMCF TDR    
  Schisto Task Mectizan ASTM           Task Force for     National Hlth    Zithromax          World Bank School-Age         School age           ITI
 Force            Donation Prg.           Recommends.   Disease Eradica. Research       Approved by World Devel.    Children Prg.      Children Prg.   Established;
Est.    Established      More Spending   Estab. Carter Ctr.       Movement  FDA              Report     Launched; Concluded             Final Oncho




Program Grant Grant Average
Count Amount Grant
Schistosomiasis
Immunology and Vaccine Development      134           16,546,012 123,477
Biochemistry and Drug Development       71 5,715,981   80,506
Epidemiology and Disease Control              127           10,122,530   79,704
Subtotal:  Schistosomiasis                 332         $ 32,384,523     $  97,543
Onchocerciasis
Immunology and Vaccine Development
Animal Models      17 3,053,000 179,588
Antigen Identification      67           11,031,679 164,651
Antigen Screening        6    726,000 121,000
Immune Mechanisms      10 1,108,792 110,879
Research Resources      30 4,578,732 152,624
Other I&V        3    128,000          42,666
Oncho Other
Task Force Support        6    819,500 136,583
Communications        3      74,535          24,845
Field Research        2      75,000   37,500
Subtotal:  Onchocerciasis                144        $ 21,595,238     $ 149,966
Trachoma
Immunology and Vaccine Development
Animal Models      9 1,718,986 190,998
Antigen Identification    20 3,816,244 190,812
Immune Mechanisms    15 2,386,132 159,075
Pathogenesis    10 1,638,000 163,800
Epidemiology and Control    43 8,744,408 203,358
Operational Research    18 1,678,000   93,222
Capacity Building    10 1,602,500 160,250
Coordinating Entity      9 3,911,500 434,611
Communications      8    645,000   80,625
Country Programs      8 1,874,000 234,250
Other/Unspecified      1    145,000 145,000





Program Grant Grant Average
Count Amount Grant
Health of School Age Children
Ghana
Capacity Building        1 200,000  200,000
Research        3 630,000  210,000
Other        1 430,000  430,000
Tanzania
Capacity Building        2 680,000  340,000
Research        2 400,000  200,000
International
Capacity Building/
         Technical Assistance        7          1,227,000 175,285
Other        3 258,000   86,000
Other/Unspecified        4 485,000 121,250
Subtotal:  HSAC      23          4,310,000 187,391
“Other”
Exploratory      20           1,552,062   77,603
Prevention of Blindness        4  135,000   33,750
Other      17           1,834,845 107,932
Subtotal:  “Other”         41           3,521,907   85,900
_________________________________________________________________________________
Totals    691         89,971,439 130,204
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APPENDIX E
NIH Tropical Disease Research Funding, 1985-1999
Malaria, Schisto, Oncho, Filariasis*
NIH Research Funding
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